survey

A Taxonomy of Cyber Defence Strategies Against False Data Attacks in Smart Grids

Authors:

Haftu Tasew Reda,

Abdun Naser Mahmood,

Zahir TariAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Computing Surveys, Volume 55, Issue 14s

Article No.: 331, Pages 1 - 37

https://doi.org/10.1145/3592797

Published: 17 July 2023 Publication History

Abstract

The modern electric power grid, known as the Smart Grid, has fast transformed the isolated and centrally controlled power system to a fast and massively connected cyber-physical system that benefits from the revolutions happening in communications (such as 5G/6G) and the fast adoption of Internet of Things devices (such as intelligent electronic devices and smart meters). While the synergy of a vast number of cyber-physical entities has allowed the Smart Grid to be much more effective and sustainable in meeting the growing global energy challenges, it has also brought with it a large number of vulnerabilities resulting in breaches of data integrity, confidentiality, and availability. False data injection (FDI) appears to be among the most critical cyberattacks and has been a focal point of interest for both research and industry. To this end, this article presents a comprehensive review of the recent advances in defence countermeasures of FDI attacks on the Smart Grid. Relevant existing works of literature are evaluated and compared in terms of their theoretical and practical significance to Smart Grid cybersecurity. In conclusion, a range of technical limitations of existing false data attack detection research is identified, and a number of future research directions are recommended.

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Chang ZWu JLiang HWang YWang YXiong X(2024)A Review of Power System False Data Attack Detection Technology Based on Big DataInformation10.3390/info1508043915:8(439)Online publication date: 28-Jul-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/info15080439
Husnoo MAnwar AHosseinzadeh NIslam SMahmood ADoss R(2024)A Secure Federated Learning Framework for Residential Short-Term Load ForecastingIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid10.1109/TSG.2023.329238215:2(2044-2055)Online publication date: Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2023.3292382
Li JZhang Y(2024) FDI Attack Detection Based on L 2 Gain Performance Adaptive Integral Sliding Mode Observer 2024 IEEE 7th International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS)10.1109/ICPS59941.2024.10640058(1-6)Online publication date: 12-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICPS59941.2024.10640058
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Index Terms

A Taxonomy of Cyber Defence Strategies Against False Data Attacks in Smart Grids

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cover image ACM Computing Surveys

ACM Computing Surveys Volume 55, Issue 14s

December 2023

1355 pages

ISSN:0360-0300

EISSN:1557-7341

DOI:10.1145/3606253

Editor:
Albert Zomaya
University of Sydney, Australia

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Publication History

Published: 17 July 2023

Online AM: 14 April 2023

Accepted: 02 April 2023

Revised: 31 October 2022

Received: 19 January 2021

Published in CSUR Volume 55, Issue 14s

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Cited By

Chang ZWu JLiang HWang YWang YXiong X(2024)A Review of Power System False Data Attack Detection Technology Based on Big DataInformation10.3390/info1508043915:8(439)Online publication date: 28-Jul-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/info15080439
Husnoo MAnwar AHosseinzadeh NIslam SMahmood ADoss R(2024)A Secure Federated Learning Framework for Residential Short-Term Load ForecastingIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid10.1109/TSG.2023.329238215:2(2044-2055)Online publication date: Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2023.3292382
Li JZhang Y(2024) FDI Attack Detection Based on L 2 Gain Performance Adaptive Integral Sliding Mode Observer 2024 IEEE 7th International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS)10.1109/ICPS59941.2024.10640058(1-6)Online publication date: 12-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICPS59941.2024.10640058
Irmak EKabalci EKabalci Y(2023)Digital Transformation of Microgrids: A Review of Design, Operation, Optimization, and CybersecurityEnergies10.3390/en1612459016:12(4590)Online publication date: 8-Jun-2023
https://doi.org/10.3390/en16124590
Ge MZhang DQu GWu THan LWu H(2023)Network Attack Tracking Method for Digital Substation Power Industry Control System Based on Apriori Algorithm2023 9th International Conference on Computer and Communications (ICCC)10.1109/ICCC59590.2023.10507398(1206-1210)Online publication date: 8-Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCC59590.2023.10507398
Saffar MNaji H(2022)Increasing the Security of Advanced Metering Infrastructure Using Dynamic Defense Methods2022 12th Smart Grid Conference (SGC)10.1109/SGC58052.2022.9998971(1-5)Online publication date: 13-Dec-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/SGC58052.2022.9998971
Sharma PGillanders J(2022)Cybersecurity and Forensics in Connected Autonomous Vehicles: A Review of the State-of-the-ArtIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2022.321384310(108979-108996)Online publication date: 2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3213843

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