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Flood & Loot: A Systemic Attack on The Lightning Network

Published: 26 October 2020 Publication History

Abstract

The Lightning Network promises to alleviate Bitcoin's known scalability problems. The operation of such second layer approaches relies on the ability of participants to turn to the blockchain to claim funds at any time, which is assumed to happen rarely.
One of the risks that was identified early on is that of a wide systemic attack on the protocol, in which an attacker triggers the closure of many Lightning channels at once. The resulting high volume of transactions in the blockchain will not allow for the proper settlement of all debts, and attackers may get away with stealing some funds.
This paper explores the details of such an attack and evaluates its cost and overall impact on Bitcoin and the Lightning Network. Specifically, we show that an attacker is able to simultaneously cause victim nodes to overload the Bitcoin blockchain with requests and to steal funds that were locked in channels.
We go on to examine the interaction of Lightning nodes with the fee estimation mechanism and show that the attacker can continuously lower the fee of transactions that will later be used by the victim in its attempts to recover funds - eventually reaching a state in which only low fractions of the block are available for lightning transactions. Our attack is made easier even further as the Lightning protocol allows the attacker to increase the fee offered by his own transactions.
We show that the vast majority of nodes agree to channel opening requests from unknown sources and are therefore susceptible to this attack. We highlight differences between various implementations of the Lightning Network protocol and review the susceptibility of each one to the attack. Finally, we propose mitigation strategies to lower the systemic attack risk of the network.

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    AFT '20: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies
    October 2020
    275 pages
    ISBN:9781450381390
    DOI:10.1145/3419614
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    Publication History

    Published: 26 October 2020

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    Author Tags

    1. Bitcoin
    2. HTLC
    3. Lightning Network
    4. Payment channels
    5. Second-layer

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    • (2024)Decision Tree Based Inference of Lightning Network Client ImplementationsModeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence10.1007/978-3-031-68208-7_9(103-114)Online publication date: 15-Aug-2024
    • (2023)A Review of the Lightning Network’s Evolution: Unraveling Its Present State and the Emergence of Disruptive Digital Business ModelsJournal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research10.3390/jtaer1803006818:3(1338-1364)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2023
    • (2023)Sustainability in Blockchain: A Systematic Literature Review on Scalability and Power Consumption IssuesEnergies10.3390/en1603151016:3(1510)Online publication date: 3-Feb-2023
    • (2023)Analyzing the Threats to Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Identities by Conducting a Literature SurveyApplied Sciences10.3390/app1401013914:1(139)Online publication date: 22-Dec-2023
    • (2023)Lightning Network Economics: TopologySSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4439190Online publication date: 2023
    • (2023)Instantaneous Account Settlement in Roll-Up based Layer-2 Blockchain Framework for Metaverse Applications2023 IEEE International Conference on Metaverse Computing, Networking and Applications (MetaCom)10.1109/MetaCom57706.2023.00026(78-85)Online publication date: Jun-2023
    • (2023)Game-Theoretic Analysis of (Non-)Refundable Fees in the Lightning Network2023 IEEE 29th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS)10.1109/ICPADS60453.2023.00100(645-652)Online publication date: 17-Dec-2023
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