The Worst Idea of All Time: Revelations at 100!
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Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments
EC '07: Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerceFor allocation problems with one or more items, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, strategy-proof, individually rational, and does not incur a deficit. However, the VCG mechanism is not (strongly) budget balanced: ...
Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction
Web and Internet EconomicsAbstractWe study the performance of the discriminatory price auction under the uniform bidding interface, which is one of the popular formats for running multi-unit auctions in practice. We undertake an equilibrium analysis with the goal of characterizing ...
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in heterogeneous-item auctions with unit demand
AAMAS '12: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources among the agents. For resource allocation problems, the well-known VCG mechanism satisfies a list of desired properties, including efficiency, strategy-proofness, ...
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