Cited By
View all- Aminian MManshadi VNiazadeh R(2023)Markovian Search with Socially Aware ConstraintsSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4347447Online publication date: 2023
Implementing Fairness Constraints in Markets Using Taxes and Subsidies
Pages 916 - 930
Abstract
Fisher markets are those where buyers with budgets compete for scarce items, a natural model for many real world markets including online advertising. A market equilibrium is a set of prices and allocations of items such that supply meets demand. We show how market designers can use taxes or subsidies in Fisher markets to ensure that market equilibrium outcomes fall within certain constraints. We show how these taxes and subsidies can be computed even in an online setting where the market designer does not have access to private valuations. We adapt various types of fairness constraints proposed in existing literature to the market case and show who benefits and who loses from these constraints, as well as the extent to which properties of markets including Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, and incentive compatibility are preserved. We find that some prior discussed constraints have few guarantees in terms of who is made better or worse off by their imposition.
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Index Terms
- Implementing Fairness Constraints in Markets Using Taxes and Subsidies
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June 2023
1929 pages
ISBN:9798400701924
DOI:10.1145/3593013
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Published: 12 June 2023
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FAccT '23
FAccT '23: the 2023 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency
June 12 - 15, 2023
IL, Chicago, USA
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View all- Aminian MManshadi VNiazadeh R(2023)Markovian Search with Socially Aware ConstraintsSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4347447Online publication date: 2023
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