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Public Projects, Boolean Functions, and the Borders of Border's Theorem

Published: 15 June 2015 Publication History

Abstract

Border's theorem gives an intuitive linear characterization of the feasible interim allocation rules of a Bayesian single-item environment, and it has several applications in economic and algorithmic mechanism design. All known generalizations of Border's theorem either restrict attention to relatively simple settings, or resort to approximation. This paper identifies a complexity-theoretic barrier that indicates, assuming standard complexity class separations, that Border's theorem cannot be extended significantly beyond the state-of-the-art. We also identify a surprisingly tight connection between Myerson's optimal auction theory, when applied to public project settings, and some fundamental results in the analysis of Boolean functions.

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  1. Public Projects, Boolean Functions, and the Borders of Border's Theorem

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    EC '15: Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
    June 2015
    852 pages
    ISBN:9781450334105
    DOI:10.1145/2764468
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 15 June 2015

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    Author Tags

    1. Boolean functions
    2. Chow parameters
    3. arginal probability
    4. auctions

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    EC '15
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    EC '15: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
    June 15 - 19, 2015
    Oregon, Portland, USA

    Acceptance Rates

    EC '15 Paper Acceptance Rate 72 of 220 submissions, 33%;
    Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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    • (2022)Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternativesSocial Choice and Welfare10.1007/s00355-022-01398-359:2(335-359)Online publication date: 14-Mar-2022
    • (2019)Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced FormsMathematics of Operations Research10.1287/moor.2018.0958Online publication date: 30-May-2019
    • (2019)Complexity-Theoretic Barriers in EconomicsThe Future of Economic Design10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_22(159-163)Online publication date: 16-Nov-2019
    • (2018)Fast Algorithms for Computing Interim Allocations in Single-Parameter EnvironmentsPRIMA 2018: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/978-3-030-03098-8_12(194-209)Online publication date: 24-Oct-2018
    • (2017)Algorithmic information structure designACM SIGecom Exchanges10.1145/3055589.305559115:2(2-24)Online publication date: 24-Feb-2017
    • (2016)Optimal Auctions for Negatively Correlated ItemsProceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/2940716.2940766(103-120)Online publication date: 21-Jul-2016
    • (2016)Algorithmic Bayesian persuasionProceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing10.1145/2897518.2897583(412-425)Online publication date: 19-Jun-2016

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