Optimal settlement strategy for the thermal power in the electricity market with highly penetration of renewable energy
Pages 399 - 403
Abstract
The evolution of green energy is relentless, prompting coal power enterprises to devise more robust operational strategies. With the implementation of capacity mechanisms, the choices surrounding electricity pricing and maximizing technical output assume paramount importance for coal power enterprises. Pricing strategies directly impact revenue streams, whereas decisions regarding maximum technical output have far-reaching implications for efficiency and reliability. Employing game theory, this study meticulously scrutinizes the decision-making dynamics of coal power enterprises concerning electricity pricing and maximum technical output post the adoption of capacity mechanisms. Findings reveal that the introduction of capacity mechanisms leads to a reduction in coal power prices, albeit decisions regarding maximum technical output encounter constraints. Furthermore, the efficacy of capacity mechanisms in benefiting coal power enterprises is contingent upon various factors, including government-set electricity prices.
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Index Terms
- Optimal settlement strategy for the thermal power in the electricity market with highly penetration of renewable energy
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Published In
May 2024
514 pages
ISBN:9798400709838
DOI:10.1145/3677892
Copyright © 2024 ACM.
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Association for Computing Machinery
New York, NY, United States
Publication History
Published: 26 August 2024
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DSAI 2024
DSAI 2024: 2024 International Conference on Digital Society and Artificial Intelligence
May 24 - 26, 2024
Qingdao, China
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