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Which is the fairest (rent division) of them all?

Published: 23 January 2018 Publication History
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    cover image Communications of the ACM
    Communications of the ACM  Volume 61, Issue 2
    February 2018
    94 pages
    ISSN:0001-0782
    EISSN:1557-7317
    DOI:10.1145/3181977
    Issue’s Table of Contents
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    Publication History

    Published: 23 January 2018
    Published in CACM Volume 61, Issue 2

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    • (2020)A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach for Conflict Resolution in Multi-agent PlanningGroup Decision and Negotiation10.1007/s10726-020-09703-0Online publication date: 5-Sep-2020
    • (undefined)3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting AlgorithmSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.3126935

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