Cited By
View all- Stoian MDas SPandis ISelçuk Candan KAmer-Yahia S(2023)Fast Joint Shapley ValuesCompanion of the 2023 International Conference on Management of Data10.1145/3555041.3589393(285-287)Online publication date: 4-Jun-2023
A Measure of Added Value in Groups
Authors: 
Bedoor K. Alshebli, Tomasz P. Michalak, Oskar Skibski, 
Michael Wooldridge, Talal RahwanAuthors Info & Claims
Bedoor K. Alshebli, Tomasz P. Michalak, Oskar Skibski, Michael Wooldridge, Talal RahwanAuthors Info & ClaimsArticle No.: 18, Pages 1 - 46
Abstract
The intuitive notion of added value in groups represents a fundamental property of biological, physical, and economic systems: how the interaction or cooperation of multiple entities, substances, or other agents can produce synergistic effects. However, despite the ubiquity of group formation, a well-founded measure of added value has remained elusive. Here, we propose such a measure inspired by the Shapley value—a fundamental solution concept from Cooperative Game Theory. To this end, we start by developing a solution concept that measures the average impact of each player in a coalitional game and show how this measure uniquely satisfies a set of intuitive properties. Then, building upon our solution concept, we propose a measure of added value that not only analyzes the interactions of players inside their group, but also outside it, thereby reflecting otherwise-hidden information about how these individuals typically perform in various groups of the population.
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Publication History
Published: 23 July 2019
Accepted: 01 March 2019
Received: 01 August 2018
Published in TAAS Volume 13, Issue 4
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View all- Stoian MDas SPandis ISelçuk Candan KAmer-Yahia S(2023)Fast Joint Shapley ValuesCompanion of the 2023 International Conference on Management of Data10.1145/3555041.3589393(285-287)Online publication date: 4-Jun-2023
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