Structural Complexities of Matching Mechanisms
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- Structural Complexities of Matching Mechanisms
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Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities
<P>Labor markets can often be viewed as many-to-one matching markets. It is well known that if complementarities are present in such markets, a stable matching may not exist. We study large random matching markets with couples. We introduce a new ...
Matching with couples revisited
EC '11: Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerceIt is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high ...
Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities
Labor markets can often be viewed as many-to-one matching markets. It is well known that if complementarities are present in such markets, a stable matching may not exist. We study large random matching markets with couples. We introduce a new matching ...
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![cover image ACM Conferences](/cms/asset/de19c9d1-d71b-445e-8b46-5fbe0094e40c/3618260.cover.jpg)
- General Chairs:
- Bojan Mohar,
- Igor Shinkar,
- Program Chair:
- Ryan O'Donnell
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Association for Computing Machinery
New York, NY, United States
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