We study the performance of anonymous posted-price selling mechanisms for a standard Bayesian auction setting, where n bidders have i.i.d. valuations for a single item. We show that for the natural class of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions, ...
Two classes of distributions that are widely used in the analysis of Bayesian auctions are the monotone hazard rate (MHR) and regular distributions. They can both be characterized in terms of the rate of change of the associated virtual value functions: ...
Sequential posted pricing auctions are popular because of their simplicity in practice and their tractability in theory. A usual assumption in their study is that the Bayesian prior distributions of the buyers are known to the seller, while in reality ...
Association for Computing Machinery
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