Learning Equilibrium Contributions in Multi-project Civic Crowdfunding
Pages 368 - 375
Abstract
Crowdfunding is an efficient method for raising funds for projects. When used for non-excludable public projects, the process is termed Civic Crowdfunding (CC) and is an active research area. Researchers have analyzed CC in game-theoretic settings assuming that agents are interested in (and contribute to) a single public project. Generalizing the existing single project theory to determine agents’ equilibrium contributions for multiple projects is non-trivial – especially with budget-constrained agents. This work hypothesizes that the agents can learn their equilibrium contributions with repeated participation in multi-project CC. We model CC as a game to validate the hypothesis and build an RL-based simulator: EqC-Learner. We first show that EqC-Learner learns a policy that mimics equilibrium contributions in a single project case for the existing CC mechanisms. To validate EqC-Learner for the multi-project case, we present certain theoretical results for the general multi-project case. Via extensive simulation-based experiments, we show that the learned contributions in EqC-Learner follow all the available theoretical analysis. Thus, we believe that such an RL-based simulator can learn equilibrium contributions for the general multi-project CC mechanism.
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Published In
December 2021
698 pages
ISBN:9781450391153
DOI:10.1145/3486622
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Published: 13 April 2022
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