Brian Phillips
University of Essex, Department of Government, Faculty Member
Los expertos están divididos entre los que defienden que el terrorismo es un instrumento eficaz para conseguir concesiones políticas y aquellos que argumentan que son muy pocos los grupos terroristas que han conseguido sus objetivos... more
Los expertos están divididos entre los que defienden que el terrorismo es un instrumento eficaz para conseguir concesiones políticas y aquellos que argumentan que son muy pocos los grupos terroristas que han conseguido sus objetivos estratégicos a largo plazo. El éxito o no de la violencia política es una cuestión de vital importancia a nivel teórico y práctico para los gobiernos y sociedades que se enfrentan a amenazas terroristas, así como para los propios grupos terroristas (interesados en la supervivencia del grupo). La relevancia operativa resulta, también, incuestionable: identificar las condiciones que llevan al fracaso del terrorismo sería de gran utilidad para los responsables de la seguridad. Este número aborda estas y otras aportaciones recientes al debate sobre la eficacia del terrorismo; destaca varias de las problemáticas inherentes a la discusión académica y ofrece una series de estudios de caso: desde el terrorismo yihadista en el Reino Unido y Francia hasta la estrategia no violenta en el Sáhara Occidental, pasando por la violencia revolucionaria en El Salvador y Uruguay.
Research Interests: History, Comparative Politics, International Relations, Effectiveness, International Security, and 14 moreWar Studies, Political Science, Security Studies, Political Violence and Terrorism, El Salvador, Counter terrorism, France, Uruguay, United Kingdom, Western Sahara, Relaciones Internacionales, Terorism, Violencia Política, and Terrorismo
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How do militant organizations respond to counterterrorism? A vast literature seeks to understand the effects of counterterrorism, examining outcomes such as levels of violence. However, violence is only one way that militant groups can... more
How do militant organizations respond to counterterrorism? A vast literature seeks to understand the effects of counterterrorism, examining outcomes such as levels of violence. However, violence is only one way that militant groups can respond to pressure. We focus on terrorist designation or proscription, the sanctions many states and international organizations impose on militants as an attempt to weaken them. We introduce a new typology of armed group responses to counterterrorism: (L)egal tactics like lawsuits or petitions, (I)dentity shifts like name changes or fragmentation, (V)iolence increases or decreases, and (E)conomic or financial tactics such as changing funding sources. These four approaches can be summarized by the acronym LIVE. Empirically, we illustrate the model with examples from the case of militant organizations in Pakistan, an important and under-studied case. Overall, the LIVE typology can be helpful for anticipating the repertoire of responses to counterterrorism, and for explaining armed group behavior generally.
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Supplemental Material, insurgent_terrorism_appendix_august_2018 for Carrots, Sticks, and Insurgent Targeting of Civilians by Victor Asal, Brian J. Phillips, R. Karl Rethemeyer, Corina Simonelli, and Joseph K. Young in Journal of Conflict... more
Supplemental Material, insurgent_terrorism_appendix_august_2018 for Carrots, Sticks, and Insurgent Targeting of Civilians by Victor Asal, Brian J. Phillips, R. Karl Rethemeyer, Corina Simonelli, and Joseph K. Young in Journal of Conflict Resolution
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Which countries are likely to be subjects of research in the study of armed conflict? Evidence from other fields suggests that research often focuses disproportionately on the West, but it is unclear to what extent this is true in... more
Which countries are likely to be subjects of research in the study of armed conflict? Evidence from other fields suggests that research often focuses disproportionately on the West, but it is unclear to what extent this is true in conflict studies. We suggest that a baseline explanation of research focus is each country’s conflict experience, and we present two additional hypotheses: Western bias and research feasibility. Empirically, we count countries in the abstracts of five prominent conflict or security journals, 1990–2015. We also manually count single-country case studies. Western countries, measured by U.N. voting or geographic location, appear more than non-Western countries, even after considering conflict, wealth, and other factors. There is less support for the research feasibility argument, measured by each country’s official languages and democracy. We find French- and Spanish-language countries less likely to appear in the literature. We conclude with a discussion of ...
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ABSTRACTCriminal groups often avoid the limelight, shunning publicity. However, in some instances, they overtly communicate, such as with banners or signs. This article explains the competition dynamics behind public criminal... more
ABSTRACTCriminal groups often avoid the limelight, shunning publicity. However, in some instances, they overtly communicate, such as with banners or signs. This article explains the competition dynamics behind public criminal communication and provides theory and evidence of the conditions under which it emerges. Relying on a new dataset of approximately 1,800 banners publicly deployed by Mexican criminal groups from 2007 to 2010, the study identifies the conditions behind such messaging. The findings suggest that criminal groups “go public” in the presence of interorganizational contestation, violence from authorities, antagonism toward the local media, local demand for drugs, and local drug production. Some of these factors are associated only with communication toward particular audiences: rivals, the state, or the public. An interesting finding is that the correlates of criminal propaganda are sometimes distinct from those of criminal violence, suggesting that these phenomena ar...
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Most terrorism is carried out by organizations with particular political motivations, mobilization issues, and other characteristics that affect their behavior, including their attacks. Group dynamics are often overlooked when research... more
Most terrorism is carried out by organizations with particular political motivations, mobilization issues, and other characteristics that affect their behavior, including their attacks. Group dynamics are often overlooked when research focuses on units of analysis such as countries or individuals. However, understanding the organizational dynamics of terrorism can shed light on this type of violence in important ways. This chapter begins by discussing definitions of key concepts, and then analyzes recent literature on several prominent topics: outbidding, internal group dynamics, and organizational longevity or failure. It concludes by noting potential avenues for future research, including more work on strategic interactions between terrorist organizations and states, as well as increased dialogue with research on related topics such as civil conflict.
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In the past 10 years in Mexico, more than 100,000 people have been killed in violence related to organized crime. Some attacks have left horrific scenes, meant to send messages to the public or government. Debate continues about how to... more
In the past 10 years in Mexico, more than 100,000 people have been killed in violence related to organized crime. Some attacks have left horrific scenes, meant to send messages to the public or government. Debate continues about how to characterize this violence, and some observers describe it as “terrorism” or its perpetrators as “terrorists.” This article emphasizes that Mexico has experienced terrorist tactics by criminal organizations. This implies that while the perpetrators are better thought of (and dealt with) as criminal groups, some of their violence at least partially fulfills the criteria to be defined as terrorism. The use of terrorist tactics by criminal groups is an understudied aspect of the crime-terror nexus because more research examines crime by terrorist groups. The article discusses three tactics seen in Mexico: bombings, violent communication, and attacks against politicians. It then presents comparable examples from other countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, ...
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How do conciliatory and coercive counterinsurgency tactics affect militant group violence against civilians? Scholars of civil war increasingly seek to understand intentional civilian targeting, often referred to as terrorism. Extant... more
How do conciliatory and coercive counterinsurgency tactics affect militant group violence against civilians? Scholars of civil war increasingly seek to understand intentional civilian targeting, often referred to as terrorism. Extant research emphasizes group weakness, or general state attributes such as regime type. We focus on terrorism as violent communication and as a response to government actions. State tactics toward groups, carrots and sticks, should be important for explaining insurgent terror. We test the argument using new data on terrorism by insurgent groups, with many time-varying variables, covering 1998 through 2012. Results suggest government coercion against a group is associated with subsequent terrorism by that group. However, this is only the case for larger insurgent groups, which raises questions about the notion of terrorism as a weapon of the weak. Carrots are often negatively related to group terrorism. Other factors associated with insurgent terrorism incl...
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ABSTRACT How does branding militant groups as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs) affect them? Beyond its obvious policy importance, this question speaks to debates about counterterrorism, terrorism financing, and organizational... more
ABSTRACT How does branding militant groups as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs) affect them? Beyond its obvious policy importance, this question speaks to debates about counterterrorism, terrorism financing, and organizational dynamics of subnational violence. This article analyzes FTO designation, a key policy used by the U.S. government since 1997 to impose costs on foreign terrorist groups and those who might support them. Contrary to arguments that sanctions are ineffective and that terrorism is too “cheap” to be affected, it is argued that designation should weaken terrorist groups, reducing their attacks over time. However, the effect is probably conditional. FTO designation should be especially effective against groups operating in U.S.-aligned countries, given the importance of international cooperation in counterterrorism. Global quantitative analyses suggest that FTOs operating in U.S.-aligned countries carry out fewer attacks over time than other groups, taking many other factors into consideration.
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What explains the emergence of vigilante organizations? Throughout the world, vigilantes emerge to illegally punish perceived criminals, often leading to serious consequences. However, the literature presents partial and conflicting... more
What explains the emergence of vigilante organizations? Throughout the world, vigilantes emerge to illegally punish perceived criminals, often leading to serious consequences. However, the literature presents partial and conflicting explanations for this phenomenon. This article argues that local economic inequality creates a situation ripe for vigilante organizations. Inequality creates demand for vigilantism because poorer citizens feel relatively deprived of security compared with wealthier neighbors who have advantages regarding private and public security. In addition, inequality suggests a patron-and-worker distribution of labor, and this is ideal for organizing a particular type of group, the patron-funded vigilante group. Empirical tests use original data on the 2013 wave of Mexican vigilante organizations, present in 13 of Mexico’s 32 federal entities. Municipal-level income inequality is robustly associated with organized vigilantism. Less support is found for competing ex...
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Spanish Abstract: ?Por que algunos grupos terroristas perduran mas que otros? ?Que nos revela esta longevidad sobre la eficacia de las organizaciones terroristas? Este articulo examina, en primer lugar, por que la supervivencia... more
Spanish Abstract: ?Por que algunos grupos terroristas perduran mas que otros? ?Que nos revela esta longevidad sobre la eficacia de las organizaciones terroristas? Este articulo examina, en primer lugar, por que la supervivencia organizativa puede considerarse un factor de eficacia organizativa. En segundo lugar, se revisa la literatura sobre la longevidad de los grupos terroristas –incluyendo el examen sistematico de diez estudios cuantitativos sobre este tema. El analisis muestra que unos pocos factores estan asociados a la longevidad recurrentemente –entre ellos, el tamano del grupo y la participacion en alianzas de grupos terroristas. En tercer lugar, y dado el interes teorico por las relaciones interorganizativas, se toman en consideracion argumentos para explicar por que las alianzas de grupos terroristas, y tambien la competencia entre grupos, probablemente contribuyen a la longevidad del grupo. Por ultimo, se ofrecen sugerencias para avanzar en la investigacion sobre esta tem...
Research Interests: Geography and Philosophy
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Prominent scholars criticize terrorism research for lacking sufficient empirical testing of arguments. Interestingly, one of the most widely-cited estimates in terrorism studies has not been evaluated using the many data sources now... more
Prominent scholars criticize terrorism research for lacking sufficient empirical testing of arguments. Interestingly, one of the most widely-cited estimates in terrorism studies has not been evaluated using the many data sources now available. Rapoport's 1992 claim, that perhaps 90 percent of terrorist groups last less than one year, has been described as part of the conventional wisdom. This estimate is frequently used to justify studies of terrorist group longevity, a substantial line of research in recent years. Is the estimate accurate? Scholars increasingly publish data sets of terrorist organizations, but no one has analyzed them collectively to see if the 90 percent claim holds up. This article examines the eight largest global data sets of terrorist group longevity, covering 1968-2013. The samples vary considerably, but the percent of groups that do not survive beyond their first year in these relevant data sets is between 25-74 percent. Across all data sets, on average about 50 percent of terrorist organizations do not make it past their first year. There is some variation depending on group motivations, consistent with Rapoport's " wave " theory. However, overall, terrorist organizations appear to be more durable than the conventional wisdom suggests.
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What explains the emergence of vigilante organizations? Throughout the world, vigilantes emerge to illegally punish perceived criminals, often leading to serious consequences. However, the literature presents partial and conflicting... more
What explains the emergence of vigilante organizations? Throughout the world, vigilantes emerge to illegally punish perceived criminals, often leading to serious consequences. However, the literature presents partial and conflicting explanations for this phenomenon. This article argues that local economic inequality creates a situation ripe for vigilante organizations. Inequality creates demand for vigilantism because poorer citizens feel relatively deprived of security compared with wealthier neighbors who have advantages regarding private and public security. In addition, inequality suggests a patron-and-worker distribution of labor, and this is ideal for organizing a particular type of group, the patron-funded vigilante group. Empirical tests use original data on the 2013 wave of Mexican vigilante organizations, present in 13 of Mexico's 32 federal entities. Municipal-level income inequality is robustly associated with organized vigilantism. Less support is found for competing explanations.
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Scholars, politicians, and pundits increasingly suggest lone wolf terrorists are substantial threats, but we know little about how dangerous these actors are—especially relative to other terrorist actors. How deadly are lone actor... more
Scholars, politicians, and pundits increasingly suggest lone wolf terrorists are substantial threats, but we know little about how dangerous these actors are—especially relative to other terrorist actors. How deadly are lone actor terrorists? A growing body of empirical research focuses on terrorist organizations, but similar work on lone actors is sparse. Furthermore, attempts to explicitly compare these or other types of terrorist actors are almost non-existent. This article considers theoretical arguments for why lone wolves ought to be especially lethal. However, it presents an argument for why terrorist groups should generally be more lethal. This argument is conditional upon the environment in which actors operate. Lone wolves should only be more deadly in states with especially strong counterterrorism capacity. The article uses data on terrorist attacks in fifteen developed countries, 1970–2010, to compare the lethality of terrorist acts. Around the world, attacks by organizations tend to be far more lethal than attacks by other actors. In the United States, however, lone wolves are generally the more lethal terrorist actors. This is argued to be because the robust counterterrorism capacity makes organized terrorism more difficult to accomplish.
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Researchers increasingly conduct quantitative studies of terrorist groups, which is an important advance in the literature. However, there has been little discussion of what constitutes a “terrorist group,” regarding conceptualization or... more
Researchers increasingly conduct quantitative studies of terrorist groups, which is an important advance in the literature. However, there has been little discussion of what constitutes a “terrorist group,” regarding conceptualization or measurement. Many studies of terrorist groups do not define the term, and among those that do, definitions vary considerably. The lack of clarity leads to conceptual confusion as well as sample selection issues, which can affect inferences. To address these issues, this article offers an in-depth analysis of the term and its use. It explores definitions in the literature, and then discusses different samples used. Empirically, the article demonstrates how sample selection can affect variable values. It also shows that a non-representative sample, such as the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization list, can lead to inaccurate generalizations. Ultimately, I present a straightforward “inclusive” definition, and argue for its practicality. Other suggestions are made for a more effective and cohesive research program.
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ABSTRACT
Terrorist organizations often attack each other, but we know little about how this affects the involved groups. Some states encourage or turn a blind eye toward terrorist group interorganizational violence, hoping that it destroys at... more
Terrorist organizations often attack each other, but we know little about how this affects the involved groups. Some states encourage or turn a blind eye toward terrorist group interorganizational violence, hoping that it destroys at least one of the groups involved. This article argues that – contrary to the wishes of such governments – violent rivalries can contribute to the longevity of participating terrorist groups. Violent rivalries encourage civilians to take a side, inspire innovation, provide new incentives to group members, and spoil peace talks. Some of these mechanisms should be especially likely between rivals of different political goals (interfield rivalries), instead of between rivals seeking the same primary goal (intrafield rivalries). Illustrative cases in Colombia and Northern Ireland show that the theorized mechanisms occur in diverse environments. Quantitative global analysis of terrorist groups from 1987 to 2005, using original data on interorganizational violence, suggests that violent rivalries are generally associated with group longevity. Further analysis suggests that when rivalries are disaggregated by type, only interfield rivalries are positively associated with group longevity. Participation in violent rivalry is never found to increase a group’s chance of ending. The results suggest the importance of studying interorganizational dynamics, and raise questions about the notion of encouraging a violent rivalry as a way to hurt an involved terrorist group.
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Does development aid attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in post-conflict countries? This article contributes to the growing literature on effects of aid and on determinants of FDI by explaining how development aid in low-information... more
Does development aid attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in post-conflict countries? This article contributes to the growing literature on effects of aid and on determinants of FDI by explaining how development aid in low-information environments is a signal that can attract investment. Before investing abroad, firms seek data on potential host countries. In post-conflict countries, reliable information is poor, in part because governments face unusual incentives to misrepresent information. In these conditions, firms look to signals. One is development aid, because donors tend to give more to countries they trust to properly handle the funds. Our results show that aid seems to draw FDI—however, this is conditional on whether the aid can be considered geostrategically motivated. We also show that this effect decreases as time elapses after the conflict. This suggests that aid’s signaling effect is specific to low-information environments, and helps rule out alternative causal mechanisms linking aid and FDI.
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This article takes a closer look at the relationship between democracy and transnational terrorism. It investigates what it is about democracies that make them particularly vulnerable to terrorism from abroad. The authors suggest that... more
This article takes a closer look at the relationship between democracy and transnational terrorism. It investigates what it is about democracies that make them particularly vulnerable to terrorism from abroad. The authors suggest that states that exhibit a certain type of foreign policy behavior, regardless of their regime type, are likely to attract transnational terrorism. States that are actively involved in international politics are likely to create resentment abroad and hence more likely to be the target of transnational terrorism than are states that pursue a more isolationist foreign policy. Democratic states are more likely to be targeted by transnational terrorist groups not because of their regime type per se but because of the type of foreign policy they tend to pursue. The empirical analysis provides support for the argument.
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Why do some ethnopolitical organizations use violence? Research on substate violence often uses the state level of analysis, or only analyzes groups that are already violent. Using a resource mobilization framework drawn from a broad... more
Why do some ethnopolitical organizations use violence? Research on substate violence often uses the state level of analysis, or only analyzes groups that are already violent. Using a resource mobilization framework drawn from a broad literature, we test hypotheses with new data on hundreds of violent and non-violent ethnopolitical organizations in Eastern Europe and Russia. Our study finds interorganizational competition, state repression and strong group leadership associated with organizational violence. Lack of popularity and holding territory are also associated with violence. We do not find social service provision positively related to violence, which contrasts with research on the Middle East.
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Why do some terrorist groups survive considerably longer than others? The literature is just beginning to address this important question in a systematic manner. Additionally, and as with most studies of terrorism, longevity studies have... more
Why do some terrorist groups survive considerably longer than others? The literature is just beginning to address this important question in a systematic manner. Additionally, and as with most studies of terrorism, longevity studies have ignored the possibility of interactions between terrorist groups. This article attempts to address these two gaps in the literature: the incomplete understanding of terrorist group survival and the tendency to assume that terrorist groups act independently. In spite of risks associated with cooperation, I argue that it should help involved terrorist groups mitigate mobilization concerns. More importantly, the impact of cooperation is conditioned by attributes of the country in which a terrorist group operates. Using new global data on terrorist groups between 1987 and 2005, I show that cooperation has the strongest effect on longevity in states where groups should have a harder time operating—more capable states and less democratic states. Interestingly, a group's number of relationships is more important than to whom the group is connected.