DELTA: DEsigning a stealthy trigger mechanism for analog hardware trojans and its detection analysis
Authors: 
Nishant Gupta, Mohil Sandip Desai, Mark Wijtvliet, Shubham Rai, 
Akash KumarAuthors Info & Claims
Nishant Gupta, Mohil Sandip Desai, Mark Wijtvliet, Shubham Rai, Akash KumarAuthors Info & ClaimsPages 787 - 792
Abstract
This paper presents a stealthy triggering mechanism that reduces the dependencies of analog hardware Trojans on the frequent toggling of the software-controlled rare nets. The trigger to activate the Trojan is generated by using a glitch generation circuit and a clock signal, which increases the selectivity and feasibility of the trigger signal. The proposed trigger is able to evade the state-of-the-art run-time detection (R2D2) and Built-In Acceleration Structure (BIAS) schemes. Furthermore, the simulation results show that the proposed trigger circuit incurs a minimal overhead in side-channel footprints in terms of area (29 transistors), delay (less than 1ps in the clock cycle), and power (1μW).
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Published: 23 August 2022
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