research-article

On the Strategy and Behavior of Bitcoin Mining with N-attackers

Authors:

Weijia JiaAuthors Info & Claims

ASIACCS '18: Proceedings of the 2018 on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Pages 357 - 368

https://doi.org/10.1145/3196494.3196512

Published: 29 May 2018 Publication History

Abstract

Selfish mining is a well-known mining attack strategy discovered by Eyal and Sirer in 2014. After that, the attackers' strategy has been further discussed by many other works, which analyze the strategy and behavior of a single attacker. The extension of the strategy research is greatly restricted by the assumption that there is only one attacker in the blockchain network, since, in many cases, a proof of work blockchain has multiple attackers. The attackers can be independent of others instead of sharing information and attacking the blockchain as a whole. In this paper, we will establish a new model to analyze the miners' behavior in a proof of work blockchain with multiple attackers. Based on our model, we extend the attackers' strategy by proposing a new strategy set publish-n. Meanwhile, we will also review other attacking strategies such as selfish mining and stubborn mining in our model to explore whether these strategies work or not when there are multiple attackers. The performances of different strategies are compared using relative stale block rate of the attackers. In a proof of work blockchain model with two attackers, strategy publish-n can beat selfish mining by up to 26.3%.

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Cited By

Li SCampajola CTessone C(2024)Statistical detection of selfish mining in proof-of-work blockchain systemsScientific Reports10.1038/s41598-024-55348-314:1Online publication date: 15-Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-55348-3
Biçer OKüpçü A(2023)FORTIS: Selfish Mining Mitigation by (FOR)geable (TI)me(S)tampsDistributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice10.1145/36163972:4(1-26)Online publication date: 14-Dec-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3616397
Li QChang YZhang C(2023)Tree Representation, Growth Rate of Blockchain and Reward Allocation in Ethereum With Multiple Mining PoolsIEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management10.1109/TNSM.2022.319529220:1(182-200)Online publication date: Mar-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/TNSM.2022.3195292
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

On the Strategy and Behavior of Bitcoin Mining with N-attackers
1. Security and privacy
  1. Human and societal aspects of security and privacy
    1. Economics of security and privacy
  2. Systems security
    1. Distributed systems security

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

ASIACCS '18: Proceedings of the 2018 on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

May 2018

866 pages

ISBN:9781450355766

DOI:10.1145/3196494

General Chairs:
Jong Kim
Pohang University of Science and Technology, South Korea
,
Gail-Joon Ahn
Arizona State University, USA &Samsung Electronics, South Korea
,
Seungjoo Kim
Korea University, South Korea
,
Program Chairs:
Yongdae Kim
KAIST, South Korea
,
Javier Lopez
University of Malaga, Spain
,
Taesoo Kim
Georgia Tech, USA

Copyright © 2018 ACM.

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SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 29 May 2018

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Funding Sources

Chinese National Research Fund Key Project
National China 973 Project
Chinese National Research Fund

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ASIA CCS '18

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SIGSAC

ASIA CCS '18: ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

June 4, 2018

Incheon, Republic of Korea

Acceptance Rates

ASIACCS '18 Paper Acceptance Rate 52 of 310 submissions, 17%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 418 of 2,322 submissions, 18%

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Cited By

Li SCampajola CTessone C(2024)Statistical detection of selfish mining in proof-of-work blockchain systemsScientific Reports10.1038/s41598-024-55348-314:1Online publication date: 15-Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-55348-3
Biçer OKüpçü A(2023)FORTIS: Selfish Mining Mitigation by (FOR)geable (TI)me(S)tampsDistributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice10.1145/36163972:4(1-26)Online publication date: 14-Dec-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3616397
Li QChang YZhang C(2023)Tree Representation, Growth Rate of Blockchain and Reward Allocation in Ethereum With Multiple Mining PoolsIEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management10.1109/TNSM.2022.319529220:1(182-200)Online publication date: Mar-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/TNSM.2022.3195292
Bai QXu YLiu NWang X(2023)Blockchain Mining With Multiple Selfish MinersIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2023.327573618(3116-3131)Online publication date: 2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2023.3275736
Schwarz-Schilling CLi STessone C(2022)Stochastic Modelling of Selfish Mining in Proof-of-Work ProtocolsJournal of Cybersecurity and Privacy10.3390/jcp20200162:2(292-310)Online publication date: 20-May-2022
https://doi.org/10.3390/jcp2020016
Wang YChen YWu HZhou LDeng SWattenhofer R(2022)Cyclic Arbitrage in Decentralized ExchangesCompanion Proceedings of the Web Conference 202210.1145/3487553.3524201(12-19)Online publication date: 25-Apr-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3487553.3524201
Jebari BIbrahimi KJouhari MGhogho M(2022)Analysis of Blockchain Selfish Mining: a Stochastic Game ApproachICC 2022 - IEEE International Conference on Communications10.1109/ICC45855.2022.9839233(4217-4222)Online publication date: 16-May-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC45855.2022.9839233
Zhang MLi YLi JKong CDeng X(2022)Insightful Mining EquilibriaWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_2(21-37)Online publication date: 9-Dec-2022
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_2
Wang ZSusilo WGuo JWang YZhao M(2022)Reinforcement-Mining: Protecting Reward in Selfish MiningProvable and Practical Security10.1007/978-3-031-20917-8_14(199-209)Online publication date: 7-Nov-2022
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20917-8_14
Li TWang ZChen YLi CJia YYang Y(2022)Is semi‐selfish mining available without being detected?International Journal of Intelligent Systems10.1002/int.2265637:12(10576-10597)Online publication date: 29-Dec-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1002/int.22656
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