Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Metaphysics/archive1

Metaphysics

Featured article candidates/Metaphysics/archive1

Nominator(s): Phlsph7 (talk) 12:53, 30 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that examines the basic structure of reality. Some of its main topics include the categories of being, the concepts of possibility and necessity, the nature of spacetime, and the relation between mind and matter. It is relevant to many fields, ranging from other branches of philosophy to the sciences, which often implicitly rely on metaphysical concepts and ideas. Thanks to 750h+ for their GA review and to Patrick Welsh for their peer review! Phlsph7 (talk) 12:53, 30 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Generalissima's comments

Mark me down for a prose review here. Generalissima (talk) (it/she) 16:21, 30 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Hi Generalissima and thanks for taking a look! I was wondering whether you had some initial comments. Please feel under no obligation if now is not a good time. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:56, 18 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Apologies for my delay on this, Phlsph7! I knew I was forgetting something.

Lede is very solid throughout.
For ontology, in definitions, you need to italicize using the em template or em tags per MOS:EMPHASIS (I think this is for accessibility concerns.)
- Same with bare particular, Haecceity, red, coming before, being next to, etc. later on. There's just a lot of these. The only time you shouldn't be using the em tags/template is for foreign language term, which should use the lang template.
  Done. I'm a little confused about which cases fall under MOS:EMPHASIS and which ones under MOS:WORDSASWORDS. For now, I used the em-template for all cases that do not use expressions like "the term...", "is called...", "means...", etc. I hope I got all. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:02, 23 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Should ontological deflationism be bolded, or redlinked? I feel if it's a possible split in its own right, itd be better to redlink it (especially as the bolding is a bit distracting so far into the article).
You are right that having bold link target so far into the article can be confusing. I can't add a red link since we already have a redirect with that name. As an alternative, I put an anchor right to the paragraph where the bold terms appear and changed the redirect targets so they don't link to main section but right to the anchor. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:02, 23 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
However, not really any prose issues through the thing. I wasn't confused at any points,
Yay, a Deleuze mention. Love that guy.
All images are properly licensed. They also have alt text which is nice to see.

@Phlsph7: Not much here to fix! Generalissima (talk) (it/she) 18:56, 22 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks a lot for reviewing the prose and the images! Phlsph7 (talk) 13:02, 23 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Shapeyness

Another amazing article on a core topic in philosophy! Here are some initial comments from my first read through Shapeyness (talk) 15:30, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Hello Shapeyness, it has been a while. Thanks for reviewing the article! Phlsph7 (talk) 17:08, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

It is sometimes characterized as first philosophy to suggest that it is more fundamental than other forms of philosophical inquiry. It is probably best to attribute this idea, e.g. "Some philosophers, including Aristotle, designate metaphysics as first philosophy to suggest that it is more fundamental than other forms of philosophical inquiry."
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:08, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Universals are general repeatable entities that characterize particulars, like the color red. Would suggest simplifying or rewording this sentence a bit for the general reader
Done. It's probably still not ideal but I hope it's better now. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:08, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Yeah that's better! :) Shapeyness (talk) 20:23, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
metaphysics was once declared meaningless, and then revived with various criticisms of earlier theories and new approaches to metaphysical inquiry. imo this is a bit vague and awkwardly worded
Done. The new version is hopefull less awkwardly worded but I'm not sure I can do much about the vagueness without making it longer. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:08, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I think that's clear enough now, don't need to make it any longer. Shapeyness (talk) 20:24, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Phillips 1967 and Haack 1979 are relatively old sources to be using for the sentence about Strawson
I found a newer source to replace them. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:46, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks! Should the MacDonald source be citing page 18 instead? Shapeyness (talk) 20:33, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, page 18 supports our text more directly. I changed it. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:21, 14 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Veldsman 2017 and Heidegger 1996 - are these appropriate for the etymology section? On that note, the sources for "Metaphysics got its name by a historical accident" could maybe be better, I would expect them to be from historians/historians of philosophy focusing on Aristotle or etymologists, but maybe I'm missing something?
I removed Veldsman 2017 and Heidegger 1996 since the paragraph is already well-covered by the remaining sources. I found a source on the history of metaphysics for the part about the historical accident. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:46, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Do you have the quote you are using from that source? Shapeyness (talk) 20:34, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
From Hamlyn 2005, p. 590: The term ‘metaphysics’ originated, however, as a title given to some of Aristotle’s works in the catalogue of the edition of them produced by Andronicus of Rhodes in the second half of the first century bc (although it may have come from an earlier library classification). It meant simply the works which followed those on physics in the catalogue. But those works, which were concerned with being, both as such and in respect of various categories of it, especially substance, contain discussions concerning matters which have an obvious continuity with later metaphysical theories. Hence it is reasonable to see Aristotle’s Metaphysics, untidy though it is in the form in which it has come down to us, as the first systematic treatise in metaphysics... Phlsph7 (talk) 09:21, 14 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Ok I was wondering if it used the term historical accident. It doesn't use that phrase but paints the same picture as the other sources. Potentially could attribute "historical accident" phrasing but I'm not sure if that is necessary or not. Shapeyness (talk) 20:16, 14 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I weakened the claim about the historical accident. The exact term "historical accident" is found in the other sources. This became an issue during the DYK nomination since one of the suggested hooks used that expression. See Talk:Metaphysics#Did_you_know_nomination for the discussion and more quotes. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:57, 15 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Metaphysicians often regard existence or being as one of the most basic and general concepts Very minor one but Gibson 1998 and Vallicella 2010 are slightly weaker inclusions in the citation here imo
I removed them since the other references should be sufficient. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:46, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
exist outside space and time This is often used to get the idea across, but really "outside" is an inappropriate concept to use here as it is a spatial concept. The sentence is also quite long, although I didn't have any issue parsing it.
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:59, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The part on the problem of the many could do with some rewording so it's as clear as possible for the general reader
Reformulated. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:15, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

For instance, it raises the issue of whether a dust particle on a tabletop is part of the table. I think this could still do with some motivating, or the reader might just think "why would anyone think a dust particle is a part of the table?" I've not read the cited sources and whether they use particular examples, but could be worded in terms of atoms maybe, not sure what the best way to do it simply is. Shapeyness (talk) 20:45, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I used a different example about a coffee cup and a printer. Another common example focuses on the boundary of a cloud and whether a cloud is one or many. We could also use something else if you have a different idea. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 14 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I was trying to remember what example I'd heard before and it is the cloud one you mentioned. I think that is a more intuitive hook into the question because it it clear that the boundaries of the cloud are ambiguous, and hence that the question of which molecules of water it is that compose the cloud is also ambiguous. Shapeyness (talk) 19:57, 18 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Done, I hope the cloud example is more accessible. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:15, 19 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
They belong to modal metaphysics, which investigates the metaphysical principles underlying them This is a bit weirdly worded
Reformulated. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:15, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
A possible world is a complete and consistent way of how things could have been This is also a bit weirdly worded
Reformulated. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:15, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I read through the sources and I think the wording I'm finding strange is "a way of how", but I guess this is an attempt to avoid close paraphrasing? I would word it A possible world is a complete and consistent way things could have been. I don't think "way things could have been" being a shared wording with some of the sources should be a problem per WP:LIMITED and the fact that a few different sources all seem to use the same wording as a kind of standard definition. Shapeyness (talk) 21:06, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
A possible world is a complete and consistent way the totality of things could have been might also work. Shapeyness (talk) 21:42, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I used your second suggestion. I agree that for the short definition itself, WP:CLOSEPARAPHRASE shouldn't be a problem. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 14 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
McLaughlin 1999 - should this have a chapter/entry?
Added. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:15, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Züricher 2021 - is this a high quality source for metaphysics, it seems to be a psychotherapy handbook
Replaced. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:15, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Imaguire 2018 - this is a bit more specific compared to the other sources in this citation, I think it isn't needed
Removed. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:20, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
For example, the statement "a tomato is red" is true because there exists a red tomato as its truthmaker - as far as I'm aware, truthmakers are generally not identified with ordinary objects like tomatoes, they are usually identified with facts, states of affairs or tropes. Slightly nitpicky but also quite important to the debate I think (I can provide sources if useful).
I think you got a point that various truthmaker theories focus on facts. I tried to reformulate it in a way that leaves either option open so both thing ontologists and fact ontologists can read it the way they want. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:20, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Doesn't this still say that the red tomato is the truthmaker? A truthmaker of a statement is the entity whose existence makes the statement true. For example, the statement "a tomato is red" is true because of the existence of a red tomato as its truthmaker. The problem with the tomato being the truthmaker is that there is a possible world where the tomato is not red, so the tomato doesn't necessitate the truth of the statement. My understanding is that truthmaker theorists will generally say that the truthmaker is "the tomato's being red" or "the redness of the tomato" or "the fact that the tomato is red". Shapeyness (talk) 19:14, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Well, the expression "a red tomato" refers to a particular. The question is probably whether the expression "the existence of a red tomato" can refer to a fact.

The issue of necessitation most likely also depends on how we interpret the expression. Interpreted in a simple manner, a red tomato can't be blue at the same time, so we would be on the safe side. However, if "a red tomato" means "a tomato that is red in the actual world" then the tomato could have a different color in another world.

Our source, Tallant 2017 p. 1–2 (chapter 1. An introduction to truth-making), says: that ‘a tomato is red’ is true is due to there existing a red tomato. ... when we say that ‘ “the tomato is red” is true,’ we say this because there exists a red tomato.

Some alternative formulations:
For example, the existence of a red tomato or the tomato's being red acts as a truthmaker for the statement "a tomato is red".
This version covers several variations.

For example, the statement "a tomato is red" is true because of the fact that a tomato is red as its truthmaker.
This version focuses on facts. It might sound too tautological to some readers.

I'm also open to other suggestions. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:43, 11 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
How about For example, the fact that a tomato exists and that it is red acts as a truthmaker for the statement "a tomato is red"? It mirrors the kind of language the Tallant source uses for other claims (except I explicitly added the word "fact"). I think maybe there isn't a perfect way to reflect the nuance here in a way that will be picked up on by the someone who doesn't know anything about the topic without being overlong. Fwiw I'm drawing from thoughts similar to those in these overviews:
Take an alleged contingent truth about a certain rose, say that <The rose is red>. Clearly, the rose itself cannot be the truthmaker for this proposition, since given that it is contingent that it is red, it is possible for the rose to be another colour. But if it is possible for the rose to be another colour, then the rose itself does not necessitate the truth of <The rose is red> and so it is not its truthmaker. (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006)

The existence of such an object is not sufficient to satisfy [the truthmaker principle], however. The existence of something which happens to satisfy ‘x is a rose and x is red’ does not entail the truth of 〈The rose is red〉, since the object in question—a rose, which, as it happens, is red—might not have been red, and so there are possible worlds where that object exists yet 〈The rose is red〉 is false. (Beebee & Dodd 2005)

—Shapeyness (talk) 19:10, 11 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Sounds good. I implemented the suggestion and added these two sources. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:47, 12 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Ryckman 2005 - why is a book on philosophy of physics being used as a source on phenomenalism
Replaced. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:20, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The transcendental method is... do we need the sources other than Stern & Cheng 2023?
I also kept Pihlström 2009 since it has a section explicitly dedicated to the transcendental method but I removed the others. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:30, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I don't think we should label Hume a skeptic in Wikipedia's voice when that is a matter of controversy. According to the most recent philpapers survey only 37% of philosophers label Hume a skeptic vs 55% that call him a naturalist (when you filter by those specialising in 17th/18th century philosophy, that goes up to 63%)
I think it uncontroversial that Hume has a skeptical outlook about metaphysical knowledge but I changed the term to "critical outlook" to avoid problems. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:30, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I was thinking more about the discussion in the criticism section but I guess you're right that there's a difference between being skeptical of metaphysics and being a skeptic full stop. Do the sources generally phrase it using the term skepticism? If so then there's probably no problem. I don't have access to all of the sources used for those sentences. Shapeyness (talk) 19:34, 14 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
From Rea 2021, pp. 210–211: A priori theorizing about the world ... has long been viewed with skepticism ... One of the most well-known expressions of this sort of negative attitude toward metaphysics comes from David Hume

From Koons & Pickavance 2015, p. 4: A number of significant thinkers began to sound a new note in the late eighteenth century, raising doubts about the right of metaphysics to stand as a science among other fields of knowledge. David Hume, the great philosopher of Scotland, stands out as pre-eminent among these new antimetaphysicians.

I can look for more, but I think they should be sufficient for the way it is currently worded. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:57, 15 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Yep they should be good. Shapeyness (talk) 10:22, 16 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
New scientific discoveries have also influenced existing and inspired new metaphysical theories I think this should be something like "New scientific discoveries have also influenced existing metaphysical theories and inspired new ones."
Changed. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:30, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
History - do you think there is room for a sentence on Locke to fill out the major empiricist philosophers
I found a way to mention him in relation to Hume. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:30, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
At the turn of the 20th century in analytic philosophy, philosophers such as Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and G. E. Moore (1873–1958) led a "revolt against idealism" Maybe this can be explained slightly (e.g. why? how?), obviously we don't want lots of detail
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:30, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Hi Shapeyness, I was wondering if you felt in a position to either support or oppose this nomination? Obviously, neither is obligatory. Thanks. Gog the Mild (talk) 12:56, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

@Gog the Mild: Have left some final comments below

Shapeyness (talk) 14:09, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for responding to those Phlsph7! Some more below, should hopefully be the final set of comments. Shapeyness (talk) 14:08, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

A related mereological problem is whether there are simple entities that have no parts, as atomists claim, or not, as continuum theorists contend. I think it would be clearer to list both options here, e.g. "A related mereological problem is whether there are simple entities that have no parts, as atomists claim, or whether everything can be endlessly subdivided into smaller parts, as continuum theorists contend."
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:14, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The history of metaphysics examines how the inquiry into the basic structure of reality has evolved in the course of history. Imo this is redundant and the following sentence would be a stronger start
Removed. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:14, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
"The American Heritage Dictionary Entry: Existence" Believe the title should just be "Existence"
Changed. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:14, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Retrieved date seems to be used inconsistently unless I'm missing something, not sure if that needs to be consistent per 2c or not
I removed them from all Google Book links, where they don't really belong. Did you spot other inconsistencies? Phlsph7 (talk) 18:05, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I'm still not sure what the logic behind which have a retrieved date and which don't but this is such a minor point anyway. Shapeyness (talk) 13:13, 23 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
A lot of the sources have urls linked from the book title that I think should be linked from the chapter title
I think this happens for cite templates that use the parameter "url". For all templates that specify a chapter, I changed the parameter "url" to "chapter-url". I hope this solves the problem. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:14, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Chen 2023 - is this a high quality source for history of philosophy?
This is one of the sources by a non-Western publisher. For them, I'm usually a little less strict since they can be hard to find. But let me know if you think otherwise. The sentence is covered by the remaining soures and this one could be removed. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:39, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Duignan 2009a - why is this 2009a and not just 2009?
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:14, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Goffi & Roux 2011 - this is missing editors
Added. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:29, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Kind 2018 - I think part of the book title should actually be the series title
Changed. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:29, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Macnamara 2009 - is this a hiqh quality source for philosophy?
Removed. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:39, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Mumford 2003 - this is missing editors
Mumford is given as the editor in the template. I didn't add an author. The author would usually be Russell since the book is mostly a selection of Russell's writings but the passage in question is a comment by Mumford. I'm not sure if this is the best practice. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:29, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Oops no that was a mistake from me. Shapeyness (talk) 18:01, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Poidevin et al. 2009 - this is an edited collection, should an individual chapter/chapters be cited?
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:29, 21 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Some more general comments: reading over the overview sources, there aren't any major areas that aren't covered although a few cover social metaphysics a bit more (having said that, some don't mention it at all). Also, the article mentions truthmakers, but it doesn't go much into theories of truth - a few of the overviews have truth as a high level section. Obviously there can never be a completely comprehensive article so fine to leave out if you think these would overexpand the article. This might be a reflection of the discipline across history, but I also can't see any philosophers mentioned that aren't men.
I added a sentence on theories of truth. In principle, it could be expanded, but I'm not sure that we should. I found a way to mention Hypatia. I'm open to more suggestions. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:21, 22 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I don't have a broad enough knowledge of the history of philosophy to know which female philosophers would be the best to include sadly, but Anscombe might be worth a mention in relation to the idea that causation can be non-deterministic. Her SEP article has a good section if she isn't mentioned in any of the sources in that part already. Shapeyness (talk) 01:19, 23 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I added a footnote to the section on causality. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:51, 23 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Support: While I think it would be nice for there to be more representation of philosophers who aren't men in the main body of the article, and perhaps more discussion of social metaphysics, I don't think either of these prevent the article from meeting the FA criteria. The article is as accessible as possible throughout, covers all major areas to at least some extent without delving into too much detail, and is well-structured, illustrated and cited. Shapeyness (talk) 13:21, 23 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

750h

Will review once the above leaves their final comments. 750 h+ 23:18, 18 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]