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GetReal: Towards Realistic Selection of Influence Maximization Strategies in Competitive Networks

Published: 27 May 2015 Publication History

Abstract

State-of-the-art classical influence maximization (IM) techniques are "competition-unaware" as they assume that a group (company) finds seeds (users) in a network independent of other groups who are also simultaneously interested in finding such seeds in the same network. However, in reality several groups often compete for the same market (e.g., Samsung, HTC, and Apple for the smart phone market) and hence may attempt to select seeds in the same network. This has led to increasing body of research in devising IM techniques for competitive networks. Despite the considerable progress made by these efforts toward finding seeds in a more realistic settings, unfortunately, they still make several unrealistic assumptions (e.g., a new company being aware of a rival's strategy, alternate seed selection, etc.) making their deployment impractical in real-world networks. In this paper, we propose a novel framework based on game theory to provide a more realistic solution to the IM problem in competitive networks by jettisoning these unrealistic assumptions. Specifically, we seek to find the "best" IM strategy (an algorithm or a mixture of algorithms) a group should adopt in the presence of rivals so that it can maximize its influence. As each group adopts some strategy, we model the problem as a game with each group as competitors and the expected influences under the strategies as payoffs. We propose a novel algorithm called GetReal to find each group's best solution by leveraging the competition between different groups. Specifically, it seeks to find whether there exist a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in a game, which guarantees that there exist an "optimal" strategy for each group. Our experimental study on real-world networks demonstrates the superiority of our solution in a more realistic environment.

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    SIGMOD '15: Proceedings of the 2015 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data
    May 2015
    2110 pages
    ISBN:9781450327589
    DOI:10.1145/2723372
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    Publication History

    Published: 27 May 2015

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    Author Tags

    1. competitive network
    2. game theory
    3. influence maximization
    4. nash equilibrium
    5. pure and mixed strategies

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    SIGMOD/PODS'15
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    SIGMOD/PODS'15: International Conference on Management of Data
    May 31 - June 4, 2015
    Victoria, Melbourne, Australia

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    SIGMOD '15 Paper Acceptance Rate 106 of 415 submissions, 26%;
    Overall Acceptance Rate 785 of 4,003 submissions, 20%

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    Cited By

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    • (2024)Fairness-Aware Competitive Bidding Influence Maximization in Social NetworksIEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems10.1109/TCSS.2023.328560511:2(2147-2159)Online publication date: Apr-2024
    • (2024)Efficient Algorithm for Stochastic Rumor Blocking Problem in Social Networks During Safety Accident PeriodTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2024.114898(114898)Online publication date: Oct-2024
    • (2024)Influence maximization on hypergraphs via multi-hop influence estimationInformation Processing & Management10.1016/j.ipm.2024.10368361:3(103683)Online publication date: May-2024
    • (2024)Order-Sensitive Competitive Revenue Maximization for Viral Marketing in Social NetworksInformation Sciences10.1016/j.ins.2024.121474(121474)Online publication date: Sep-2024
    • (2024)Neural attentive influence maximization model in social networks via reverse influence sampling on historical behavior sequencesExpert Systems with Applications10.1016/j.eswa.2024.123491249(123491)Online publication date: Sep-2024
    • (2024)Complementary influence maximization under comparative linear threshold modelExpert Systems with Applications10.1016/j.eswa.2023.121826238(121826)Online publication date: Mar-2024
    • (2024)A co-operative game theoretic approach for the budgeted influence maximization problemSocial Network Analysis and Mining10.1007/s13278-024-01357-z14:1Online publication date: 29-Sep-2024
    • (2023)Social Network Analysis: A Survey on Measure, Structure, Language Information Analysis, Privacy, and ApplicationsACM Transactions on Asian and Low-Resource Language Information Processing10.1145/353973222:5(1-47)Online publication date: 9-May-2023
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    • (2023)Spam community detection & influence minimization using NRIM algorithmComputers in Human Behavior10.1016/j.chb.2023.107832147:COnline publication date: 1-Oct-2023
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