Los expertos están divididos entre los que defienden que el terrorismo es un instrumento eficaz p... more Los expertos están divididos entre los que defienden que el terrorismo es un instrumento eficaz para conseguir concesiones políticas y aquellos que argumentan que son muy pocos los grupos terroristas que han conseguido sus objetivos estratégicos a largo plazo. El éxito o no de la violencia política es una cuestión de vital importancia a nivel teórico y práctico para los gobiernos y sociedades que se enfrentan a amenazas terroristas, así como para los propios grupos terroristas (interesados en la supervivencia del grupo). La relevancia operativa resulta, también, incuestionable: identificar las condiciones que llevan al fracaso del terrorismo sería de gran utilidad para los responsables de la seguridad. Este número aborda estas y otras aportaciones recientes al debate sobre la eficacia del terrorismo; destaca varias de las problemáticas inherentes a la discusión académica y ofrece una series de estudios de caso: desde el terrorismo yihadista en el Reino Unido y Francia hasta la estrategia no violenta en el Sáhara Occidental, pasando por la violencia revolucionaria en El Salvador y Uruguay.
How do militant organizations respond to counterterrorism? A vast literature seeks to understand ... more How do militant organizations respond to counterterrorism? A vast literature seeks to understand the effects of counterterrorism, examining outcomes such as levels of violence. However, violence is only one way that militant groups can respond to pressure. We focus on terrorist designation or proscription, the sanctions many states and international organizations impose on militants as an attempt to weaken them. We introduce a new typology of armed group responses to counterterrorism: (L)egal tactics like lawsuits or petitions, (I)dentity shifts like name changes or fragmentation, (V)iolence increases or decreases, and (E)conomic or financial tactics such as changing funding sources. These four approaches can be summarized by the acronym LIVE. Empirically, we illustrate the model with examples from the case of militant organizations in Pakistan, an important and under-studied case. Overall, the LIVE typology can be helpful for anticipating the repertoire of responses to counterterrorism, and for explaining armed group behavior generally.
Supplemental Material, insurgent_terrorism_appendix_august_2018 for Carrots, Sticks, and Insurgen... more Supplemental Material, insurgent_terrorism_appendix_august_2018 for Carrots, Sticks, and Insurgent Targeting of Civilians by Victor Asal, Brian J. Phillips, R. Karl Rethemeyer, Corina Simonelli, and Joseph K. Young in Journal of Conflict Resolution
Which countries are likely to be subjects of research in the study of armed conflict? Evidence fr... more Which countries are likely to be subjects of research in the study of armed conflict? Evidence from other fields suggests that research often focuses disproportionately on the West, but it is unclear to what extent this is true in conflict studies. We suggest that a baseline explanation of research focus is each country’s conflict experience, and we present two additional hypotheses: Western bias and research feasibility. Empirically, we count countries in the abstracts of five prominent conflict or security journals, 1990–2015. We also manually count single-country case studies. Western countries, measured by U.N. voting or geographic location, appear more than non-Western countries, even after considering conflict, wealth, and other factors. There is less support for the research feasibility argument, measured by each country’s official languages and democracy. We find French- and Spanish-language countries less likely to appear in the literature. We conclude with a discussion of ...
ABSTRACTCriminal groups often avoid the limelight, shunning publicity. However, in some instances... more ABSTRACTCriminal groups often avoid the limelight, shunning publicity. However, in some instances, they overtly communicate, such as with banners or signs. This article explains the competition dynamics behind public criminal communication and provides theory and evidence of the conditions under which it emerges. Relying on a new dataset of approximately 1,800 banners publicly deployed by Mexican criminal groups from 2007 to 2010, the study identifies the conditions behind such messaging. The findings suggest that criminal groups “go public” in the presence of interorganizational contestation, violence from authorities, antagonism toward the local media, local demand for drugs, and local drug production. Some of these factors are associated only with communication toward particular audiences: rivals, the state, or the public. An interesting finding is that the correlates of criminal propaganda are sometimes distinct from those of criminal violence, suggesting that these phenomena ar...
Most terrorism is carried out by organizations with particular political motivations, mobilizatio... more Most terrorism is carried out by organizations with particular political motivations, mobilization issues, and other characteristics that affect their behavior, including their attacks. Group dynamics are often overlooked when research focuses on units of analysis such as countries or individuals. However, understanding the organizational dynamics of terrorism can shed light on this type of violence in important ways. This chapter begins by discussing definitions of key concepts, and then analyzes recent literature on several prominent topics: outbidding, internal group dynamics, and organizational longevity or failure. It concludes by noting potential avenues for future research, including more work on strategic interactions between terrorist organizations and states, as well as increased dialogue with research on related topics such as civil conflict.
In the past 10 years in Mexico, more than 100,000 people have been killed in violence related to ... more In the past 10 years in Mexico, more than 100,000 people have been killed in violence related to organized crime. Some attacks have left horrific scenes, meant to send messages to the public or government. Debate continues about how to characterize this violence, and some observers describe it as “terrorism” or its perpetrators as “terrorists.” This article emphasizes that Mexico has experienced terrorist tactics by criminal organizations. This implies that while the perpetrators are better thought of (and dealt with) as criminal groups, some of their violence at least partially fulfills the criteria to be defined as terrorism. The use of terrorist tactics by criminal groups is an understudied aspect of the crime-terror nexus because more research examines crime by terrorist groups. The article discusses three tactics seen in Mexico: bombings, violent communication, and attacks against politicians. It then presents comparable examples from other countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, ...
How do conciliatory and coercive counterinsurgency tactics affect militant group violence against... more How do conciliatory and coercive counterinsurgency tactics affect militant group violence against civilians? Scholars of civil war increasingly seek to understand intentional civilian targeting, often referred to as terrorism. Extant research emphasizes group weakness, or general state attributes such as regime type. We focus on terrorism as violent communication and as a response to government actions. State tactics toward groups, carrots and sticks, should be important for explaining insurgent terror. We test the argument using new data on terrorism by insurgent groups, with many time-varying variables, covering 1998 through 2012. Results suggest government coercion against a group is associated with subsequent terrorism by that group. However, this is only the case for larger insurgent groups, which raises questions about the notion of terrorism as a weapon of the weak. Carrots are often negatively related to group terrorism. Other factors associated with insurgent terrorism incl...
ABSTRACT How does branding militant groups as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs) affect the... more ABSTRACT How does branding militant groups as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs) affect them? Beyond its obvious policy importance, this question speaks to debates about counterterrorism, terrorism financing, and organizational dynamics of subnational violence. This article analyzes FTO designation, a key policy used by the U.S. government since 1997 to impose costs on foreign terrorist groups and those who might support them. Contrary to arguments that sanctions are ineffective and that terrorism is too “cheap” to be affected, it is argued that designation should weaken terrorist groups, reducing their attacks over time. However, the effect is probably conditional. FTO designation should be especially effective against groups operating in U.S.-aligned countries, given the importance of international cooperation in counterterrorism. Global quantitative analyses suggest that FTOs operating in U.S.-aligned countries carry out fewer attacks over time than other groups, taking many other factors into consideration.
What explains the emergence of vigilante organizations? Throughout the world, vigilantes emerge t... more What explains the emergence of vigilante organizations? Throughout the world, vigilantes emerge to illegally punish perceived criminals, often leading to serious consequences. However, the literature presents partial and conflicting explanations for this phenomenon. This article argues that local economic inequality creates a situation ripe for vigilante organizations. Inequality creates demand for vigilantism because poorer citizens feel relatively deprived of security compared with wealthier neighbors who have advantages regarding private and public security. In addition, inequality suggests a patron-and-worker distribution of labor, and this is ideal for organizing a particular type of group, the patron-funded vigilante group. Empirical tests use original data on the 2013 wave of Mexican vigilante organizations, present in 13 of Mexico’s 32 federal entities. Municipal-level income inequality is robustly associated with organized vigilantism. Less support is found for competing ex...
Spanish Abstract: ?Por que algunos grupos terroristas perduran mas que otros? ?Que nos revela est... more Spanish Abstract: ?Por que algunos grupos terroristas perduran mas que otros? ?Que nos revela esta longevidad sobre la eficacia de las organizaciones terroristas? Este articulo examina, en primer lugar, por que la supervivencia organizativa puede considerarse un factor de eficacia organizativa. En segundo lugar, se revisa la literatura sobre la longevidad de los grupos terroristas –incluyendo el examen sistematico de diez estudios cuantitativos sobre este tema. El analisis muestra que unos pocos factores estan asociados a la longevidad recurrentemente –entre ellos, el tamano del grupo y la participacion en alianzas de grupos terroristas. En tercer lugar, y dado el interes teorico por las relaciones interorganizativas, se toman en consideracion argumentos para explicar por que las alianzas de grupos terroristas, y tambien la competencia entre grupos, probablemente contribuyen a la longevidad del grupo. Por ultimo, se ofrecen sugerencias para avanzar en la investigacion sobre esta tem...
Los expertos están divididos entre los que defienden que el terrorismo es un instrumento eficaz p... more Los expertos están divididos entre los que defienden que el terrorismo es un instrumento eficaz para conseguir concesiones políticas y aquellos que argumentan que son muy pocos los grupos terroristas que han conseguido sus objetivos estratégicos a largo plazo. El éxito o no de la violencia política es una cuestión de vital importancia a nivel teórico y práctico para los gobiernos y sociedades que se enfrentan a amenazas terroristas, así como para los propios grupos terroristas (interesados en la supervivencia del grupo). La relevancia operativa resulta, también, incuestionable: identificar las condiciones que llevan al fracaso del terrorismo sería de gran utilidad para los responsables de la seguridad. Este número aborda estas y otras aportaciones recientes al debate sobre la eficacia del terrorismo; destaca varias de las problemáticas inherentes a la discusión académica y ofrece una series de estudios de caso: desde el terrorismo yihadista en el Reino Unido y Francia hasta la estrategia no violenta en el Sáhara Occidental, pasando por la violencia revolucionaria en El Salvador y Uruguay.
How do militant organizations respond to counterterrorism? A vast literature seeks to understand ... more How do militant organizations respond to counterterrorism? A vast literature seeks to understand the effects of counterterrorism, examining outcomes such as levels of violence. However, violence is only one way that militant groups can respond to pressure. We focus on terrorist designation or proscription, the sanctions many states and international organizations impose on militants as an attempt to weaken them. We introduce a new typology of armed group responses to counterterrorism: (L)egal tactics like lawsuits or petitions, (I)dentity shifts like name changes or fragmentation, (V)iolence increases or decreases, and (E)conomic or financial tactics such as changing funding sources. These four approaches can be summarized by the acronym LIVE. Empirically, we illustrate the model with examples from the case of militant organizations in Pakistan, an important and under-studied case. Overall, the LIVE typology can be helpful for anticipating the repertoire of responses to counterterrorism, and for explaining armed group behavior generally.
Supplemental Material, insurgent_terrorism_appendix_august_2018 for Carrots, Sticks, and Insurgen... more Supplemental Material, insurgent_terrorism_appendix_august_2018 for Carrots, Sticks, and Insurgent Targeting of Civilians by Victor Asal, Brian J. Phillips, R. Karl Rethemeyer, Corina Simonelli, and Joseph K. Young in Journal of Conflict Resolution
Which countries are likely to be subjects of research in the study of armed conflict? Evidence fr... more Which countries are likely to be subjects of research in the study of armed conflict? Evidence from other fields suggests that research often focuses disproportionately on the West, but it is unclear to what extent this is true in conflict studies. We suggest that a baseline explanation of research focus is each country’s conflict experience, and we present two additional hypotheses: Western bias and research feasibility. Empirically, we count countries in the abstracts of five prominent conflict or security journals, 1990–2015. We also manually count single-country case studies. Western countries, measured by U.N. voting or geographic location, appear more than non-Western countries, even after considering conflict, wealth, and other factors. There is less support for the research feasibility argument, measured by each country’s official languages and democracy. We find French- and Spanish-language countries less likely to appear in the literature. We conclude with a discussion of ...
ABSTRACTCriminal groups often avoid the limelight, shunning publicity. However, in some instances... more ABSTRACTCriminal groups often avoid the limelight, shunning publicity. However, in some instances, they overtly communicate, such as with banners or signs. This article explains the competition dynamics behind public criminal communication and provides theory and evidence of the conditions under which it emerges. Relying on a new dataset of approximately 1,800 banners publicly deployed by Mexican criminal groups from 2007 to 2010, the study identifies the conditions behind such messaging. The findings suggest that criminal groups “go public” in the presence of interorganizational contestation, violence from authorities, antagonism toward the local media, local demand for drugs, and local drug production. Some of these factors are associated only with communication toward particular audiences: rivals, the state, or the public. An interesting finding is that the correlates of criminal propaganda are sometimes distinct from those of criminal violence, suggesting that these phenomena ar...
Most terrorism is carried out by organizations with particular political motivations, mobilizatio... more Most terrorism is carried out by organizations with particular political motivations, mobilization issues, and other characteristics that affect their behavior, including their attacks. Group dynamics are often overlooked when research focuses on units of analysis such as countries or individuals. However, understanding the organizational dynamics of terrorism can shed light on this type of violence in important ways. This chapter begins by discussing definitions of key concepts, and then analyzes recent literature on several prominent topics: outbidding, internal group dynamics, and organizational longevity or failure. It concludes by noting potential avenues for future research, including more work on strategic interactions between terrorist organizations and states, as well as increased dialogue with research on related topics such as civil conflict.
In the past 10 years in Mexico, more than 100,000 people have been killed in violence related to ... more In the past 10 years in Mexico, more than 100,000 people have been killed in violence related to organized crime. Some attacks have left horrific scenes, meant to send messages to the public or government. Debate continues about how to characterize this violence, and some observers describe it as “terrorism” or its perpetrators as “terrorists.” This article emphasizes that Mexico has experienced terrorist tactics by criminal organizations. This implies that while the perpetrators are better thought of (and dealt with) as criminal groups, some of their violence at least partially fulfills the criteria to be defined as terrorism. The use of terrorist tactics by criminal groups is an understudied aspect of the crime-terror nexus because more research examines crime by terrorist groups. The article discusses three tactics seen in Mexico: bombings, violent communication, and attacks against politicians. It then presents comparable examples from other countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, ...
How do conciliatory and coercive counterinsurgency tactics affect militant group violence against... more How do conciliatory and coercive counterinsurgency tactics affect militant group violence against civilians? Scholars of civil war increasingly seek to understand intentional civilian targeting, often referred to as terrorism. Extant research emphasizes group weakness, or general state attributes such as regime type. We focus on terrorism as violent communication and as a response to government actions. State tactics toward groups, carrots and sticks, should be important for explaining insurgent terror. We test the argument using new data on terrorism by insurgent groups, with many time-varying variables, covering 1998 through 2012. Results suggest government coercion against a group is associated with subsequent terrorism by that group. However, this is only the case for larger insurgent groups, which raises questions about the notion of terrorism as a weapon of the weak. Carrots are often negatively related to group terrorism. Other factors associated with insurgent terrorism incl...
ABSTRACT How does branding militant groups as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs) affect the... more ABSTRACT How does branding militant groups as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs) affect them? Beyond its obvious policy importance, this question speaks to debates about counterterrorism, terrorism financing, and organizational dynamics of subnational violence. This article analyzes FTO designation, a key policy used by the U.S. government since 1997 to impose costs on foreign terrorist groups and those who might support them. Contrary to arguments that sanctions are ineffective and that terrorism is too “cheap” to be affected, it is argued that designation should weaken terrorist groups, reducing their attacks over time. However, the effect is probably conditional. FTO designation should be especially effective against groups operating in U.S.-aligned countries, given the importance of international cooperation in counterterrorism. Global quantitative analyses suggest that FTOs operating in U.S.-aligned countries carry out fewer attacks over time than other groups, taking many other factors into consideration.
What explains the emergence of vigilante organizations? Throughout the world, vigilantes emerge t... more What explains the emergence of vigilante organizations? Throughout the world, vigilantes emerge to illegally punish perceived criminals, often leading to serious consequences. However, the literature presents partial and conflicting explanations for this phenomenon. This article argues that local economic inequality creates a situation ripe for vigilante organizations. Inequality creates demand for vigilantism because poorer citizens feel relatively deprived of security compared with wealthier neighbors who have advantages regarding private and public security. In addition, inequality suggests a patron-and-worker distribution of labor, and this is ideal for organizing a particular type of group, the patron-funded vigilante group. Empirical tests use original data on the 2013 wave of Mexican vigilante organizations, present in 13 of Mexico’s 32 federal entities. Municipal-level income inequality is robustly associated with organized vigilantism. Less support is found for competing ex...
Spanish Abstract: ?Por que algunos grupos terroristas perduran mas que otros? ?Que nos revela est... more Spanish Abstract: ?Por que algunos grupos terroristas perduran mas que otros? ?Que nos revela esta longevidad sobre la eficacia de las organizaciones terroristas? Este articulo examina, en primer lugar, por que la supervivencia organizativa puede considerarse un factor de eficacia organizativa. En segundo lugar, se revisa la literatura sobre la longevidad de los grupos terroristas –incluyendo el examen sistematico de diez estudios cuantitativos sobre este tema. El analisis muestra que unos pocos factores estan asociados a la longevidad recurrentemente –entre ellos, el tamano del grupo y la participacion en alianzas de grupos terroristas. En tercer lugar, y dado el interes teorico por las relaciones interorganizativas, se toman en consideracion argumentos para explicar por que las alianzas de grupos terroristas, y tambien la competencia entre grupos, probablemente contribuyen a la longevidad del grupo. Por ultimo, se ofrecen sugerencias para avanzar en la investigacion sobre esta tem...
Prominent scholars criticize terrorism research for lacking sufficient empirical testing of argum... more Prominent scholars criticize terrorism research for lacking sufficient empirical testing of arguments. Interestingly, one of the most widely-cited estimates in terrorism studies has not been evaluated using the many data sources now available. Rapoport's 1992 claim, that perhaps 90 percent of terrorist groups last less than one year, has been described as part of the conventional wisdom. This estimate is frequently used to justify studies of terrorist group longevity, a substantial line of research in recent years. Is the estimate accurate? Scholars increasingly publish data sets of terrorist organizations, but no one has analyzed them collectively to see if the 90 percent claim holds up. This article examines the eight largest global data sets of terrorist group longevity, covering 1968-2013. The samples vary considerably, but the percent of groups that do not survive beyond their first year in these relevant data sets is between 25-74 percent. Across all data sets, on average about 50 percent of terrorist organizations do not make it past their first year. There is some variation depending on group motivations, consistent with Rapoport's " wave " theory. However, overall, terrorist organizations appear to be more durable than the conventional wisdom suggests.
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