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How to Sell a Dataset? Pricing Policies for Data Monetization

Published: 17 June 2019 Publication History

Abstract

The wide variety of pricing policies used in practice by data-sellers suggests that there are significant challenges in pricing datasets. The selling of a dataset -- arranged in a row-column format, where rows represent records and columns represent attributes of the records -- is more nuanced than that of information goods like telephone minutes and bandwidth, in the sense that, for a buyer, it is not only the amount of data that matters but also the type of the data. We develop a utility framework that is appropriate for data-buyers and the corresponding pricing of the data by the data-seller.
A buyer interested in purchasing a dataset has private valuations in two aspects -- her ideal record that she values the most, and the rate at which her valuation for the records in the dataset decays as they differ from her ideal record. The seller allows individual (and heterogeneous) buyers to filter the dataset and select the records that are of interest to them. The multi-dimensional private information of the buyers coupled with the endogenous selection of records makes the seller's problem of optimally pricing the dataset a challenging one. We formulate a tractable model and successfully exploit its special structure to examine it both analytically and numerically. A key result we establish is that, under reasonable assumptions, a price-quantity schedule is an optimal data-selling mechanism. Such a schedule has a nuanced interpretation in the data-selling context in that buyers buy different sets of records but the price for a given number of records does not depend on the identity of the records chosen by the buyer. Even when the assumptions leading to the optimality of a price-quantity schedule do not hold, we show that the optimal price-quantity schedule offers an attractive worst-case performance guarantee relative to an optimal mechanism. Further, we numerically solve for the optimal mechanism and show that the actual performance of two simple and well-known price-quantity schedules -- two-part pricing and two-block pricing -- is near-optimal. We also quantify the value to the seller from allowing buyers to filter the dataset.

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Cited By

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  • (2024)Equilibrium of data markets with externalityProceedings of the 41st International Conference on Machine Learning10.5555/3692070.3692830(18905-18925)Online publication date: 21-Jul-2024
  • (2024)Data Acquisition for Improving Model ConfidenceProceedings of the ACM on Management of Data10.1145/36549342:3(1-25)Online publication date: 30-May-2024
  • (2023)Data market design through deep learningProceedings of the 37th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3666122.3666414(6662-6689)Online publication date: 10-Dec-2023
  • Show More Cited By

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cover image ACM Conferences
EC '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
June 2019
947 pages
ISBN:9781450367929
DOI:10.1145/3328526
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 17 June 2019

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Author Tags

  1. data monetization
  2. multi-dimensional mechanism design
  3. price-quantity schedules

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  • Extended-abstract

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EC '19
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EC '19: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
June 24 - 28, 2019
AZ, Phoenix, USA

Acceptance Rates

EC '19 Paper Acceptance Rate 106 of 382 submissions, 28%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
July 7 - 11, 2025
Stanford , CA , USA

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Cited By

View all
  • (2024)Equilibrium of data markets with externalityProceedings of the 41st International Conference on Machine Learning10.5555/3692070.3692830(18905-18925)Online publication date: 21-Jul-2024
  • (2024)Data Acquisition for Improving Model ConfidenceProceedings of the ACM on Management of Data10.1145/36549342:3(1-25)Online publication date: 30-May-2024
  • (2023)Data market design through deep learningProceedings of the 37th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3666122.3666414(6662-6689)Online publication date: 10-Dec-2023
  • (2023)Capitalize Your Data: Optimal Selling Mechanisms for IoT Data ExchangeIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2021.311338722:4(1988-2000)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2023
  • (2023)A Survey of Data Pricing for Data MarketplacesIEEE Transactions on Big Data10.1109/TBDATA.2023.32541529:4(1038-1056)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2023
  • (2023)SWDPM: A Social Welfare-Optimized Data Pricing Mechanism2023 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC)10.1109/SMC53992.2023.10394049(2900-2906)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2023
  • (2022)Protecting Data Markets from Strategic BuyersProceedings of the 2022 International Conference on Management of Data10.1145/3514221.3517855(1755-1769)Online publication date: 10-Jun-2022
  • (2021)Optimal Advertising for Information ProductsProceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3465456.3467649(888-906)Online publication date: 18-Jul-2021
  • (2021)Privacy Risk is a Function of Information Type: Learnings for the Surveillance Capitalism AgeIEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management10.1109/TNSM.2020.304670418:3(3280-3296)Online publication date: Sep-2021
  • (2020)Identifying Influencing Factors for Data Transactions: A Case Study from Shanghai Data ExchangeJournal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering10.1007/s11518-020-5473-129:6(697-708)Online publication date: 26-Nov-2020
  • Show More Cited By

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