Cited By
View all- Hansjoerg APierre-Olivier G(2022)On the Profitability of Selfish Blockchain Mining Under Consideration of RuinOperations Research10.1287/opre.2021.216970:1(179-200)Online publication date: Jan-2022
On profitability of block withholding strategies
Page 126
Abstract
We present recent developments in the understanding of the profitability block withholding strategies in Bitcoin mining and other Proof-of-Work based blockchains. Block withholding strategies (like selfish, stubborn, trailing or catch-up mining) are rogue mining strategies that violate the rules of the Bitcoin protocol. The authors found recently the exact model based on iterative games to evaluate the profitability per unit time. With a novel application of martingale techniques and Doob's Stopping Time Theorem we compute their profitability in close-form. We can then compare in parameter space these strategies and honest mining, and decide which one is more profitable.
References
[1]
C. Grunspan & R. P´erez-Marco. Double spend races, International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance, accepted 2018.
[2]
C. Grunspan & R. P´erez-Marco. On profitability of Selfish Mining, ArXiv:1805.08281, 2018
[3]
C. Grunspan & R. P´erez-Marco. On profitability of Stubborn Mining, ArXiv 1808.01041, 2018.
[4]
C. Grunspan & R. P´erez-Marco. On profitability of Trailing Mining, 2018.
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Association for Computing Machinery
New York, NY, United States
Publication History
Published: 25 January 2019
Published in SIGMETRICS Volume 46, Issue 3
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View all- Hansjoerg APierre-Olivier G(2022)On the Profitability of Selfish Blockchain Mining Under Consideration of RuinOperations Research10.1287/opre.2021.216970:1(179-200)Online publication date: Jan-2022
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