HUNGARIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EUROPEAN LAW, 2024
Almost 700 cases concerning Hungary have been decided by the ECtHR since it delivered its first '... more Almost 700 cases concerning Hungary have been decided by the ECtHR since it delivered its first 'Hungarian' judgment on 20 May 1999. In nearly 94 % of all the decisions concerning Hungary, the ECtHR has found against the State, confirming at least one violation of the ECHR. Around 4 % of cases concerned Article 10 ECHR. This article analyses all Hungarian freedom of expression cases before the ECtHR, discusses their merits, finding the comparative common grounds and unpacking the differences. This is all them more justified, as the Hungarian Article 10 cases have significantly contributed to the ECtHR clarifying its position, in particular, as these had covered a wide range of aspects of freedom of expression, from defamation and political speech to new forms of online communication.
The European Union has opted for a different model in internet liability (also known as the “safe... more The European Union has opted for a different model in internet liability (also known as the “safe harbour model”) from the US regulation, which focuses on an automatic exemption. Although many issues have been debated since the adoption of the E-Commerce Directive (such as when to declare that the service provider has actual knowledge; what is a manifestly illegal content; what is the time limit within which the service provider must act; are we talking about an active or passive type of service provider), it would be beyond the scope of this study to examine these questions in detail. However, we have to point out that those questions are crucial in determining whether content has been lawfully removed or whether there are censorship effects. The two paths that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s thus outlined different regulatory directions, but in the intervening years, it has become clear from international judicial practice that they are converging.
The article argues that the Digital Services Act, as part of the EU’s broader attempt to regulate... more The article argues that the Digital Services Act, as part of the EU’s broader attempt to regulate intermediary services providers in a constantly growing and challenging technological, social and political environment, does not provide a final and comprehensive solution to the issue. The Digital Services Act appears inconsistent with the previous case law of European supranational judiciary forums regarding the prohibition of general monitoring by intermediary services providers. In fact, it provides the Member States with vaguely worded regulatory exceptions in the event of a ban on general monitoring. However, the Digital Services Act can be seen as a legitimate and necessary attempt to enforce the regulation at the European level through Member States while at the same time giving a unique regulatory position in specific cases to the European Commission or pan-European legal bodies in general. Finally, the Digital Services Act also turns initial enforced self-regulatory attempts to regulate social harms, possibly caused by intermediary services providers, into co-regulation.
Han pasado veintisiete años desde que se aprobó la "legislación sobre Internet" en Estados Unidos... more Han pasado veintisiete años desde que se aprobó la "legislación sobre Internet" en Estados Unidos, e Internet ha cambiado significativamente. Por ello, una pregunta que debe responderse es si la jurisprudencia debe colmar las lagunas de la amplia redacción del artículo 230 de la Communications Decency Act de 1996 o si el legislador aclarará las normas. ¿Ha colapsado Internet el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos de América? ¿Se ha sentado a mediados de 2023 un precedente decisivo que cambiará las reglas del juego en los casos Twitter contra Taamneh y Gonzalez contra Google? ¿Pueden utilizarse los algoritmos para apoyar actos de terrorismo? Sobre estas cuestiones, el SCOTUS adoptó una postura clara en 2023: no corresponde a los tribunales determinar el alcance de la inmunidad prevista por el CDA230.
IDP. Revista de Internet, Derecho y Política, 2024
Este artículo explora la relación entre deepfake y fake news a través de la lente del derecho. Se... more Este artículo explora la relación entre deepfake y fake news a través de la lente del derecho. Se divide en tres partes conceptuales principales: en primer lugar, se examina la base teórica, a continuación, se explora la relación entre desinformación y deepfake y, por último, se ofrece una visión general de la regulación pertinente en el contexto del contenido de noticias falsas deepfake (en particular las tendencias reguladoras de Estados Unidos, Europa y China). El documento presta especial atención a la percepción jurídica de la desinformación en el contexto de la tecnología deepfake, destacando las consecuencias sociales y jurídicas perjudiciales que conlleva. Se basa en una visión general de las normativas nacionales e internacionales y de la bibliografía pertinente, e incluye las soluciones propuestas por los autores a las controversias generadas por la desinformación deepfake.
HUNGARIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EUROPEAN LAW, 2024
Almost 700 cases concerning Hungary have been decided by the ECtHR since it delivered its first '... more Almost 700 cases concerning Hungary have been decided by the ECtHR since it delivered its first 'Hungarian' judgment on 20 May 1999. In nearly 94 % of all the decisions concerning Hungary, the ECtHR has found against the State, confirming at least one violation of the ECHR. Around 4 % of cases concerned Article 10 ECHR. This article analyses all Hungarian freedom of expression cases before the ECtHR, discusses their merits, finding the comparative common grounds and unpacking the differences. This is all them more justified, as the Hungarian Article 10 cases have significantly contributed to the ECtHR clarifying its position, in particular, as these had covered a wide range of aspects of freedom of expression, from defamation and political speech to new forms of online communication.
The European Union has opted for a different model in internet liability (also known as the “safe... more The European Union has opted for a different model in internet liability (also known as the “safe harbour model”) from the US regulation, which focuses on an automatic exemption. Although many issues have been debated since the adoption of the E-Commerce Directive (such as when to declare that the service provider has actual knowledge; what is a manifestly illegal content; what is the time limit within which the service provider must act; are we talking about an active or passive type of service provider), it would be beyond the scope of this study to examine these questions in detail. However, we have to point out that those questions are crucial in determining whether content has been lawfully removed or whether there are censorship effects. The two paths that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s thus outlined different regulatory directions, but in the intervening years, it has become clear from international judicial practice that they are converging.
The article argues that the Digital Services Act, as part of the EU’s broader attempt to regulate... more The article argues that the Digital Services Act, as part of the EU’s broader attempt to regulate intermediary services providers in a constantly growing and challenging technological, social and political environment, does not provide a final and comprehensive solution to the issue. The Digital Services Act appears inconsistent with the previous case law of European supranational judiciary forums regarding the prohibition of general monitoring by intermediary services providers. In fact, it provides the Member States with vaguely worded regulatory exceptions in the event of a ban on general monitoring. However, the Digital Services Act can be seen as a legitimate and necessary attempt to enforce the regulation at the European level through Member States while at the same time giving a unique regulatory position in specific cases to the European Commission or pan-European legal bodies in general. Finally, the Digital Services Act also turns initial enforced self-regulatory attempts to regulate social harms, possibly caused by intermediary services providers, into co-regulation.
Han pasado veintisiete años desde que se aprobó la "legislación sobre Internet" en Estados Unidos... more Han pasado veintisiete años desde que se aprobó la "legislación sobre Internet" en Estados Unidos, e Internet ha cambiado significativamente. Por ello, una pregunta que debe responderse es si la jurisprudencia debe colmar las lagunas de la amplia redacción del artículo 230 de la Communications Decency Act de 1996 o si el legislador aclarará las normas. ¿Ha colapsado Internet el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos de América? ¿Se ha sentado a mediados de 2023 un precedente decisivo que cambiará las reglas del juego en los casos Twitter contra Taamneh y Gonzalez contra Google? ¿Pueden utilizarse los algoritmos para apoyar actos de terrorismo? Sobre estas cuestiones, el SCOTUS adoptó una postura clara en 2023: no corresponde a los tribunales determinar el alcance de la inmunidad prevista por el CDA230.
IDP. Revista de Internet, Derecho y Política, 2024
Este artículo explora la relación entre deepfake y fake news a través de la lente del derecho. Se... more Este artículo explora la relación entre deepfake y fake news a través de la lente del derecho. Se divide en tres partes conceptuales principales: en primer lugar, se examina la base teórica, a continuación, se explora la relación entre desinformación y deepfake y, por último, se ofrece una visión general de la regulación pertinente en el contexto del contenido de noticias falsas deepfake (en particular las tendencias reguladoras de Estados Unidos, Europa y China). El documento presta especial atención a la percepción jurídica de la desinformación en el contexto de la tecnología deepfake, destacando las consecuencias sociales y jurídicas perjudiciales que conlleva. Se basa en una visión general de las normativas nacionales e internacionales y de la bibliografía pertinente, e incluye las soluciones propuestas por los autores a las controversias generadas por la desinformación deepfake.
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Papers by Gergely Gosztonyi
what is the time limit within which the service provider must act; are we talking about an active or passive type of service provider), it would be beyond the scope of this study to examine these questions in detail. However, we have to point out that those questions are crucial in determining
whether content has been lawfully removed or whether there are censorship effects. The two paths that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s thus outlined different regulatory directions, but in the intervening years, it has
become clear from international judicial practice that they are converging.
the Member States with vaguely worded regulatory exceptions in the event of a ban on general monitoring. However, the Digital Services Act can be seen as a legitimate and necessary attempt to enforce the regulation at the European level through Member States while at the same time giving a unique regulatory position in specific cases to the European Commission or pan-European legal bodies in general. Finally, the Digital Services Act also turns initial enforced self-regulatory attempts to regulate social harms, possibly caused by intermediary services providers, into co-regulation.
what is the time limit within which the service provider must act; are we talking about an active or passive type of service provider), it would be beyond the scope of this study to examine these questions in detail. However, we have to point out that those questions are crucial in determining
whether content has been lawfully removed or whether there are censorship effects. The two paths that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s thus outlined different regulatory directions, but in the intervening years, it has
become clear from international judicial practice that they are converging.
the Member States with vaguely worded regulatory exceptions in the event of a ban on general monitoring. However, the Digital Services Act can be seen as a legitimate and necessary attempt to enforce the regulation at the European level through Member States while at the same time giving a unique regulatory position in specific cases to the European Commission or pan-European legal bodies in general. Finally, the Digital Services Act also turns initial enforced self-regulatory attempts to regulate social harms, possibly caused by intermediary services providers, into co-regulation.