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Towards Analyzing the Input Validation Vulnerabilities associated with Android System Services

Published: 07 December 2015 Publication History

Abstract

Although the input validation vulnerabilities play a critical role in web application security, such vulnerabilities are so far largely neglected in the Android security research community. We found that due to the unique Framework Code layer, Android devices do need specific input validation vulnerability analysis in system services. In this work, we take the first steps to analyze Android specific input validation vulnerabilities. In particular, a) we take the first steps towards measuring the corresponding attack surface and reporting the current input validation status of Android system services. b) We developed a new input validation vulnerability scanner for Android devices. This tool fuzzes all the Android system services by sending requests with malformed arguments to them. Through comprehensive evaluation of Android system with over 90 system services and over 1,900 system service methods, we identified 16 vulnerabilities in Android system services. We have reported all the issues to Google and Google has confirmed them.

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Cited By

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  • (2023)A Systematic Study of Android Non-SDK (Hidden) Service API SecurityIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2022.316087220:2(1609-1623)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2023
  • (2023)Input Validation Vulnerabilities in Web Applications: Systematic Review, Classification, and Analysis of the Current State-of-the-ArtIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2023.326638511(40128-40161)Online publication date: 2023
  • (2023)If You’re Scanning This, It’s Too Late! A QR Code-Based Fuzzing Methodology to Identify Input Vulnerabilities in Mobile AppsApplied Cryptography and Network Security Workshops10.1007/978-3-031-41181-6_30(553-570)Online publication date: 4-Oct-2023
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cover image ACM Other conferences
ACSAC '15: Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
December 2015
489 pages
ISBN:9781450336826
DOI:10.1145/2818000
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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  • ACSA: Applied Computing Security Assoc

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 07 December 2015

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Overall Acceptance Rate 104 of 497 submissions, 21%

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Cited By

View all
  • (2023)A Systematic Study of Android Non-SDK (Hidden) Service API SecurityIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2022.316087220:2(1609-1623)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2023
  • (2023)Input Validation Vulnerabilities in Web Applications: Systematic Review, Classification, and Analysis of the Current State-of-the-ArtIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2023.326638511(40128-40161)Online publication date: 2023
  • (2023)If You’re Scanning This, It’s Too Late! A QR Code-Based Fuzzing Methodology to Identify Input Vulnerabilities in Mobile AppsApplied Cryptography and Network Security Workshops10.1007/978-3-031-41181-6_30(553-570)Online publication date: 4-Oct-2023
  • (2022)iService: Detecting and Evaluating the Impact of Confused Deputy Problem in AppleOSProceedings of the 38th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference10.1145/3564625.3568001(964-977)Online publication date: 5-Dec-2022
  • (2022)JNI Global References Are Still Vulnerable: Attacks and DefensesIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2020.299554219:1(607-619)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2022
  • (2022)SAUSAGE: Security Analysis of Unix domain Socket usAGE in Android2022 IEEE 7th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)10.1109/EuroSP53844.2022.00042(572-586)Online publication date: Jun-2022
  • (2022)Android Stack Vulnerabilities: Security Analysis of a DecadeProceedings of the International Conference on Paradigms of Communication, Computing and Data Sciences10.1007/978-981-16-5747-4_10(111-122)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2022
  • (2021)A Longitudinal Study of Application Structure and Behaviors in AndroidIEEE Transactions on Software Engineering10.1109/TSE.2020.297517647:12(2934-2955)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2021
  • (2021)Understanding the Evolution of Android App VulnerabilitiesIEEE Transactions on Reliability10.1109/TR.2019.295669070:1(212-230)Online publication date: Mar-2021
  • (2021)Looking Back! Using Early Versions of Android Apps as Attack VectorsIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2019.291420218:2(652-666)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2021
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