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Practical Trade-Offs in Integrity Protection for Binaries via Ethereum

Published: 21 December 2020 Publication History

Abstract

Ensuring the integrity of executable binaries is of vital importance to systems that run and depend on them. Additionally, supply-chain attacks and security related bugs demonstrate that binaries, once deployed, may need to be revoked and replaced with updated versions.
Recently, blockchain ecosystems have garnered broad attention as middlewares for decentralised solutions to existing problems. Stengele et al. [4] presented a concept how the Ethereum blockchain and peer-to-peer network can be used to ensure the integrity of binaries with timely, accurate, and machine-readable revocations. In this work, we show this concept in practice with a user client implementation in Go and demonstrate how revocations and updates can reliably reach a user client within minutes. We show the client's ability to ensure the integrity of multiple binaries and continuously monitor the Ethereum blockchain for updates and revocations via an unmodified Ethereum client. We also examine the trust relations and trade-offs through our use case. Since the user client fully relies on an Ethereum client as a gateway, the latter's resilience against malicious actors is crucial to consider in a practical deployment.

References

[1]
M. Al-Bassam and S. Meiklejohn. 2018. Contour: A practical system for binary transparency. In Data Privacy Management, Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology. Springer, Cham, 94--110.
[2]
Y. Liu, W. Tome, L. Zhang, D. Choffnes, D. Levin, B. Maggs, A. Mislove, A. Schulman, and C. Wilson. 2015. An end-to-end measurement of certificate revocation in the web's PKI. In Proceedings of the 2015 Internet Measurement Conference. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 183--196.
[3]
K. Nikitin, E. Kokoris-Kogias, P. Jovanovic, N. Gailly, L. Gasser, I. Khoffi, J. Cappos, and B. Ford. 2017. CHAINIAC: Proactive Software-Update Transparency via Collectively Signed Skipchains and Verified Builds. In 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). USENIX Association, Vancouver, BC, 1271--1287.
[4]
O. Stengele, A. Baumeister, P. Birnstill, and H. Hartenstein. 2019. Access Control for Binary Integrity Protection using Ethereum. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 3--12.

Cited By

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  • (2022)Decentralized Review and Attestation of Software Attribute ClaimsIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2022.318504610(66694-66710)Online publication date: 2022
  • (2021)Towards Correct Smart Contracts: A Case Study on Formal Verification of Access ControlProceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies10.1145/3450569.3463574(125-130)Online publication date: 11-Jun-2021

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cover image ACM Conferences
Middleware '20 Demos and Posters: Proceedings of the 21st International Middleware Conference Demos and Posters
December 2020
15 pages
ISBN:9781450382021
DOI:10.1145/3429358
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 21 December 2020

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Author Tags

  1. Blockchain
  2. integrity protection
  3. revocation

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  • Short-paper
  • Research
  • Refereed limited

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Middleware '20
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Middleware '20: 21st International Middleware Conference
December 7 - 11, 2020
Delft, Netherlands

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Overall Acceptance Rate 203 of 948 submissions, 21%

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MIDDLEWARE '24
25th International Middleware Conference
December 2 - 6, 2024
Hong Kong , Hong Kong

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Cited By

View all
  • (2022)Decentralized Review and Attestation of Software Attribute ClaimsIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2022.318504610(66694-66710)Online publication date: 2022
  • (2021)Towards Correct Smart Contracts: A Case Study on Formal Verification of Access ControlProceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies10.1145/3450569.3463574(125-130)Online publication date: 11-Jun-2021

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