Article

Concurrent auctions across the supply chain

Authors:

Moshe Babaioff,

Noam NisanAuthors Info & Claims

EC '01: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce

Pages 1 - 10

https://doi.org/10.1145/501158.501159

Published: 14 October 2001 Publication History

Abstract

With the recent technological feasibility of electronic commerce over the Internet, much attention has been given to the design of electronic markets for various types of electronically-tradable goods. Such markets, however, will normally need to function in some relationship with markets for other related goods, usually those downstream or upstream in the supply chain. Thus, for example, an electronic market for rubber tires for trucks, will likely need to be strongly influenced by the rubber market as well as by the truck market.In this paper we design protocols for exchange of information between a sequence of markets along a single supply chain. These protocols allow each of these markets to function separately, while the information exchanged guarantees efficient global behavior across the supply chain. Each market form a link in the supply chain operates as a double auction, where the bids on one side of the double auction come from bidders in the corresponding segment of the industry, and the bids on the other side are synthetically generated by the protocol to express the combined information from all other links in the chain. The double auctions in each of the markets can be of several types, and we study several variants of incentive compatible double auctions, comparing them in terms of their efficiency and of the market revenue.

References

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Digital Library

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Cited By

Cui YYang LLi RXu X(2022)Online Double Auction for Wireless Spectrum Allocation With General Conflict GraphIEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology10.1109/TVT.2022.319245371:11(12222-12234)Online publication date: Nov-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/TVT.2022.3192453
Amin WAhmad FUmer KKhawaja AAfzal MAhmad SChaitusaney S(2022)An Effective Pricing Mechanism for Electricity Trading Considering Customer Preference and Reserved Price in Direct P2P Electricity Market Under Uncertainty in Grid SupplyIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2022.320512510(96197-96211)Online publication date: 2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3205125
Lin JPipattanasomporn MRahman S(2019)Comparative Analysis of Blockchain-based Smart Contracts for Solar Electricity Exchanges2019 IEEE Power & Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT)10.1109/ISGT.2019.8791632(1-5)Online publication date: Feb-2019
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Index Terms

Concurrent auctions across the supply chain
1. Applied computing
  1. Electronic commerce
2. Social and professional topics
  1. Professional topics
    1. Computing industry
      1. Computer manufacturing

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

EC '01: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce

October 2001

277 pages

ISBN:1581133871

DOI:10.1145/501158

Conference Chairs:
Michael P. Wellman
University of Michigan
,
Yoav Shoham
Stanford University

Copyright © 2001 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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SIGecom: Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 14 October 2001

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EC01: Third ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

October 14 - 17, 2001

Florida, Tampa, USA

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EC '01 Paper Acceptance Rate 35 of 100 submissions, 35%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Cited By

Cui YYang LLi RXu X(2022)Online Double Auction for Wireless Spectrum Allocation With General Conflict GraphIEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology10.1109/TVT.2022.319245371:11(12222-12234)Online publication date: Nov-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/TVT.2022.3192453
Amin WAhmad FUmer KKhawaja AAfzal MAhmad SChaitusaney S(2022)An Effective Pricing Mechanism for Electricity Trading Considering Customer Preference and Reserved Price in Direct P2P Electricity Market Under Uncertainty in Grid SupplyIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2022.320512510(96197-96211)Online publication date: 2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3205125
Lin JPipattanasomporn MRahman S(2019)Comparative Analysis of Blockchain-based Smart Contracts for Solar Electricity Exchanges2019 IEEE Power & Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT)10.1109/ISGT.2019.8791632(1-5)Online publication date: Feb-2019
https://doi.org/10.1109/ISGT.2019.8791632
Lin JPipattanasomporn MRahman S(2019)Comparative analysis of auction mechanisms and bidding strategies for P2P solar transactive energy marketsApplied Energy10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.113687255(113687)Online publication date: Dec-2019
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.113687
Zhang XZhu ZLi BZhu J(2019)Allocation and pricing of group-buying based on the fixed biddingMultimedia Tools and Applications10.1007/s11042-019-7302-4Online publication date: 8-Feb-2019
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11042-019-7302-4
Zhai XZhou TZhu CChen BFang WZhu K(2018)Truthful Double Auction for Joint Internet of Energy and Profit Optimization in Cognitive Radio NetworksIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2018.28175166(23180-23190)Online publication date: 2018
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2817516
Zong RGao XFeng X(2016)Truthful double auction of spectrum trading for femtocell service provisionWireless Communications and Mobile Computing10.1002/wcm.273816:17(2924-2938)Online publication date: 23-Sep-2016
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcm.2738
Chli MWinsper M(2015)Using the Max-Sum Algorithm for Supply Chain Emergence in Dynamic Multiunit EnvironmentsIEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems10.1109/TSMC.2014.235178245:3(422-435)Online publication date: Mar-2015
https://doi.org/10.1109/TSMC.2014.2351782
Huang HSun YLi XChen SXiao MHuang L(2015)Truthful Auction Mechanisms with Performance Guarantee in Secondary Spectrum MarketsIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2014.234397614:6(1315-1329)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2015
https://doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2014.2343976
Peng Li Song Guo (2015)Incentive mechanisms for device-to-device communicationsIEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking10.1109/MNET.2015.716619429:4(75-79)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/MNET.2015.7166194
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