Power Contracts: Provably Complete Power Leakage Models for Processors
Authors: 
Roderick Bloem, Barbara Gigerl, Marc Gourjon, Vedad Hadzic, Stefan Mangard, Robert PrimasAuthors Info & Claims
Roderick Bloem, Barbara Gigerl, Marc Gourjon, Vedad Hadzic, Stefan Mangard, Robert PrimasAuthors Info & ClaimsPages 381 - 395
Abstract
The protection of cryptographic software implementations against power-analysis attacks is critical for applications in embedded systems. A commonly used algorithmic countermeasure against these attacks is masking, a secret-sharing scheme that splits a sensitive computation into computations on multiple random shares. In practice, the security of masking schemes relies on several assumptions that are often violated by microarchitectural side-effects of CPUs. Many past works address this problem by studying these leakage effects and building corresponding leakage models that can then be integrated into a software verification workflow. However, these models have only been derived empirically, putting in question the otherwise rigorous security statements made with verification. We solve this problem in two steps. First, we introduce a contract layer between the (CPU) hardware and the software that allows the specification of microarchitectural side-effects on masked software in an intuitive language. Second, we present a method for proving the correspondence between contracts and CPU netlists to ensure the completeness of the specified leakage models. Then, any further security proofs only need to happen between software and contract, which brings benefits such as reduced verification runtime, improved user experience, and the possibility of working with vendor-supplied contracts of CPUs whose design is not available on netlist-level due to IP restrictions. We apply our approach to the popular RISC-V IBEX core, provide a corresponding formally verified contract, and describe how this contract could be used to verify masked software implementations.
References
[1]
Arnold Abromeit, Florian Bache, Leon A. Becker, Marc Gourjon, Tim Gü neysu, Sabrina Jorn, Amir Moradi, Maximilian Orlt, and Falk Schellenberg. 2021. Automated Masking of Software Implementations on Industrial Microcontrollers. In Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition, DATE 2021, Grenoble, France, February 1--5, 2021. IEEE, 1006--1011. https://doi.org/10.23919/DATE51398.2021.9474183
[2]
Alasdair Armstrong, Thomas Bauereiss, Brian Campbell, Kathryn E. Gray, Robert Norton-Wright, Christopher Pulte, Shaked Flur, and Peter Sewell. July 2021 (accessed January 12, 2022) a. https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rems-project/sail/sail2/manual.pdf.
[3]
Alasdair Armstrong, Thomas Bauereiss, Brian Campbell, Alastair Reid, Kathryn E. Gray, Robert M. Norton, Prashanth Mundkur, Mark Wassell, Jon French, Christopher Pulte, Shaked Flur, Ian Stark, Neel Krishnaswami, and Peter Sewell. 2018 (accessed January 12, 2022) b. MiniSail: A core calculus for Sail. https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ mpew2/papers/minisail_anf.pdf.
[4]
Alasdair Armstrong, Thomas Bauereiss, Brian Campbell, Alastair Reid, Kathryn E. Gray, Robert M. Norton, Prashanth Mundkur, Mark Wassell, Jon French, Christopher Pulte, Shaked Flur, Ian Stark, Neel Krishnaswami, and Peter Sewell. 2019. ISA Semantics for ARMv8-A, RISC-V, and CHERI-MIPS. In Proc. 46th ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3290384 Proc. ACM Program. Lang. 3, POPL, Article 71.
[5]
Josep Balasch, Benedikt Gierlichs, Vincent Grosso, Oscar Reparaz, and Francc ois-Xavier Standaert. 2014. On the Cost of Lazy Engineering for Masked Software Implementations. In Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications - 13th International Conference, CARDIS 2014, Paris, France, November 5--7, 2014. Revised Selected Papers (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 8968), Marc Joye and Amir Moradi (Eds.). Springer, 64--81. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3--319--16763--3_5
[6]
Clark Barrett, Aaron Stump, and Cesare Tinelli. 2010. The SMT-LIB Standard: Version 2.0. Technical Report. Department of Computer Science, The University of Iowa. Available at www.SMT-LIB.org.
[7]
Gilles Barthe, Sonia Belaïd, Franc cois Dupressoir, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Benjamin Grégoire, and Pierre-Yves Strub. 2015. Verified Proofs of Higher-Order Masking. In EUROCRYPT 2015, Part I (LNCS, Vol. 9056), Elisabeth Oswald and Marc Fischlin (Eds.). Springer, Heidelberg, 457--485. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3--662--46800--5_18
[8]
Gilles Barthe, Sonia Belaïd, Franc cois Dupressoir, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Benjamin Grégoire, Pierre-Yves Strub, and Rébecca Zucchini. 2016. Strong Non-Interference and Type-Directed Higher-Order Masking. In ACM CCS 2016, Edgar R. Weippl, Stefan Katzenbeisser, Christopher Kruegel, Andrew C. Myers, and Shai Halevi (Eds.). ACM Press, 116--129. https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978427
[9]
Gilles Barthe, Marc Gourjon, Benjamin Grégoire, Maximilian Orlt, Clara Paglialonga, and Lars Porth. 2021. Masking in Fine-Grained Leakage Models: Construction, Implementation and Verification. IACR TCHES, Vol. 2021, 2 (2021), 189--228. https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2021.i2.189--228 https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8792.
[10]
Omid Bazangani, Alexandre Iooss, Ileana Buhan, and Lejla Batina. 2021. ABBY: Automating the creation of fine-grained leakage models. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2021/1569. https://ia.cr/2021/1569.
[11]
Sonia Belaïd, Pierre-Évariste Dagand, Darius Mercadier, Matthieu Rivain, and Raphaël Wintersdorff. 2020. Tornado: Automatic Generation of Probing-Secure Masked Bitsliced Implementations. In EUROCRYPT 2020, Part III (LNCS, Vol. 12107), Anne Canteaut and Yuval Ishai (Eds.). Springer, Heidelberg, 311--341. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3-030--45727--3_11
[12]
Roderick Bloem, Barbara Gigerl, Marc Gourjon, Vedad Hadzic, Stefan Mangard, and Robert Primas. 2022. Power Contracts: Provably Complete Power Leakage Models for Processors. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/565. https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/565 https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/565.
[13]
Gaë tan Cassiers and Francc ois-Xavier Standaert. 2020. Trivially and Efficiently Composing Masked Gadgets With Probe Isolating Non-Interference. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur., Vol. 15 (2020), 2542--2555. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2020.2971153
[14]
Suresh Chari, Charanjit S. Jutla, Josyula R. Rao, and Pankaj Rohatgi. 1999. Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks. In CRYPTO'99 (LNCS, Vol. 1666), Michael J. Wiener (Ed.). Springer, Heidelberg, 398--412. https://doi.org/10.1007/3--540--48405--1_26
[15]
Thomas De Cnudde, Oscar Reparaz, Begü l Bilgin, Svetla Nikova, Ventzislav Nikov, and Vincent Rijmen. 2016. Masking AES with d1 Shares in Hardware. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2016 - 18th International Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 17--19, 2016, Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 9813). Springer, 194--212.
[16]
Jean-Sé bastien Coron, Christophe Giraud, Emmanuel Prouff, Soline Renner, Matthieu Rivain, and Praveen Kumar Vadnala. 2012. Conversion of Security Proofs from One Leakage Model to Another: A New Issue. In Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - Third International Workshop, COSADE 2012, Darmstadt, Germany, May 3--4, 2012. Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7275). Springer, 69--81.
[17]
Jean-Sébastien Coron. 2014. Higher Order Masking of Look-Up Tables. In EUROCRYPT 2014 (LNCS, Vol. 8441), Phong Q. Nguyen and Elisabeth Oswald (Eds.). Springer, Heidelberg, 441--458. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3--642--55220--5_25
[18]
Thomas De Cnudde, Begül Bilgin, Benedikt Gierlichs, Ventzislav Nikov, Svetla Nikova, and Vincent Rijmen. 2017. Does Coupling Affect the Security of Masked Implementations?. In COSADE 2017 (LNCS, Vol. 10348), Sylvain Guilley (Ed.). Springer, Heidelberg, 1--18. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3--319--64647--3_1
[19]
Wouter de Groot, Kostas Papagiannopoulos, Antonio de la Piedra, Erik Schneider, and Lejla Batina. 2016. Bitsliced Masking and ARM: Friends or Foes?. In Lightweight Cryptography for Security and Privacy - 5th International Workshop, LightSec 2016, Aksaray, Turkey, September 21--22, 2016, Revised Selected Papers (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 10098). Springer, 91--109.
[20]
Leonardo Mendoncc a de Moura and Nikolaj S. Bjørner. 2008. Z3: An Efficient SMT Solver. In Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, 14th International Conference, TACAS 2008, Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2008, Budapest, Hungary, March 29-April 6, 2008. Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 4963), C. R. Ramakrishnan and Jakob Rehof (Eds.). Springer, 337--340. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3--540--78800--3_24
[21]
Sebastian Faust, Vincent Grosso, Santos Merino Del Pozo, Clara Paglialonga, and Franc cois-Xavier Standaert. 2018. Composable Masking Schemes in the Presence of Physical Defaults & the Robust Probing Model. IACR TCHES, Vol. 2018, 3 (2018), 89--120. https://doi.org/10.13154/tches.v2018.i3.89--120 https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7270.
[22]
Andreas Frö hlich, Gergely Ková sznai, and Armin Biere. 2013. More on the Complexity of Quantifier-Free Fixed-Size Bit-Vector Logics with Binary Encoding. In Computer Science - Theory and Applications - 8th International Computer Science Symposium in Russia, CSR 2013, Ekaterinburg, Russia, June 25--29, 2013. Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7913), Andrei A. Bulatov and Arseny M. Shur (Eds.). Springer, 378--390. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3--642--38536-0_33
[23]
Si Gao, Ben Marshall, Dan Page, and Elisabeth Oswald. 2019. Share-slicing: Friend or Foe? IACR TCHES, Vol. 2020, 1 (2019), 152--174. https://doi.org/10.13154/tches.v2020.i1.152--174 https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8396.
[24]
Si Gao and Elisabeth Oswald. 2021. A Novel Completeness Test and its Application to Side Channel Attacks and Simulators. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2021/756. https://ia.cr/2021/756.
[25]
Si Gao, Elisabeth Oswald, and Dan Page. 2021. Reverse Engineering the Micro-Architectural Leakage Features of a Commercial Processor. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2021/794. https://ia.cr/2021/794.
[26]
Barbara Gigerl, Vedad Hadzic, Robert Primas, Stefan Mangard, and Roderick Bloem. 2021a. Coco: Co-Design and Co-Verification of Masked Software Implementations on CPUs. In 30th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2021, August 11--13, 2021, Michael Bailey and Rachel Greenstadt (Eds.). USENIX Association, 1469--1468. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/gigerl
[27]
Barbara Gigerl, Robert Primas, and Stefan Mangard. 2021b. Secure and Efficient Software Masking on Superscalar Pipelined Processors. In Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2021 - 27th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Singapore, December 6--10, 2021, Proceedings, Part II (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 13091), Mehdi Tibouchi and Huaxiong Wang (Eds.). Springer, 3--32. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3-030--92075--3_1
[28]
Hannes Gross, Stefan Mangard, and Thomas Korak. 2016. Domain-Oriented Masking: Compact Masked Hardware Implementations with Arbitrary Protection Order. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Theory of Implementation Security (Vienna, Austria) (TIS '16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 3--3. https://doi.org/10.1145/2996366.2996426
[29]
Hannes Gross, Stefan Mangard, and Thomas Korak. 2017. An Efficient Side-Channel Protected AES Implementation with Arbitrary Protection Order. In CT-RSA 2017, San Francisco, CA, USA, February 14--17, 2017, Proceedings, Helena Handschuh (Ed.). Springer International Publishing, Cham, 95--112. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3--319--52153--4_6
[30]
Marco Guarnieri, Boris Kö pf, Jan Reineke, and Pepe Vila. 2021. Hardware-Software Contracts for Secure Speculation. In 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021, San Francisco, CA, USA, 24--27 May 2021. IEEE, 1868--1883. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00036
[31]
Vedad Hadzic and Roderick Bloem. 2021. COCOALMA: A Versatile Masking Verifier. In Formal Methods in Computer Aided Design, FMCAD 2021, New Haven, CT, USA, October 19--22, 2021. IEEE, 1--10. https://doi.org/10.34727/2021/isbn.978--3--85448-046--4_9
[32]
Yuval Ishai, Amit Sahai, and David Wagner. 2003. Private Circuits: Securing Hardware against Probing Attacks. In CRYPTO 2003 (LNCS, Vol. 2729), Dan Boneh (Ed.). Springer, Heidelberg, 463--481. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3--540--45146--4_27
[33]
Paul C. Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, and Benjamin Jun. 1999 a. Differential Power Analysis. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '99, 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, California, USA, August 15--19, 1999, Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1666), Michael J. Wiener (Ed.). Springer, 388--397. https://doi.org/10.1007/3--540--48405--1_25
[34]
Paul C. Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, and Benjamin Jun. 1999 b. Differential Power Analysis. In CRYPTO '99. Springer-Verlag, London, UK, 10 pages. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=646764.703989
[35]
lowRISC. [n.,d.]. Ibex RISC-V Core. https://github.com/lowRISC/ibex.
[36]
Stefan Mangard, Thomas Popp, and Berndt M. Gammel. 2005 a. Side-Channel Leakage of Masked CMOS Gates. In CT-RSA 2005 (LNCS, Vol. 3376), Alfred Menezes (Ed.). Springer, Heidelberg, 351--365. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3--540--30574--3_24
[37]
Stefan Mangard, Norbert Pramstaller, and Elisabeth Oswald. 2005 b. Successfully Attacking Masked AES Hardware Implementations. In CHES 2005 (LNCS, Vol. 3659), Josyula R. Rao and Berk Sunar (Eds.). Springer, Heidelberg, 157--171. https://doi.org/10.1007/11545262_12
[38]
Stefan Mangard, Norbert Pramstaller, and Elisabeth Oswald. 2005 c. Successfully Attacking Masked AES Hardware Implementations. In CHES (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 3659). Springer, 157--171.
[39]
Ben Marshall, Dan Page, and James Webb. 2021. MIRACLE: MIcRo-ArChitectural Leakage Evaluation: A study of micro-architectural power leakage across many devices. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol. 2022, 1 (Nov. 2021), 175--220. https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2022.i1.175--220
[40]
David McCann, Elisabeth Oswald, and Carolyn Whitnall. 2017. Towards Practical Tools for Side Channel Aware Software Engineering: 'Grey Box' Modelling for Instruction Leakages. In USENIX Security 2017, Engin Kirda and Thomas Ristenpart (Eds.). USENIX Association, 199--216.
[41]
Thomas S. Messerges. 2000. Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software. In CHES 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/3--540--44499--8_19
[42]
Lauren De Meyer, Elke De Mulder, and Michael Tunstall. 2020. On the Effect of the (Micro)Architecture on the Development of Side-Channel Resistant Software. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., Vol. 2020 (2020), 1297. https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1297
[43]
Prashanth Mundkur, Rishiyur S. Nikhil, Bluespec Inc, Jon French, Brian Campbell, Robert Norton-Wright, Alasdair Armstrong, Thomas Bauereiss, Shaked Flur, Christopher Pulte, Peter Sewell, Alexander Richardson, Hesham Almatary, Jessica Clarke, Microsoft, Nathaniel Wesley Filardo, Peter Rugg, and Aril Computer Corp. August 2021 (accessed January 17, 2022). RISCV Sail Model. https://github.com/riscv/sail-riscv.
[44]
Prashanth Mundkur, Rishiyur S. Nikhil, Bluespec Inc., Jon French, Brian Campbell, Robert Norton-Wright, Alasdair Armstrong, Thomas Bauereiss, Shaked Flur, Christopher Pulte, Peter Sewell, Alexander Richardson, Hesham Almatary, Jessica Clarke, Microsoft, Nathaniel Wesley Filardo, Peter Rugg, Aril Computer Corp., Scott Johnson, Hamburg University of Technology, Marc Gourjon, Graz University of Technology, and Vedad Hadzic. 2020. RISCV Sail Model License. In paper and supplementary materials. RISCV Sail Model This Sail RISC-V architecture model, comprising all files and directories except for the snapshots of the Lem and Sail libraries in the prover_snapshots directory (which include copies of their licences), is subject to the BSD two-clause licence below. Copyright (c) 2017--2021 Prashanth Mundkur, Rishiyur S. Nikhil and Bluespec Inc., Jon French, Brian Campbell, Robert Norton-Wright, Alasdair Armstrong, Thomas Bauereiss, Shaked Flur, Christopher Pulte, Peter Sewell, Alexander Richardson, Hesham Almatary, Jessica Clarke, Microsoft, for contributions by Robert Norton-Wright and Nathaniel Wesley Filardo, Peter Rugg and Aril Computer Corp., for contributions by Scott Johnson Copyright 2020--2022 - TUHH, TU Graz All rights reserved. This software was developed by the above within the Rigorous Engineering of Mainstream Systems (REMS) project, partly funded by EPSRC grant EP/K008528/1, at the Universities of Cambridge and Edinburgh. This software was developed by SRI International and the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory (Department of Computer Science and Technology) under DARPA/AFRL contract FA8650--18-C-7809 ("CIFV"), and under DARPA contract HR0011--18-C-0016 ("ECATS") as part of the DARPA SSITH research programme. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement 789108, ELVER). This software has received funding from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) as part of the VE-Jupiter project grant 16ME0231K. This work was supported by the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) through the FERMION project (grant number 867542) and the AWARE project (FO999891092). Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS “AS IS” AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .
[45]
Svetla Nikova, Christian Rechberger, and Vincent Rijmen. 2006. Threshold Implementations Against Side-Channel Attacks and Glitches. In ICICS 06 (LNCS, Vol. 4307), Peng Ning, Sihan Qing, and Ninghui Li (Eds.). Springer, Heidelberg, 529--545.
[46]
Svetla Nikova, Vincent Rijmen, and Martin Schl"affer. 2011. Secure Hardware Implementation of Nonlinear Functions in the Presence of Glitches. Journal of Cryptology, Vol. 24, 2 (April 2011), 292--321. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-010--9085--7
[47]
Kostas Papagiannopoulos and Nikita Veshchikov. 2017. Mind the Gap: Towards Secure 1st-Order Masking in Software. In COSADE 2017 (LNCS, Vol. 10348), Sylvain Guilley (Ed.). Springer, Heidelberg, 282--297. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3--319--64647--3_17
[48]
Emmanuel Prouff and Matthieu Rivain. 2013. Masking against Side-Channel Attacks: A Formal Security Proof. In EUROCRYPT 2013 (LNCS, Vol. 7881), Thomas Johansson and Phong Q. Nguyen (Eds.). Springer, Heidelberg, 142--159. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3--642--38348--9_9
[49]
Jean-Jacques Quisquater and David Samyde. 2001. ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards. In Smart Card Programming and Security, International Conference on Research in Smart Cards, E-smart 2001, Cannes, France, September 19--21, 2001, Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 2140), Isabelle Attali and Thomas P. Jensen (Eds.). Springer, 200--210. https://doi.org/10.1007/3--540--45418--7_17
[50]
Oscar Reparaz, Begü l Bilgin, Svetla Nikova, Benedikt Gierlichs, and Ingrid Verbauwhede. 2015. Consolidating Masking Schemes. In CRYPTO 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978--3--662--47989--6_37
[51]
Peter Sewell. June 2020 (accessed January 14, 2022). ISA Formal Spec Public Review. https://github.com/riscvarchive/ISA_Formal_Spec_Public_Review.
[52]
Madura A. Shelton, Niels Samwel, Lejla Batina, Francesco Regazzoni, Markus Wagner, and Yuval Yarom. 2021. Rosita: Towards Automatic Elimination of Power-Analysis Leakage in Ciphers. In NDSS. The Internet Society.
Index Terms
- Power Contracts: Provably Complete Power Leakage Models for Processors
Recommendations
Collective Contracts for Message-Passing Parallel Programs
Computer Aided VerificationAbstractProcedure contracts are a well-known approach for specifying programs in a modular way. We investigate a new contract theory for collective procedures in parallel message-passing programs. As in the sequential setting, one can verify that a ...
Resilient uniformity: applying resiliency in masking
AbstractThreshold Implementations are known countermeasures defending against side-channel attacks via the use of masking techniques. While sufficient properties are known to defend against first-order side-channel attacks, it is not known how to achieve ...
Automated Negotiation of Privacy Contracts
COMPSAC '05: Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference - Volume 01Privacy in the Internet is currently not addressed or just stated to tacit acceptance. The user is left to either accept or deny the contractual conditions. A negotiation and thus dynamic contract placement would allow for fairer chances concerning ...
Comments
Information & Contributors
Information
Published In
November 2022
3598 pages
ISBN:9781450394505
DOI:10.1145/3548606
- General Chairs:
- Heng Yin,
- Angelos Stavrou,
- Program Chairs:
- Cas Cremers,
- Elaine Shi
Copyright © 2022 Owner/Author.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution International 4.0 License.
Sponsors
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
New York, NY, United States
Publication History
Published: 07 November 2022
Check for updates
Author Tags
Qualifiers
- Research-article
Funding Sources
- Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG)
- Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF)
Conference
CCS '22
Sponsor:
CCS '22: 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
November 7 - 11, 2022
CA, Los Angeles, USA
Acceptance Rates
Overall Acceptance Rate 1,261 of 6,999 submissions, 18%
Upcoming Conference
CCS '25
- Sponsor:
- sigsac
Contributors
Other Metrics
Bibliometrics & Citations
Bibliometrics
Article Metrics
- 0Total Citations
- 677Total Downloads
- Downloads (Last 12 months)335
- Downloads (Last 6 weeks)27
Reflects downloads up to 07 Nov 2024
Other Metrics
Citations
Cited By
View allView Options
Get Access
Login options
Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.
Sign in