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AutoCC: Automatic Discovery of Covert Channels in Time-Shared Hardware

Authors:

Marcelo Orenes-Vera,

David Wentzlaff,

Margaret MartonosiAuthors Info & Claims

MICRO '23: Proceedings of the 56th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture

Pages 871 - 885

https://doi.org/10.1145/3613424.3614254

Published: 08 December 2023 Publication History

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Abstract

Covert channels enable information leakage between security domains that should be isolated by observing execution differences in shared hardware. These channels can appear in any stateful shared resource, including caches, predictors, and accelerators. Previous works have identified many vulnerable components, demonstrating and defending against attacks via reverse engineering. However, this approach requires much human effort and reasoning. With the Cambrian explosion of specialized hardware, it is becoming increasingly difficult to identify all vulnerabilities manually.

To tackle this challenge, we propose AutoCC, a methodology that leverages formal property verification (FPV) to automatically discover covert channels in hardware that is shared between processes. AutoCC operates at the register-transfer level (RTL) to exhaustively examine any machine state left by a process after a context switch that creates an execution difference. Upon finding such a difference, AutoCC provides a precise execution trace showing how the information was encoded into the machine state and recovered.

Leveraging AutoCC’s flow to generate FPV testbenches that apply our methodology, we evaluated it on four open-source hardware projects, including two RISC-V cores and two accelerators. Without hand-written code or directed tests, AutoCC uncovered known covert channels (within minutes instead of many hours of test-driven emulations) and unknown ones. Although AutoCC is primarily intended to find covert channels, our evaluation has also found RTL bugs, demonstrating that AutoCC is an effective tool to test both the security and reliability of hardware designs.

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Cited By

Huang GSchuermann LLevy A(2024)Bridge: A Leak-Free Hardware-Software Architecture for Parallel Embedded SystemsProceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Kernel Isolation, Safety and Verification10.1145/3698576.3698765(16-22)Online publication date: 4-Nov-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3698576.3698765
Hölk KMazurczyk WZuppelli MCaviglione L(2024)Investigating HTTP Covert Channels Through Fuzz TestingProceedings of the 19th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security10.1145/3664476.3664493(1-9)Online publication date: 30-Jul-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3664476.3664493
Ceesay-Seitz KSolt FRazavi KLuo BLiao XXu JKirda ELie D(2024)μCFI: Formal Verification of Microarchitectural Control-flow IntegrityProceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3658644.3690344(213-227)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3690344
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

AutoCC: Automatic Discovery of Covert Channels in Time-Shared Hardware
1. Hardware
  1. Electronic design automation
    1. Methodologies for EDA
      1. Best practices for EDA
2. Security and privacy
  1. Security in hardware
    1. Hardware attacks and countermeasures
      1. Side-channel analysis and countermeasures
    2. Tamper-proof and tamper-resistant designs
  2. Systems security
    1. Information flow control

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MICRO '23: Proceedings of the 56th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture

October 2023

1528 pages

ISBN:9798400703294

DOI:10.1145/3613424

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Published: 08 December 2023

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Cited By

Huang GSchuermann LLevy A(2024)Bridge: A Leak-Free Hardware-Software Architecture for Parallel Embedded SystemsProceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Kernel Isolation, Safety and Verification10.1145/3698576.3698765(16-22)Online publication date: 4-Nov-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3698576.3698765
Hölk KMazurczyk WZuppelli MCaviglione L(2024)Investigating HTTP Covert Channels Through Fuzz TestingProceedings of the 19th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security10.1145/3664476.3664493(1-9)Online publication date: 30-Jul-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3664476.3664493
Ceesay-Seitz KSolt FRazavi KLuo BLiao XXu JKirda ELie D(2024)μCFI: Formal Verification of Microarchitectural Control-flow IntegrityProceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3658644.3690344(213-227)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3690344
Barthe GBöhme MCauligi SChuengsatiansup CGenkin DGuarnieri MMateos Romero DSchwabe PWu DYarom YLuo BLiao XXu JKirda ELie D(2024)Testing Side-channel Security of Cryptographic Implementations against Future MicroarchitecturesProceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3658644.3670319(1076-1090)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3670319

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