Cited By
View all- Agmon SAgmon Ben-Yehuda OSchuster A(2019)Preventing Collusion in Cloud Computing AuctionsEconomics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services10.1007/978-3-030-13342-9_3(24-38)Online publication date: 8-Feb-2019
Collusion in Cloud Computing Auctions
Page 113
Abstract
No abstract available.
References
[1]
Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda, Muli Ben-Yehuda, Assaf Schuster, and Dan Tsafrir. 2013. Deconstructing Amazon EC2 Spot Instance Pricing. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 1, 3, Article 16 (Sept. 2013).
[2]
Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda, Muli Ben-Yehuda, Assaf Schuster, and Dan Tsafrir. 2014. The Rise of RaaS: the Resource-as-a-Service Cloud. Commun. ACM 57, 7 (2014), 76--84.
[3]
Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda, Eyal Posener, Muli Ben-Yehuda, Assaf Schuster, and Ahuva Mu'alem. 2014. Ginseng: Market-Driven Memory Allocation. SIGPLAN Not. 49, 7 (March 2014), 41--52.
[4]
Liran Funaro, Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda, and Assaf Schuster. 2016. Ginseng: Market-Driven LLC Allocation. In 2016 USENIX Annual Technical Conference. USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 295--308.
Index Terms
- Collusion in Cloud Computing Auctions
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Information & Contributors
Information
Published In
June 2018
144 pages
ISBN:9781450358491
DOI:10.1145/3211890
- General Chair:
- David Breitgand,
- Program Chairs:
- Gala Yadgar,
- Donald E. Porter,
- Publications Chair:
- Ittay Eyal
Copyright © 2018 ACM.
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Sponsors
- Technion: Israel Institute of Technology
- SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
- USENIX Assoc: USENIX Assoc
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
New York, NY, United States
Publication History
Published: 04 June 2018
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- Research
- Refereed limited
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SYSTOR '18
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- SIGOPS
- USENIX Assoc
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Overall Acceptance Rate 108 of 323 submissions, 33%
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Cited By
View all- Agmon SAgmon Ben-Yehuda OSchuster A(2019)Preventing Collusion in Cloud Computing AuctionsEconomics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services10.1007/978-3-030-13342-9_3(24-38)Online publication date: 8-Feb-2019
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