Militant

Radio is an old medium that seems to struggle to renew itself. With the switchover from analogue to digital and the necessity to keep up with consumer demand and expectations, radio has been regularly deemed to be obsolete. Radio as a primetime media died, but radio also morphed into something else. During the French occupy movement Nuit Debout in April 2016, people who were walking around Place de la République-the Parisian heart of the protest-might have been surprised to discover Radio Debout ("radio stand up"). Why one should contribute to such a radio when Internet and social networks prevail? With the idea that micro-radio broadcasting holds the potential to empower ordinary people at the local community level, radio-activism is tinkering its way back against the overriding force of computer-mediated technologies. An earlier version of this piece appeared on inaglobal.fr, the online journal of the French National audiovisual institute (INA).

« Revolt on the air - Radio Activism, Protest and French Politics », Explosivepolitics.com, 28/12/2016, http://explosivepolitics.com/blog/revolt-on-the-air-radio-activism-protest-and-french-politics/

Souvent rabattue sur des stéréotypes réducteurs, la protection animale constitue une cause militante des plus anciennes et complexes. Du début du XIX e siècle jusqu'à nos jours, de multiples entrepreneurs de morale s'indignent du traitement que les hommes réservent aux bêtes et se mobilisent afin de corriger la brutalité de leurs contemporains. D'abord préoccupée par la cruauté à l'égard du bétail, ce n'est qu'à l'issue de longues péripéties que la protection animale s'étend aux animaux de compagnie et, bien plus tardivement encore, aux espèces sauvages et à leurs milieux naturels. En s'appuyant sur une comparaison franco-britannique, cet ouvrage retrace les inflexions successives à l'origine des multiples facettes qui caractérisent, aujourd'hui encore, la protection animale. Indissociables des évolutions de la philanthropie, bien antérieures à l'apparition des mots d'ordre de l'écologie, les mobilisations collectives en faveur du sort des animaux éclairent plusieurs processus cruciaux de notre histoire sociopolitique : évolution des sensibilités et des émotions socialement valorisées ; définition de la violence légitime ; constitution des normes visant à réformer les moeurs ; rivalité des élites se réclamant de diverses formes d'autorité ; influence des religions sur les engagements militants ; effets des discriminations de genre.

This thesis is an examination of the causes of Conservative electoral decline in Liverpool, from the end of World War Two to the present day. This is an area of Liverpool’s political history, and of the history of the Conservative Party, which is understudied. This thesis counters the traditional argument that declining sectarianism, or the premiership of Margaret Thatcher, are the root causes of Conservative decline in Liverpool.

This thesis also discounts theories of local party organisational inefficiency, municipal electoral biases, demographic change, and population drain, arguing that generally these changes were too gradual to account for the sudden, dramatic decline of the Liverpool Conservatives in the 1970s. Similarly, many of these factors do not chime temporally with actual changes in Conservative vote share.

Instead, this thesis proposes a tripartite framework, which separates the periods of success (1945-197), decline (1973-1986), and irrelevance (1987 onwards). Each period can be explained by recourse to different phenomena. Conservative success in Liverpool can be primarily explained by the socialisation effect of Protestantism, boosted in years when the Conservatives were doing well nationally. Conservative decline is mainly a result of a perfect storm of unresponsive local parties, an energetic nascent Liberal Party, dissatisfaction with the Heath government nationally, and an all-out local election in 1973 (when all seats in council were up for election) triggered by local government reform. Finally, Conservative irrelevance is attributable to a change in Scouse local identity which took on an element of anti-Thatcherism/anti-Conservatism, and has persisted to this day.

The end of 2011 general election in Nigeria results to mass recognition of another set of militant popularly called Boko Haram. These set of militant during the cause of prosecuting their objective have destroyed properties worth Billions of Naira, killed thousands of innocent people and add to religious misconception in Nigeria . It should be noted that the scope of this paper were not restricted to Boko Haram matters alone because the present writer belief that certain factors that applied to other groups that had emerged in Nigeria also laid foundation for emergence of Boko Haram. As a result of the above fact, militancy instigating factors as well as the effect of Boko Haram’s means of prosecuting their objective along with way forwards toward avoidance of future insurgency is object of discussion here.

The Niger Delta has some of the largest oil fields in the world. It is a dangerous place often associated with guns and the kidnapping of foreign nationals. It is also devastatingly underdeveloped, and suffers from heavy pollution from 50 years of living with the oil industry. The presence of Multinational oil corporations has provoked contention for decades but the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni Nine in 1995 drew the plight of the region into the international spotlight. In recent years, the region hit headlines again with the emergence of the militant group the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) which launched attacks on oil installations and kidnapped oil expatriates. This insurgency reached its height in 2009 and it was in the midst of this national emergency that President Yar’adua introduced the Niger Delta amnesty programme. Since implementation the region has witnessed relative peace; however, with the programme due to end in December this year, the chance of this peace enduring is uncertain. This paper offers a critical analysis of the programme arguing that, because it failed to address the environmental degradation of the region, it is probable that the Niger Delta will witness renewed violence.

In: Joshua Malitsky (ed.), A companion to Documentary Film History,  Wiley Blackwell

Introduction
A history of the audiences of the film movement known as Third Cinema requires extensive research into the countries where it took place, given the diverse filmmakers who aimed to produce a cinema of “cultural decolonization” in Africa, Asia and Latin America (and even in the First World, until the Third-Worldist influence) in the 1960s and 1970s. This essay focuses on the screening experience of The Hour of the Furnaces (Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino, Cine Liberación Group, 1968), one of the most important films of the movement. In other works, I have discussed how The Hour... circulated at political film festivals and among militant groups post-’68 in Europe and North America, showing the great number of countries where the movie was included in the catalogues of alternative film groups. On the pages that follow, in contrast, I will be focusing on the film’s outreach among militant audiences in Argentina from 1968-1972.
I consider this film and its spectators a singular case of militant film for three principal reasons: first, because it introduces the theory of Third Cinema (1969). Secondly, unlike the international films produced under governments put into power by revolutionary processes during “the long 60s”—in Algeria post-independence, or in Cuba after 1959, to mention only  two  emblematic cases—The Hour... is a film made to oppose the military government in power in Argentina (1966-1973). Under an Argentine dictatorship, the screenings—a clear act of resistance to the regimes—were subject to varying levels of clandestinity (depending on specific circumstances), and it is only after Peronism’s return to power in 1973 that the film obtains a theatrical release. A third compelling aspect of this film is that, due to its length (more than four hours, divided into three parts), its sections were screened separately and combined in different ways depending on the audience. What is more, in some cases, certain sequences were cut or others selected especially for their political use in specific situations, in both Argentina and other countries.
In this context, the notes that follow reveal how the Cine Liberación Group conceived of the militant outreach of The Hour... between 1968 and 1972.  I will then examine the actual screening experience. In order to provide further insight into these practices, an internal group document by one of the “Mobile Film Units” responsible for screening the film is appended here. I believe this document is unique because of its detailed description of militant screening events (at homes, high schools, universities, neighborhood centers and union offices, or during factory conflicts); of film debates held in conjunction with the screenings, and of the different audiences of workers, students or the middle classes (professionals and intellectuals).It provides insight into the type of audiences that came to see The Hour... during the military regime in Argentina, and reveals certain aspects of the experience of  both those who screened the film as well as those who came to watch it.
The document provides a type of information on that experience that is absent (or only hinted at) in the texts that the Cine Liberación Group itself released. In fact, the group’s most widely disseminated and reprinted document, “Towards a Third Cinema,” though fundamental in its history, was published very early on, in October 1969. Due to the fact that it covers only the earliest period of the militant screenings, its overview of the workings of alternative screening venues and the spectators who dared to attend is limited to some degree. As I will show, later public documents released by Cine Liberación describe some of these aspects but do not cover the hands-on tasks associated with exhibitions as described by the groups that actually screened the film. This information was only detailed in testimonials or internal documents like the one reprinted in its entirety at the end of this essay.

Increasingly, contemporary operations take place in a complex environment involving a number of local actors. There have been numerous attempts to make sense of this environment. Influence operations, for example, tend to classify local forces as friendly, neutral, adversary, or enemy. Many field officers prefer a ‘traffic light’ model, according to which local actors are classified green, amber (or yellow), or red based on their place on a spectrum of friendliness to hostility. Still others use a system of green, blue, red, yellow, and white. These characterisations of actors within the human terrain of a given situation can be highly problematic and hinder operational effectiveness. Although they are an improvement on the simple binary of ‘friendly’ or ‘hostile’ that preceded them, they share the same fundamental flaw; a presupposition that actors relate to each other in a binary manner, occupying only one point on the spectrum. While these means of classification allow for complexity of issues and motivations, at a fundamental level, they still assume that there are those who are hostile and those who are friendly. In this way, they neglect the concept of aligned motivation. This paper employs historical cases to demonstrate the problems of this neglect and suggests the basis for a new system.

This chapter offers new ways of critically assessing the vibrancy of Christianity in the Philippines. The premise is that it is diverse. While it is important to discuss the fortunes of Catholicism, the dominant religion, it is also crucial for new analyses to factor in the emergence of new religious groups. In other words, the analytical way forward is to frame the discussion in terms of Christianities in the Philippines. To spell out their salient attributes is the aim of this chapter. In the latter part consideration will be given to how Roman Catholicism fares in relation to this diversity.

The first point is that Christianity in the Philippines is militant. In the literature, Militant Christianity refers to fundamentalism and its triumphalist disposition toward different spheres of society. These facets have some local resonances. Although many new groups and denominations have emerged over the years, their general theological character is fundamentalist, which spills over into their political choices. In this sense, the religious economy, while competitive, also has a predictable and dominant trait.

The second characteristic is that it is global. The global expansion of many groups has been made possible by the movement of Filipinos to work around the world. But explaining it only in this manner is no longer adequate. I will argue that the global character of Filipino Christianity is a result too of a postcolonial assertion. Many religious leaders are convinced that Filipinos have a calling to evangelize the world.

The chapter ends by situating Roman Catholicism in relation to these developments. While other Christian groups are asserting themselves in militant and global ways, there are indications that Roman Catholicism’s influence in the public sphere is waning.

Les transformations qui se sont produites au sein du militantisme ont fait l’objet d’une diversité
d’analyses et d’explications. Cette problématique est ici abordée à partir de l’analyse d’un
cas concret : celui de la Nouvelle Action française, fondée en 1971, devenue en 1978 la Nouvelle
Action royaliste. Le choix d’une échelle d’analyse réduite tant du point de vue de l’objet empirique
que de son développement temporel, donne accès aux évènements, aux enjeux et aux difficultés
qui poussent une organisation nationaliste à modifier les dispositifs et les espaces de la pratique
militante. L’analyse d’un cas concret d’engagement militant permet d’analyser le politique non pas
tant à partir de ses variables idéologiques que sur la base d’un ensemble de pratiques, d’obstacles
et de conflits qui traversent la vie militante d’une organisation. On se situe au point d’articulation
entre, d’une part, un processus de maturation générationnelle des acteurs du militantisme radical
qui, d’autre part, se déroule dans un contexte général qui tend à limiter de plus en plus les phénomènes
de radicalisation politique. Si le passage du militantisme radical vers les réseaux associatifs
peut illustrer de manière simpliste ce processus de transformation, la mutation des tissus militants
constitue un phénomène devant être analysé en fonction des spécificités de chaque objet.

The transformations occurred in the phenomenon of activism have deserved several studies
and explanations. The present work proposes to address these problems considering a very concrete
case: the Nouvelle Action française, founded in 1971, which became the Nouvelle Action royaliste
in 1978. The choice of this double scale, at the level of the selected empirical object as well as at
the level of temporal delimitation, makes it possible to consider the events, enjeux and difficulties
that lead a nationalist organization to change its devices and spaces of activism. In this way, the
study of an activist compromise in a concrete case enables a political analysis which is not based
on its ideological variables but on a whole set of practices, difficulties and conflicts present in the
activist life of an organization. So there is an articulation between the generational maturing of the
actors involved in a radical activism and a broader context where the political radicalization finds
increasing limits. If the passage from a radical activism to association networks could constitute a
simplistic formula that summarizes the process, the mutation of activism becomes a phenomenon
that merits an investigation according to the peculiarities of every case analyzed.

There are two ideas being presented: first is that a new leader would need to pick up where Bhindranwale left off. The transition from Bhindranwale to this yet-unnamed commander acts as a microcosm for the progression of Sikh martial character from the peaceful Guru Nanak to Maharajah Ranjit Singh. The progression in martial character among Sikh leadership will give credit to the idea that a leader who is seasoned in tactical objectives will resonate with Sikhs, as a reminiscence of Ranjit Singh, and parallels will be drawn between the distant past’s evolution of leadership tactics, and the evolution from those of Bhindranwale to his successor. It will be evinced that a new leader would likely look past Bhindranwale’s sant persona and instead focus on succeeding Ranjit Singh’s position as the new Maharajah of a new Sikh State. The second part of this essay will be a bit of war gaming, putting forth that a coup d’état is the most probable course of action for such a leader. A coup is logical for many reasons: it aligns with the ideology of a dharam yudh, or just war;  as will be shown, a coup is the most probable conclusion that Sikh militant factions will ultimately come to; the idea of militant factions uniting for a mission is not new; and a new commander with military and political savvy will be needed to organize a coup. First, it is necessary to provide an overview of the evolving Sikh identity through the centuries. This essay can be viewed equally as both an academic investigation and security analysis.

En esta entrevista problematizo la mirada de las ciencias sociales acerca de las víctimas; abordo las relaciones posibles entre daño y activismo; expongo la relevancia de ciertos campos de saber en la producción social de las víctimas en el mundo actual.

The end of 2011 general election in Nigeria results to mass recognition of another set of militant popularly called Boko Haram. These set of militant during the cause of prosecuting their objective have destroyed properties worth Billions of Naira, killed thousands of innocent people and add to religious misconception in Nigeria. It should be noted that the scope of this paper were not restricted to Boko Haram matters alone because the present writer belief that certain factors that applied to other groups that had emerged in Nigeria also laid foundation for emergence of Boko Haram. As a result of the above fact, militancy instigating factors as well as the effect of Boko Haram’s means of prosecuting their objective along with way forwards toward avoidance of future insurgency are object of discussion here.

Cet article se concentre sur la relation entre les critiques Juan Piqueras et Léon Moussinac et leurs projets pour une pédagogie critique du cinéma. L’essai adopte une lecture alternative de l’avant-garde comme un modèle « pouvant être traduit » pour démontrer la synergie productive ente les cultures cinématographiques radicales françaises et espagnoles de la fin des années 1920 et du début des années 1930. En tant que traducteurs des luttes sociales en initiatives culturelles, Piqueras et Moussinac ont poussé l’avant-garde internationale et certaines initiatives militantes à être adoptées dans et adaptées à leur contexte local. Dans un contexte politique et social de plus en plus radicalisé, l’esthétique révolutionnaire n’est cependant pas suffisante pour Moussinac et Piqueras. L’art ne peut simplement se « dissoudre dans la vie de tous les jours » de manière abstraite, mais doit au contraire donner lieu à la création d’institutions culturelles au service d’une émancipation politique et artistique. Les projets de Piqueras et Moussinac révèlent non seulement la manière dont l’intervention du cinéma dans la société était imaginée, mais aussi sa mise en pratique dans les domaines culturels, politiques et sociaux de la vie de tous les jours, au-delà des simples cercles esthétiques élitistes et des institutions étatiques.

In theory, terrorism is a political communication strategy for groups to convey their grievances and the costs of ignoring them. In practice, though, terrorist groups take responsibility for just a small portion of their attacks. Rather than getting credit for the violence, terrorist leaders generally deny their operatives committed it. This theoretical and empirical disconnect may explain why scholars have ignored the subject of unclaimed attacks despite the fact that they are the norm. With a mixed-methods research design, our study helps to fill this lacuna by proposing and testing a new theory to account for these so-called “anonymous” acts of violence.

Which measures may a state undertake when its very existence is threatened? Can it suspend the democratic legal order, may it prohibit undemocratic political parties, can it withhold fundamental constitutional rights from those who intend to abuse them? Or, in case of an external threat, may the state use force in anticipatory self-defense? In addressing these issues, two legal-philosophical doctrines play a crucial role, namely: the state of exception and militant democracy. Unlike other books, this book offers an interdisciplinary approach to both doctrines by a variety of international scholars. The state of exception and militant democracy are viewed from a legal-philosophical, legalpositivist and sociological perspective, thereby creating a broad perspective on how states actually deal and how they should deal with diverse threats to their (democratic) existence.

El terrorismo de Estado interviene políticamente no sólo a través del exterminio sino también modelando sujetos. La subjetividad deviene campo de batalla de proyectos sociales encontrados. Los mecanismos afectivos instalados por el Estado terrorista tienden a reproducir su modelo de ciudadanía. Para entenderlos, preguntamos a quienes trabajan en desarmarlos, reconstruyendo afectos y vínculos. Observo Barrios por Memoria y Justicia, un colectivo de organizaciones barriales de Buenos Aires que desde 2006 instalan en las veredas las “baldosas de la memoria”. Fabricación colectiva y colocación pública forman parte de una praxis humilde pero constante que recuerda el pasado y transforma el presente.

With the United States exerting more pressure, there seems to be urgency among terrorist formations/individual leaders operating out of Pakistani soil to gain 'political legitimacy' to counter any further existential threat...In such a scenario, the danger of more terror elements infiltrating into mainstream politics is very real. Worse, it is unlikely that these groupings will give up their terrorist activities, even as a measure of political impunity is secured by engaging in the electoral process. The ‘legitimacy’ that would be gained would also tend to amplify the ambivalence that has characterized international attitudes and policies with regard to such groupings.

Servir Perón
Humberto Cucchetti, traduit par Denis Rodrigues
2013
Presses universitaires de Rennes
www.pur-editions.fr
L A GARDE DE FER ARGENTINE consista en un vaste ensemble de réseaux
et d’acteurs du militantisme péroniste apparu au début des années 1960.
Une décennie plus tard, ce groupe militant avait acquis une dimension
nationale, après l’Unité décidée avec le Front national des étudiants (FNE).
Dès lors se constitua, sous le nom d’Organisation unique du Transfert générationnel
(OUTG), un espace politique unifi é, hautement hiérarchisé et discipliné
dont les objectifs de base furent la formation de cadres politiques et la
création d’engrenages politico-territoriaux au service du mouvement péroniste
conduit par Juan Perón.
De cette trajectoire organisationnelle apparurent des cadres politiques
dirigeants qui, à partir des années 1980, commencèrent à dominer certains
espaces et structures institutionnelles, en occupant diverses fonctions au sein
des partis politiques, de la gestion de l’État, dans les groupes parlementaires
et listes électorales, et dans diverses instances associatives et institutionnelles
(universités, organismes scientifi ques, organisations patronales, etc.). Mais, en
souvenir de la vieille Garde de Fer, et en tant que produit de tentatives avortées
d’institutionnalisation partisane, apparut également une trajectoire organisationnelle
de conversion au catholicisme, animée dans une large mesure par des
acteurs qui avaient été les protagonistes du militantisme révolutionnaire des
années 1960-1970.
L’analyse de ces trajectoires militantes, pratiquement oubliées jusqu’à
aujourd’hui dans les études universitaires, permet de reconstruire deux phénomènes
plus vastes : celui de l’adhésion au péronisme et celui de la création
d’organisations militantes dans le contexte de la mobilisation sociale apparue
après la destitution de Perón (1955), mobilisation accentuée par la Révolution
cubaine (1959), les transformations socio-religieuses internationales et le climat
d’autoritarisme que connut le pays pendant toutes ces années. Éloigné aussi
bien de la lecture aberrante que de la lecture héroïque, Servir Perón. Trajectoires
de la Garde de Fer se propose d’expliquer comment, à partir des nébuleuses
militantes des années 1960 et du début des années 1970, des parcours générationnels
sont apparus et ont tenté de marquer la vie politique argentine.

"Squat. La ville est à nous est d’abord et avant tout un documentaire sur l’engagement militant qui a pris comme toile de fond deux quartiers anciens de Barcelone en voie de gentrification : El Raval et, surtout, La Barceloneta. Est mise en scène la trentaine de membres du collectif « Miles de Viviendas » qui luttent contre la spéculation foncière et les expulsions, en se réappropriant des immeubles vides qu’ils transforment en squats. Christophe Coello, le réalisateur, a une longue expérience du documentaire social, aux côtés de militants, puisqu’il a abordé par le passé des thèmes aussi divers que des mouvements sociaux en Amérique latine, la scolarisation des enfants gitans, la vie en HLM et le sens du travail dans notre société (Attention danger travail, 2003 et Volem Rien Foutre al Païs, 2007). La production a été assurée par C-P Productions dont les documentaires abordent des sujets qui sont souvent susceptibles d’intéresser les sociologues."

Mémoire de Master 2 Développement Expertise de l'Economie Sociale.

Qu’est-ce qui pousse des étudiants à choisir de se former à devenir demain les nouveaux cadres de l’ESS ? Cette économie qu’on dit marginale, mal considérée et mal payée semble conserver un pouvoir d’attractivité en drainant vers elle des cohortes toujours plus nombreuses de jeunes « en quête de sens ». Si cette orientation témoigne des mutations actuelles dans le rapport à l’emploi, c’est l’hypothèse d’un militantisme à la frontière des sphères personnelle et professionnelle qui est ici explorée.

L’ESS, cette économie atypique, voire « marginale » est-elle toujours une affaire de militants ? En étudiant les mutations du militantisme, en abordant le rapport des jeunes générations à l’engagement, c’est à cette question que ce travail essaie de répondre. Prenant appui sur la sociologie de l’engagement, il fait apparaître que celui-ci, dans un monde en crise identitaire, procède de la construction progressive d’une cohérence personnelle : ce sont des parcours, des chemins d’engagement que nous donnent à voir les jeunes en formation. Soucieux de transformer le monde, ils se refusent par contre au don de soi à la cause, préservant ainsi leurs aspirations plus personnelles . Exercice subtil d’équilibre qui n’empêche pas le renforcement progressif d’une identité, si ce n’est militante, engagée « pour un monde meilleur ». Poser la question du facteur militant dans le choix d’orientation vers l’ESS suppose aussi d’interroger l’offre militante que celle-ci propose. En la matière, force est de constater que le discours, si discours il y a, est brouillé et peu audible. Pour autant, face à la méfiance dont ils témoignent à l’égard des appareils militants, il apparaît que ces jeunes ne sont pas moins engagés que leurs aînés : ils le sont de façon si ce n’est « nouvelle », en rupture avec leurs aînés. C’est ainsi que, quand la parole et l’action publique ne semblent plus pertinentes, apparaît un militantisme qui entend quand même se propager via les « sphères de l’intime ».

The militant groups in the Philippines have gone beyond the tolerable by initiating provocative actions against anti-riot police to entice them to show force that when captured in photos can be used against them as proof of their "brutality".

This study is the first known academic study on the intergroup dynamics relationship between Indonesian Marxists and jihadists. The study was a result of a premeditated murder committed in the early morning hours of 13 July 2011 on Pulau Padang, Sumatra, Indonesia by what emerged are a combination of militant civil society groups and Marxist/Socialist militant cells. The appearance of jihadist language within the group context raised questions if the ideological motivation and group orientation between the militants is eroding and a new set of militants emerging in the Indonesian terrorist tapestry.

Whereas much of the research on militant Islamic activism and jihadism has been focused on the issue of the foreign fighters (and many of interlocutors were part of an early contingent of Syria volunteers), this ethnographic study examines the years before this period and on the activists who remained in (or returned to) Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. We bring together a Foucault-inspired perspective on resistance (counter-conduct) and research which has been conducted on activism, to explore the interaction between the militant Islamic networks, the state and the media. The point of departure for this book is the daily realities of the lives of members of networks of European Muslim militant activists in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany at a crucial but underexamined period of the time in their existence: the years before their departure to Syria.

When one cultural group becomes dominated by another, resulting rapid change and loss of authority may make its original meaning system seem thin, ineffective, and contradictory. The resulting state of deprivation often
causes members to rebuild their culture along what they consider to be more satisfying lines. The process, which is called revitalization by anthropologists, has occurred over and over again among peoples throughout the world. Often couched in religious terms movements prescribe rituals and
beliefs designed to restore order to their existence. In this selection, William O. Beeman describes the process of revitalization and shows how it shapes the beliefs and actions of such groups as the militias that have sprung up
across America and the Islamic fundamentalists of the Middle East.

Violent conflict among rebels is a common feature of civil wars and insurgencies. Yet, not all rebel groups are equally prone to such infighting. While previous research has focused on the systemic causes of violent conflict within rebel movements, this article explores the factors that affect the risk of conflict between pairs of rebel groups. We generate hypotheses concerning how differences in power, ideology, and state sponsors between rebel groups impact their propensity to clash and test them using data from the Syrian civil war. The data, drawn from hundreds of infighting claims made by rebel groups on social media, are used to construct a network of conflictual ties among 30 rebel groups. The relationship between the observed network structure and the independent variables is evaluated using network analysis metrics and methods including assortativity, community structure, simulation, and latent space modeling. We find strong evidence that ideologically distant groups have a...