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Information Design of a Delegated Search

Published: 07 July 2023 Publication History

Abstract

In this paper, we study a problem where a principal (e.g., a hiring manager, pharma company, advisor) delegates to an agent (e.g., a recruiter, biotech startup, student) a sequential search task spanning a time horizon of finite discrete periods. In each period, an agent's search generates an outcome of a priori uncertain value, whose distribution is publicly known. The agent bears the search cost and decides when to terminate the search. Once terminated, the principal and agent split the value from the search according to a pre-specified fraction. The realized value of each search outcome is only observable to the principal but not to the agent. Leveraging the information advantage, the principal designs an information policy to strategically provide the agent with some information about the search results over time.

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  1. Information Design of a Delegated Search

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    EC '23: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
    July 2023
    1253 pages
    ISBN:9798400701047
    DOI:10.1145/3580507
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s).

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    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 07 July 2023

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    Author Tags

    1. sequential decision making
    2. dynamic bayesian persuasion

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    EC '23
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    EC '23: 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
    July 9 - 12, 2023
    London, United Kingdom

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    Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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