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FreeEM: Uncovering Parallel Memory EMR Covert Communication in Volatile Environments

Published: 04 June 2024 Publication History

Abstract

Memory Electromagnetic Radiation (EMR) allows attackers to manipulate the DRAM of infiltrated systems to leak sensitive secret information. Although most of the existing works have demonstrated its feasibility, practical concerns, such as the ideal electromagnetic environment and stationary attacking layout, make the covert channel attack less convincing, especially in vulnerable sites such as offices and data centers. This work removes the above impractical assumptions to uncover the potential of memory EMR by proposing the first parallel EMR covert communication protocol. Our design reshapes the current "1-to-1" covert communication mode to "n-to-1" mode via a novel pattern-based 2-dimensional symbol encoding scheme, allowing multiple victim computers to simultaneously perform data exfiltration to one attacker (the receiver) without mutual interference. Meanwhile, this novel scheme design also enables the very first mobile attacker, i.e., a smartphone connected to a software-defined radio (SDR) dongle, to capture parallel memory EMR signals in a volatile environment. Extensive experiments are conducted to verify the performance in a volatile environment with different parameter configurations, distances, motion modes, shielding materials, orientations, hardware configurations, and SDR platforms. Our experimental results demonstrate that FreeEM can support up to 4 parallel memory EMR transmissions to achieve an overall throughput of 625Kbps and a decoding accuracy of 96.88%. The maximum communication distance can reach up to 20 meters.

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  • (2024)Enhanced Intrusion Detection in Software-Defined Networking using Advanced Feature Selection: The EMRMR ApproachEngineering, Technology & Applied Science Research10.48084/etasr.925614:6(19001-19008)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024

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cover image ACM Conferences
MOBISYS '24: Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications and Services
June 2024
778 pages
ISBN:9798400705816
DOI:10.1145/3643832
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Published: 04 June 2024

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  1. memory EMR
  2. covert communication
  3. parallelism
  4. DRAM

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View all
  • (2024)Enhanced Intrusion Detection in Software-Defined Networking using Advanced Feature Selection: The EMRMR ApproachEngineering, Technology & Applied Science Research10.48084/etasr.925614:6(19001-19008)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024

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