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Optimal Strategies of Blotto Games: Beyond Convexity

Published: 17 June 2019 Publication History

Abstract

The Colonel Blotto game, first introduced by Borel in 1921, is a well-studied game theory classic. Two colonels each have a pool of troops that they divide simultaneously among a set of battlefields. The winner of each battlefield is the colonel who puts more troops in it and the overall utility of each colonel is the sum of weights of the battlefields that s/he wins. Over the past century, the Colonel Blotto game has found applications in many different forms of competition from advertisements to politics to sports.
Two main objectives have been proposed for this game in the literature: (i) maximizing the guaranteed expected payoff, and (ii) maximizing the probability of obtaining a minimum payoff u. The former corresponds to the conventional utility maximization and the latter concerns scenarios such as elections where the candidates' goal is to maximize the probability of getting at least half of the votes (rather than the expected number of votes). In this paper, we consider both of these objectives and show how it is possible to obtain (almost) optimal solutions that have few strategies in their support.
One of the main technical challenges in obtaining bounded support strategies for the Colonel Blotto game is that the solution space becomes non-convex. This prevents us from using convex programming techniques in finding optimal strategies which are essentially the main tools that are used in the literature. However, we show through a set of structural results that the solution space can, interestingly, be partitioned into polynomially many disjoint convex polytopes that can be considered independently. Coupled with a number of other combinatorial observations, this leads to polynomial time approximation schemes for both of the aforementioned objectives.
We also provide the first complexity result for finding the maximin of Blotto-like games: we show that computing the maximin of a generalization of the Colonel Blotto game that we call General Colonel Blotto is exponential time-complete.

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    EC '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
    June 2019
    947 pages
    ISBN:9781450367929
    DOI:10.1145/3328526
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    Published: 17 June 2019

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    1. colonel blotto
    2. nash equilibrium

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