research-article

Electromagnetic Equalizer: An Active Countermeasure Against EM Side-channel Attack

Authors:

Chenguang Wang,

Qiang ZhouAuthors Info & Claims

2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD)

Pages 1 - 8

https://doi.org/10.1145/3240765.3240804

Published: 05 November 2018 Publication History

Abstract

Electromagnetic (EM) analysis is to reveal the secret information by analyzing the EM emission from a cryptographic device. EM analysis (EMA) attack is emerging as a serious threat to hardware security. It has been noted that the on-chip power grid (PG) has a security implication on EMA attack by affecting the fluctuations of supply current. However, there is little study on exploiting this intrinsic property as an active countermeasure against EMA. In this paper, we investigate the effect of PG on EM emission and propose an active countermeasure against EMA, i.e. EM Equalizer (EME). By adjusting the PG impedance, the current waveform can be flattened, equalizing the EM profile. Therefore, the correlation between secret data and EM emission is significantly reduced. As a first attempt to the co-optimization for power and EM security, we extend the EME method by fixing the vulnerability of power analysis. To verify the EME method, several cryptographic designs are implemented. The measurement to disclose (MTD) is improved by 1138x with area and power overheads of 0.62% and 1.36%, respectively.

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Cited By

Aversa ASavidis I(2024)Harnessing Heterogeneity for Targeted Attacks on 3-D ICsProceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 202410.1145/3649476.3660385(246-251)Online publication date: 12-Jun-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3649476.3660385
Ibrahim YKermanshahi SKasmarik KHu J(2024)A Taxonomy-Based Survey of EM-SCA and Implications for Multi-Robot SystemsIEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society10.1109/OJCS.2024.34618085(511-529)Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/OJCS.2024.3461808
Jevtic RPerez-Tirador PCabezaolias CCarnero PCaffarena G(2022)Side-channel Attack Countermeasure Based on Power Supply Modulation2022 30th European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO)10.23919/EUSIPCO55093.2022.9909766(618-622)Online publication date: 29-Aug-2022
https://doi.org/10.23919/EUSIPCO55093.2022.9909766
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Index Terms

Electromagnetic Equalizer: An Active Countermeasure Against EM Side-channel Attack
1. Hardware
2. Security and privacy
  1. Cryptography
  2. Security in hardware

Index terms have been assigned to the content through auto-classification.

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2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD)

Nov 2018

939 pages

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Publication History

Published: 05 November 2018

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Cited By

Aversa ASavidis I(2024)Harnessing Heterogeneity for Targeted Attacks on 3-D ICsProceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 202410.1145/3649476.3660385(246-251)Online publication date: 12-Jun-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3649476.3660385
Ibrahim YKermanshahi SKasmarik KHu J(2024)A Taxonomy-Based Survey of EM-SCA and Implications for Multi-Robot SystemsIEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society10.1109/OJCS.2024.34618085(511-529)Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/OJCS.2024.3461808
Jevtic RPerez-Tirador PCabezaolias CCarnero PCaffarena G(2022)Side-channel Attack Countermeasure Based on Power Supply Modulation2022 30th European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO)10.23919/EUSIPCO55093.2022.9909766(618-622)Online publication date: 29-Aug-2022
https://doi.org/10.23919/EUSIPCO55093.2022.9909766
Jevtic ROtero M(2022)Methodology for Complete Decorrelation of Power Supply EM Side-Channel Signal and Sensitive DataIEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Express Briefs10.1109/TCSII.2022.314407169:4(2256-2260)Online publication date: Apr-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSII.2022.3144071
He JGuo XTehranipoor MVassilev AJin Y(2022)EM Side Channels in Hardware Security: Attacks and DefensesIEEE Design & Test10.1109/MDAT.2021.313532439:2(100-111)Online publication date: Apr-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/MDAT.2021.3135324
Dofe JRai Saini K(2022)Internet of Things World: A New Security PerspectiveSN Computer Science10.1007/s42979-022-01443-z4:1Online publication date: 1-Nov-2022
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42979-022-01443-z
Dofe JDanesh W(2022)AI-Based Hardware Security Methods for Internet-of-Things ApplicationsFrontiers of Quality Electronic Design (QED)10.1007/978-3-031-16344-9_10(387-414)Online publication date: 6-Sep-2022
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16344-9_10
Dofe JNguyen ANguyen A(2021)Unified Countermeasures against Physical Attacks in Internet of Things - A survey2021 IEEE International Symposium on Smart Electronic Systems (iSES) (Formerly iNiS)10.1109/iSES52644.2021.00053(194-199)Online publication date: Dec-2021
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Jevtic RYlitolva MCalonge COjanen MSantti TKoskinen L(2021)EM Side-Channel Countermeasure for Switched-Capacitor DC–DC Converters Based on Amplitude ModulationIEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems10.1109/TVLSI.2021.307068729:6(1061-1072)Online publication date: Jun-2021
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Ma HHe JLiu YKuai JLi HLiu LZhao Y(2021)On-Chip Trust Evaluation Utilizing TDC-Based Parameter-Adjustable Security PrimitiveIEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems10.1109/TCAD.2020.303534640:10(1985-1994)Online publication date: Oct-2021
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