research-article

A signature based architecture for Trojan detection

Authors:

Aderinola Gbade-Alabi,

Vincent Mooney,

Axel Y. Poschmann,

Marc Stöttinger,

Kshitij DivekarAuthors Info & Claims

WESS '14: Proceedings of the 9th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security

Article No.: 3, Pages 1 - 10

https://doi.org/10.1145/2668322.2668325

Published: 12 October 2014 Publication History

Abstract

Trust in the integrated circuit (IC) fabrication industry is an ongoing concern given the trend towards "fabless" design and associated use of third-parties for fabrication. A Hardware Trojan (HT) introduced during fabrication can corrupt an IC's outputs, leak secret information, and yet go undetected by traditional system testing techniques. In this paper we propose an architecture to detect HTs during IC test or at run-time. An HT that would corrupt an IC's output and otherwise proceed undetected will then be rendered useless by this architecture. This approach will therefore discourage the insertion of HTs in the first place. The proposed architecture takes encryption hardware as a paradigmatic case-study and uses digital "signatures" derived from the plaintext to identify if the ciphertext has been corrupted by HTs. We test this methodology through simulation on various types of HTs inserted into a lightweight cryptographic system called "PRESENT"[13]. Our results validate that activated HTs are detected by this methodology.

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Cited By

Vishwakarma RRezaei A(2023)Risk-Aware and Explainable Framework for Ensuring Guaranteed Coverage in Evolving Hardware Trojan Detection2023 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer Aided Design (ICCAD)10.1109/ICCAD57390.2023.10323655(01-09)Online publication date: 28-Oct-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCAD57390.2023.10323655
Wehbe TMooney VInan OKeezer D(2018)Securing Medical Devices Against Hardware Trojan Attacks Through Analog-, Digital-, and Physiological-Based SignaturesJournal of Hardware and Systems Security10.1007/s41635-018-0040-72:3(251-265)Online publication date: 19-Jun-2018
https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-018-0040-7
Lodhi FHasan SHasan OAwwadl F(2017)Power profiling of microcontroller's instruction set for runtime hardware trojans detection without golden circuit modelsProceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation & Test in Europe10.5555/3130379.3130447(294-297)Online publication date: 27-Mar-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3130379.3130447
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

A signature based architecture for Trojan detection

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cover image ACM Conferences

WESS '14: Proceedings of the 9th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security

October 2014

69 pages

ISBN:9781450329323

DOI:10.1145/2668322

Program Chairs:
Ting Yu,
Shengqi Yang

Copyright © 2014 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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SIGBED: ACM Special Interest Group on Embedded Systems
SIGDA: ACM Special Interest Group on Design Automation
IEEE CAS
IEEE Council on Electronic Design Automation (CEDA)
SIGMICRO: ACM Special Interest Group on Microarchitectural Research and Processing
IEEE CS

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 12 October 2014

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ESWEEK'14

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ESWEEK'14: TENTH EMBEDDED SYSTEM WEEK

October 12 - 17, 2014

New Delhi, India

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Overall Acceptance Rate 8 of 21 submissions, 38%

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Cited By

Vishwakarma RRezaei A(2023)Risk-Aware and Explainable Framework for Ensuring Guaranteed Coverage in Evolving Hardware Trojan Detection2023 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer Aided Design (ICCAD)10.1109/ICCAD57390.2023.10323655(01-09)Online publication date: 28-Oct-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCAD57390.2023.10323655
Wehbe TMooney VInan OKeezer D(2018)Securing Medical Devices Against Hardware Trojan Attacks Through Analog-, Digital-, and Physiological-Based SignaturesJournal of Hardware and Systems Security10.1007/s41635-018-0040-72:3(251-265)Online publication date: 19-Jun-2018
https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-018-0040-7
Lodhi FHasan SHasan OAwwadl F(2017)Power profiling of microcontroller's instruction set for runtime hardware trojans detection without golden circuit modelsProceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation & Test in Europe10.5555/3130379.3130447(294-297)Online publication date: 27-Mar-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3130379.3130447
Lodhi FHasan SHasan OAwwadl F(2017)Power profiling of microcontroller's instruction set for runtime hardware Trojans detection without golden circuit modelsDesign, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE), 201710.23919/DATE.2017.7927002(294-297)Online publication date: Mar-2017
https://doi.org/10.23919/DATE.2017.7927002
Wehbe TMooney VKeezer DInan OJavaid A(2017)Use of Analog Signatures for Hardware Trojan DetectionProceedings of the 14th FPGAworld Conference10.1145/3135997.3135998(15-22)Online publication date: 19-Sep-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3135997.3135998
Wehbe TMooney VJavaid AInan O(2017)A novel physiological features-assisted architecture for rapidly distinguishing health problems from hardware Trojan attacks and errors in medical devices2017 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)10.1109/HST.2017.7951807(106-109)Online publication date: May-2017
https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2017.7951807
Lodhi FAbbasi IKhalid FHasan OAwwad FHasan S(2016)A self-learning framework to detect the intruded integrated circuits2016 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS)10.1109/ISCAS.2016.7538895(1702-1705)Online publication date: May-2016
https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCAS.2016.7538895
Wehbe TMooney VKeezer DParham NKoubias SSauter T(2015)A Novel Approach to Detect Hardware Trojan Attacks on Primary Data InputsProceedings of the WESS'15: Workshop on Embedded Systems Security10.1145/2818362.2818364(1-10)Online publication date: 4-Oct-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2818362.2818364

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