A Study of Risk Assessment and Avoidance Strategies in Supplier Introduction

We explore the optimal decision-making of a repurchase contract coordinated supply chain under stochastic price conditions with asymmetric cost-of-sale information and risk aversion of suppliers. A new repurchase contract model is constructed on the basis of the premise assumptions, solved and verified by simulation with examples, and the effects of information asymmetry and risk aversion on the relevant decision variables of the supply chain are considered after the coupling of information asymmetry and risk aversion. The results of the study show that: under the condition of random price, no matter whether the information is symmetric or not, as long as the suppliers are risk-averse, the decision variables related to the supply chain undergo bifurcation; no matter whether the market price is random or not, and no matter whether the suppliers are risk-averse or not, as long as the retailers conceal the information of private cost of goods sold, it will bring extra benefits to themselves, but it will bring damages to the suppliers and the entire supply chain; the The more asymmetric the information, the greater the oscillation of the relevant decision variables in the bifurcation mutation region. The bifurcation mutation phenomenon is a unique phenomenon after the coupling of market price stochasticity and supplier risk aversion; retailers are able to take advantage of the information asymmetry to bring additional benefits to themselves, but it will damage the interests of suppliers and the supply chain; the best countermeasure for suppliers to guard against this kind of detrimental self-interested behavior of retailers is to prompt retailers to make the cost of goods sold openly available in the least costly way by designing a cooperative mechanism; In addition, suppliers are better able to improve their own decision-making by responding to external risks with a smooth mindset.