research-article

Prime+Scope: Overcoming the Observer Effect for High-Precision Cache Contention Attacks

Authors:

Ingrid VerbauwhedeAuthors Info & Claims

CCS '21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Pages 2906 - 2920

https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484816

Published: 13 November 2021 Publication History

Abstract

Modern processors expose software to information leakage through shared microarchitectural state. One of the most severe leakage channels is cache contention, exploited by attacks referred to as PRIME+PROBE, which can infer fine-grained memory access patterns while placing only limited assumptions on attacker capabilities.

In this work, we strengthen the cache contention channel with a near-optimal time resolution. We propose PRIME+SCOPE, a cross-core cache contention attack that performs back-to-back cache contention measurements that access only a single cache line. It offers a time resolution of around 70 cycles (25ns), while maintaining the wide applicability of PRIME+PROBE. To enable such a rapid measurement, we rely on the deterministic nature of modern replacement policies and their (non-)interaction across cache levels. We provide a methodology to, essentially, prepare multiple cache levels simultaneously, and apply it to Intel processors with both inclusive and non-inclusive cache hierarchies. We characterize the resolution of PRIME+SCOPE, and confirm it with a cross-core covert channel (capacity up to 3.5 Mbps, no shared memory) and an improved attack on AES T-tables. Finally, we use the properties underlying PRIME+SCOPE to bootstrap the construction of the eviction sets needed for the attack. The resulting routine outperforms state-of-the-art techniques by two orders of magnitude.

Ultimately, our work shows that interference through cache contention can provide richer temporal precision than state-of-the-art attacks that directly interact with monitored memory addresses.

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Cited By

Liu ZYuan YChen YHu SLi TWang SLuo BLiao XXu JKirda ELie D(2024)DeepCache: Revisiting Cache Side-Channel Attacks in Deep Neural Networks ExecutablesProceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3658644.3690241(4495-4508)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3690241
Wang MJia SZheng FMa YLin JMeng LMa Z(2024)TF-Timer: Mitigating Cache Side-Channel Attacks in Cloud through a Targeted Fuzzy Timer2024 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC)10.1109/WCNC57260.2024.10571330(1-6)Online publication date: 21-Apr-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/WCNC57260.2024.10571330
Chen CCui JQu GZhang J(2024)Write+Sync: Software Cache Write Covert Channels Exploiting Memory-Disk SynchronizationIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2024.341425519(8066-8078)Online publication date: 2024
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Index Terms

Prime+Scope: Overcoming the Observer Effect for High-Precision Cache Contention Attacks
1. Security and privacy
  1. Software and application security
  2. Systems security

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cover image ACM Conferences

CCS '21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

November 2021

3558 pages

ISBN:9781450384544

DOI:10.1145/3460120

General Chairs:
Yongdae Kim
KAIST, Republic of Korea
,
Jong Kim
POSTECH, Republic of Korea
,
Program Chairs:
Giovanni Vigna
University of California, Santa Barbara / VMware, USA
,
Elaine Shi
Carnegie Mellon University, USA

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Published: 13 November 2021

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CCS '21: 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

November 15 - 19, 2021

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https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3690241
Wang MJia SZheng FMa YLin JMeng LMa Z(2024)TF-Timer: Mitigating Cache Side-Channel Attacks in Cloud through a Targeted Fuzzy Timer2024 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC)10.1109/WCNC57260.2024.10571330(1-6)Online publication date: 21-Apr-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/WCNC57260.2024.10571330
Chen CCui JQu GZhang J(2024)Write+Sync: Software Cache Write Covert Channels Exploiting Memory-Disk SynchronizationIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2024.341425519(8066-8078)Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2024.3414255
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Song WXue ZHan JLi ZLiu P(2024)Randomizing Set-Associative Caches Against Conflict-Based Cache Side-Channel AttacksIEEE Transactions on Computers10.1109/TC.2024.334965973:4(1019-1033)Online publication date: 8-Jan-2024
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