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Settling the complexity of Leontief and PLC exchange markets under exact and approximate equilibria

Published: 19 June 2017 Publication History

Abstract

Our first result shows membership in PPAD for the problem of computing approximate equilibria for an Arrow-Debreu exchange market for piecewise-linear concave (PLC) utility functions. As a corollary we also obtain membership in PPAD for Leontief utility functions. This settles an open question of Vazirani and Yannakakis (2011).
Next we show FIXP-hardness of computing equilibria in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets under Leontief utility functions, and Arrow-Debreu markets under linear utility functions and Leontief production sets, thereby settling these open questions of Vazirani and Yannakakis (2011). As corollaries, we obtain FIXP-hardness for PLC utilities and for Arrow-Debreu markets under linear utility functions and polyhedral production sets. In all cases, as required under FIXP, the set of instances mapped onto will admit equilibria, i.e., will be "yes" instances. If all instances are under consideration, then in all cases we prove that the problem of deciding if a given instance admits an equilibrium is ETR-complete, where ETR is the class Existential Theory of Reals.
As a consequence of the results stated above, and the fact that membership in FIXP has been established for PLC utilities, the entire computational difficulty of Arrow-Debreu markets under PLC utility functions lies in the Leontief utility subcase. This is perhaps the most unexpected aspect of our result, since Leontief utilities are meant for the case that goods are perfect complements, whereas PLC utilities are very general, capturing not only the cases when goods are complements and substitutes, but also arbitrary combinations of these and much more.
Finally, we give a polynomial time algorithm for finding an equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets under Leontief utility functions provided the number of agents is a constant. This settles part of an open problem of Devanur and Kannan (2008).

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MP4 File (d3_sb_t9.mp4)

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  • (2023)An Auction Algorithm for Market Equilibrium with Weak Gross Substitute DemandsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/362455811:3-4(1-24)Online publication date: 14-Sep-2023
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cover image ACM Conferences
STOC 2017: Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing
June 2017
1268 pages
ISBN:9781450345286
DOI:10.1145/3055399
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Publication History

Published: 19 June 2017

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Author Tags

  1. ETR
  2. FIXP
  3. Leontief
  4. Market Equilibria
  5. PLC
  6. PPAD

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  • Research-article

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STOC '17
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STOC '17: Symposium on Theory of Computing
June 19 - 23, 2017
Montreal, Canada

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Overall Acceptance Rate 1,469 of 4,586 submissions, 32%

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Cited By

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  • (2022)FIXP-membership via Convex Optimization: Games, Cakes, and Markets2021 IEEE 62nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)10.1109/FOCS52979.2021.00085(827-838)Online publication date: Feb-2022
  • (2022)Discrete Versions of the KKM Lemma and Their PPAD-CompletenessComputer Science – Theory and Applications10.1007/978-3-031-09574-0_11(170-189)Online publication date: 24-Jun-2022
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  • (2019)A strongly polynomial algorithm for linear exchange marketsProceedings of the 51st Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing10.1145/3313276.3316340(54-65)Online publication date: 23-Jun-2019
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