The Wisdom of Strategic Voting
Pages 885 - 905
Abstract
We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the "correct" decision, outperforming the common non-strategic behavior of informative voting and sincere voting. Our results give merit to strategic voting for making good decisions.
To this end, we investigate a natural model, where voters' preferences between two alternatives depend on a discrete state variable that is not directly observable. Each voter receives a private signal that is correlated with the state variable. We reveal a surprising equilibrium between a strategy profile being a strong equilibrium and leading to the decision favored by the majority of agents conditioned on them knowing the ground truth (referred to as the informed majority decision): as the size of the vote goes to infinity, every ε-strong Bayes Nash Equilibrium with ε converging to 0 formed by strategic agents leads to the informed majority decision with probability converging to 1. On the other hand, we show that informative voting leads to the informed majority decision only under unbiased instances, and sincere voting leads to the informed majority decision only when it also forms an equilibrium.
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Published In
July 2023
1253 pages
ISBN:9798400701047
DOI:10.1145/3580507
- Chair:
- Kevin Leyton-Brown,
- Program Chair:
- Jason D Hartline,
- Program Co-chair:
- Larry Samuelson
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Published: 07 July 2023
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