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OSPF vulnerability to persistent poisoning attacks: a systematic analysis

Published: 08 December 2014 Publication History

Abstract

Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) is one of the most widely deployed interior gateway routing protocols on the Internet. The most common attack vector against OSPF is spoofing of routing advertisements on behalf of a remote router. OSPF employs a self-defense "fight-back" mechanism that quickly reverts the effects of such attacks. Nonetheless, some attacks that evade the fight-back mechanism have been discovered, making it possible to persistently falsify routing advertisements. This type of attacks are the most serious threat to a routing protocol since they allow an attacker to gain persistent control over how traffic is routed throughout the network. This shows that despite its maturity, the OSPF specification is not without security flaws and may have still-unknown vulnerabilities. In this work we systematically analyze -- manually and by formal verification -- the OSPF specification for additional vulnerabilities in the fight-back mechanism. Our analysis uncovered a fundamental security flaw in OSPF that allows a simple means for an attacker to evade the fight-back mechanism. Most major router vendors acknowledged the existence of this vulnerability in their products. Fortunately, our analysis strongly indicates that no other vulnerabilities in the fight-back mechanism are likely to exist.

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Cited By

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  • (2023)Frequency Domain Feature Based Robust Malicious Traffic DetectionIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking10.1109/TNET.2022.319587131:1(452-467)Online publication date: Feb-2023
  • (2023)Man-in-the-Middle Attacks without Rogue AP: When WPAs Meet ICMP Redirects2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179441(3162-3177)Online publication date: May-2023
  • (2022)Advanced Models for the OSPF Routing ProtocolElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science10.4204/EPTCS.355.2355(13-26)Online publication date: 21-Mar-2022
  • Show More Cited By

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Published In

cover image ACM Other conferences
ACSAC '14: Proceedings of the 30th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
December 2014
492 pages
ISBN:9781450330053
DOI:10.1145/2664243
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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  • ACSA: Applied Computing Security Assoc

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 08 December 2014

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Author Tags

  1. OSPF
  2. formal verification
  3. routing security

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  • Research-article

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ACSAC '14
Sponsor:
  • ACSA
ACSAC '14: Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
December 8 - 12, 2014
Louisiana, New Orleans, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 104 of 497 submissions, 21%

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Cited By

View all
  • (2023)Frequency Domain Feature Based Robust Malicious Traffic DetectionIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking10.1109/TNET.2022.319587131:1(452-467)Online publication date: Feb-2023
  • (2023)Man-in-the-Middle Attacks without Rogue AP: When WPAs Meet ICMP Redirects2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179441(3162-3177)Online publication date: May-2023
  • (2022)Advanced Models for the OSPF Routing ProtocolElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science10.4204/EPTCS.355.2355(13-26)Online publication date: 21-Mar-2022
  • (2022)An Analysis of Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) Deficiencies2022 3rd International Conference for Emerging Technology (INCET)10.1109/INCET54531.2022.9824554(1-6)Online publication date: 27-May-2022
  • (2021)VPN Remote Access OSPF-based VPN Security Vulnerabilities and Counter Measurements2021 International Conference on Innovation and Intelligence for Informatics, Computing, and Technologies (3ICT)10.1109/3ICT53449.2021.9581512(236-241)Online publication date: 29-Sep-2021
  • (2020)Formal Models of the OSPF Routing ProtocolElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science10.4204/EPTCS.316.4316(72-120)Online publication date: 26-Apr-2020
  • (2020)Identifying OSPF LSA falsification attacks through non-linear analysisComputer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking10.1016/j.comnet.2019.107031167:COnline publication date: 11-Feb-2020
  • (2019)Increasing Network Resilience to Persistent OSPF AttacksICC 2019 - 2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)10.1109/ICC.2019.8761838(1-7)Online publication date: May-2019
  • (2019)Topology-Agnostic Runtime Detection of OSPF Routing Attacks2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)10.1109/CNS.2019.8802826(277-285)Online publication date: Jun-2019
  • (2018)Using Protocol Redundancy to Enhance OSPF Network System SurvivabilitySoutheastCon 201810.1109/SECON.2018.8479134(1-7)Online publication date: Apr-2018
  • Show More Cited By

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