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Cerberus: A Formal Approach to Secure and Efficient Enclave Memory Sharing

Authors:

Alexander Thomas,

Pranav Gaddamadugu,

Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner,

Sanjit A. Seshia,

Krste AsanovicAuthors Info & Claims

CCS '22: Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Pages 1871 - 1885

https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3560595

Published: 07 November 2022 Publication History

Abstract

Hardware enclaves rely on a disjoint memory model, which maps each physical address to an enclave to achieve strong memory isolation. However, this severely limits the performance and programmability of enclave programs. While some prior work proposes enclave memory sharing, it does not provide a formal model or verification of their designs. This paper presents Cerberus, a formal approach to secure and efficient enclave memory sharing. To reduce the burden of formal verification, we compare different sharing models and choose a simple yet powerful sharing model. Based on the sharing model, Cerberus extends an enclave platform such that enclave memory can be made immutable and shareable across multiple enclaves via additional operations. We use incremental verification starting with an existing formal model called the Trusted Abstract Platform (TAP). Using our extended TAP model, we formally verify that Cerberus does not break or weaken the security guarantees of the enclaves despite allowing memory sharing. More specifically, we prove the Secure Remote Execution (SRE) property on our formal model. Finally, the paper shows the feasibility of Cerberus by implementing it in an existing enclave platform, RISC-V Keystone.

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Cited By

Zeng FZhang ZChang RYu CZhang ZZhao Y(2023)Lark: Verified Cross-Domain Access Control for Trusted Execution Environments2023 IEEE 34th International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE)10.1109/ISSRE59848.2023.00031(160-171)Online publication date: 9-Oct-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ISSRE59848.2023.00031

Index Terms

Cerberus: A Formal Approach to Secure and Efficient Enclave Memory Sharing
1. Security and privacy
  1. Formal methods and theory of security
    1. Formal security models
    2. Trust frameworks
  2. Systems security
    1. Operating systems security
      1. Trusted computing

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cover image ACM Conferences

CCS '22: Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

November 2022

3598 pages

ISBN:9781450394505

DOI:10.1145/3548606

General Chairs:
Heng Yin
University of California, Riverside
,
Angelos Stavrou
Virginia Tech
,
Program Chairs:
Cas Cremers
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
,
Elaine Shi
Carnegie Mellon University

Copyright © 2022 Owner/Author.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution International 4.0 License.

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Published: 07 November 2022

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Cited By

Zeng FZhang ZChang RYu CZhang ZZhao Y(2023)Lark: Verified Cross-Domain Access Control for Trusted Execution Environments2023 IEEE 34th International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE)10.1109/ISSRE59848.2023.00031(160-171)Online publication date: 9-Oct-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ISSRE59848.2023.00031

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