Robert W Clowes
Dr. Robert Clowes is a philosopher interested in mind and technology and holds that understanding at least the human mind and our use of technology is necessarily deeply interdependent.
One concrete offshoot of this focus is trying to understand on how contemporary technologies such as the mobile internet may be altering the way our minds work.
Another is using the technologies of presence and virtuality to rethink the notion of representation and hence mind.
His PhD research was on the cognitive role of language and can be seen as an attempt to update Vygotsky in the light of the state of the art of cognitive science. The assumption was that Vygotsky still has a lot to offer although certainly requires a broad rethinking.
Dr. Robert Clowes currently works as a postdoctoral researcher at the IFL (New University of Lisbon), where he is a full member and currently developing an FCT funded project on: Virtualism and the Mind: Rethinking Presence, Representation and Self – (SFRH/BPD/70440/2010). The projects advisors are Prof. António Marques at the IFL and Dr. Ron Chrisley at the Centre for Research in Cognitive Science at the University of Sussex. Robert Clowes also holds a Visiting Research Fellowship at the University of Sussex which facilitates his ongoing collaborations in the UK.
Address: IFILNOVA,
Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas – Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Av. de Berna, 26 - 4º piso
1069-061 Lisboa
One concrete offshoot of this focus is trying to understand on how contemporary technologies such as the mobile internet may be altering the way our minds work.
Another is using the technologies of presence and virtuality to rethink the notion of representation and hence mind.
His PhD research was on the cognitive role of language and can be seen as an attempt to update Vygotsky in the light of the state of the art of cognitive science. The assumption was that Vygotsky still has a lot to offer although certainly requires a broad rethinking.
Dr. Robert Clowes currently works as a postdoctoral researcher at the IFL (New University of Lisbon), where he is a full member and currently developing an FCT funded project on: Virtualism and the Mind: Rethinking Presence, Representation and Self – (SFRH/BPD/70440/2010). The projects advisors are Prof. António Marques at the IFL and Dr. Ron Chrisley at the Centre for Research in Cognitive Science at the University of Sussex. Robert Clowes also holds a Visiting Research Fellowship at the University of Sussex which facilitates his ongoing collaborations in the UK.
Address: IFILNOVA,
Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas – Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Av. de Berna, 26 - 4º piso
1069-061 Lisboa
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Papers by Robert W Clowes
In this paper, it is our objective to rethink the notion of the sense of self in the context of PP. Now, PP is often held to be a unifying framework that offers a new integrated account of perception, cognition, imagination, and indeed the pre-reflective sense of self. We will show, however, that PP has been taken to endorse rather too many different metaphysical accounts of self: that is, views about how we should regard the ultimate nature of self. What we need to do, if possible, is to use PP to constrain the theories on offer. Here we focus upon two central constraints that we think PP implies. These are, the mutability constraint and the multi-layereredness constraint. We argue that self-views laid out in terms of the PP framework are usually – to some degree – located within the four standard metaphysical accounts of self. However, we think that realist versions of self-accounts seem to have more trouble in respecting the PP constraints or requirements. The reason, or so we believe, is PP’s mutability constraint. This does not have to be the case and we, therefore, propose an alternative realist view – namely the pre-reflective situational self view – which is more adequate to fit the PP framework.
Talks by Robert W Clowes
Machine consciousness by Robert W Clowes
In this paper, it is our objective to rethink the notion of the sense of self in the context of PP. Now, PP is often held to be a unifying framework that offers a new integrated account of perception, cognition, imagination, and indeed the pre-reflective sense of self. We will show, however, that PP has been taken to endorse rather too many different metaphysical accounts of self: that is, views about how we should regard the ultimate nature of self. What we need to do, if possible, is to use PP to constrain the theories on offer. Here we focus upon two central constraints that we think PP implies. These are, the mutability constraint and the multi-layereredness constraint. We argue that self-views laid out in terms of the PP framework are usually – to some degree – located within the four standard metaphysical accounts of self. However, we think that realist versions of self-accounts seem to have more trouble in respecting the PP constraints or requirements. The reason, or so we believe, is PP’s mutability constraint. This does not have to be the case and we, therefore, propose an alternative realist view – namely the pre-reflective situational self view – which is more adequate to fit the PP framework.
(Please see the full CFP attached)
We especially encourage researchers who are women and/or from underrepresented minorities or social classes to submit.
Please send your contributions to hipolito.ines@gmail.com.
Deadline: 31st of January, 2018
The theory is developed with reference to several existing attempts to come to terms with this process, in cognitive modelling, philosophy and theoretical psychology. To test and develop these theories a novel approach to cognitive modelling is developed that allows current thinking in this area to be tested with greater clarity than was previously possible.
My approach builds upon the work of Andy Clark, Daniel Dennett, Merlin Donald and, ultimately, Lev Vygotsky, but it goes further in developing a detailed model of the process by which language (speech) is internalised in order to play a functionally restructuring role in human cognition. In particular I emphasize how the internal and external dimensions of language interact over different time scales. Further I argue it can be used to help explain how truly human thinking is born, and some of what is unique about that thinking.
An extensive historical survey is undertaken of the context in which some of the major previous theories of thinking have been developed and I use this to assess the reasons these models have only entertained a minor role for natural language in cognitive architecture. I also use this historical backdrop to explain why only limited previous work has been done with cognitive models in this area. Two cognitive robotics models are presented and discussed that shed light on how language may be internalised. These are used to develop a theoretical model of language internalisation more generally, and the stages of cognitive reorganisation this entails.
The thesis is completed by the use of the new model to tackle some significant problems in recent literature on the scientific understanding of consciousness. I argue this model can also help to explain findings about certain disorders of thought from the psychopathological literature.