- 305-348-2071
- Johns Hopkins University, Political Science, AlumnusNew College of Florida, Political Science, Alumnusadd
- Constructivism, History Of Political Thought (Political Science), International Ethics, Political Theory, International Relations Theory, Critical International Relations Theory, and 9 moreMoral Philosophy, Prudence, International Legal Theory, Feminist International Relations, Politics and International relations, International Law, Pragmatism, Richard Rorty, and Jus Cogensedit
- Professor of International Politics and International Law working primarily on the history of political and moral concepts.edit
- Siba N. Grovogui (PhD supervisor), Nicholas G. Onuf (MA supervisor), Daniel McIntosh (BA supervisor)edit
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Page 1. International criminal bodies HARRY D. GOULD* Abstract. One of the insights of Constructivism is that our world is, in part, made by what we say about it. We make things what they are by saying what they are. One way ...
Research Interests:
From Aristotle onward, we have been taught to think of prudence as an attribute either of the character or of the mind, but consistently as a virtue of the intellect (aretai dianoetikai). 1 Although in all understandings it is concerned... more
From Aristotle onward, we have been taught to think of prudence as an attribute either of the character or of the mind, but consistently as a virtue of the intellect (aretai dianoetikai). 1 Although in all understandings it is concerned with deliberate human action and practice, the tradition has always insisted that it is not just a skill. It had (at least until Hobbes) been understood to be something of a higher order than a (mere) skill (Hobbes 1996 [1651], I.V.VII-IX, I.VIII.IV-V, IV.XL.VI.II). I find the proposition that prudence is a virtue that can be possessed to be unsatisfactory; I propose rather that prudence is more fruitfully conceptualized as a practice, a much broader notion. To be prudent, or to act prudently is best captured not in Aristotelian or Stoic psychology, but as a practice informed by Wittgenstein's notion of "knowing how to go on". This points toward an understanding of prudence as a reflexive, rule-governed practice, as a "form of life" that involves thinking both about how we act and how we ought to act. As I will develop later, this is rather at odds with the predominant understanding of practice in the field, which by stripping deliberation from its understanding of practice, by making the relevant forms of knowledge wholly inarticulable and tacit, and by treating rules as enacted but never considered, strips all reflexivity from practice. To get at the traditional understandings of prudence from which I begin, it will be useful to start with the respective treatments of the composition of prudence of several of the authors/traditions that have provided our core vocabulary and semantics of prudence. Aristotle gave us a list of five component sub-virtues (to which he subsequently added two more), the Stoics six, Cicero three faculties, Aquinas eight, and Kant three (see Table 13.1) Surveying these sets of attributes points immediately to a conception of prudence as cognitive in character; in most of these treatments, the attributes identified are either mental operations or cognitive capacities. The very word "phronesis" derives from the verb "phroneo", to think. To use Kantian language, the components of prudence in these renderings are faculties
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Consider a scenario almost too commonplace to think of as hypothetical: military planners must decide whether to attack a site which contributes significantly to their enemy's war efforts-a site which is located amidst noncombatants. The... more
Consider a scenario almost too commonplace to think of as hypothetical: military planners must decide whether to attack a site which contributes significantly to their enemy's war efforts-a site which is located amidst noncombatants. The planners must decide whether to attack the site despite foreseeing that noncombatants will unavoidably be killed as a direct result of that attack. Destroying the enemy facility will contribute significantly ending the war, but it will do so only at the cost of these noncombatant's lives. Perhaps the oldest line of reasoning when confronting such situations relies simply upon simple military-instrumental calculation: if the destruction of the site will contribute to the achievement of victory, then other consequences need not be taken into consideration. In this tradition, success is the only relevant metric; this sort of reasoning is the moral sibling of the legal dictum "silent enim leges inter arma". 1 Just War theory has turned to Catholic moral theology for a test of such a proposed act's permissibility; the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) rests upon a presumed distinction between the intended effects of an act and the foreseen but unintended effects of that same act. 2 It is, strictly speaking, a deontological approach. 3
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
... Constructivism and the Agent-Structure Debate It should by now be plain what the constructivist stance on issues of agency and structure is, but to clarify at the outset just how this stance relates to the debate over agency and... more
... Constructivism and the Agent-Structure Debate It should by now be plain what the constructivist stance on issues of agency and structure is, but to clarify at the outset just how this stance relates to the debate over agency and structure in IR, I make the following claims: Page 99. ...
Research Interests:
As was briefly alluded to in the preceding chapter, Realist IR theorists have tended to characterize IR as having essentially always been a self-help system in which states use force to promote, defend, or vindicate their own interests;... more
As was briefly alluded to in the preceding chapter, Realist IR theorists have tended to characterize IR as having essentially always been a self-help system in which states use force to promote, defend, or vindicate their own interests; we need not read it as always having been that way. Alongside the self-interested, self-help ethos and its attendant practices, a punitive ethos operated for a period of centuries. Unlike the self-help regime—and it is indeed a congeries of rules —that requires only more-or-less like units in interaction, the punitive ethos was predicated upon a very specific legal-normative context. The practice, however, went through a series of transformations before eventually being rejected. International punishment, as both idea and practice, evolved in a context unlike that of the current international system, and as we will see in the coming sections, each move from that context toward our own undermined the legitimacy of invoking punishment as a grounds for the just use of force.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
We come finally to contemporary efforts to bring back the classical practice of international punishment in its nearly complete form; as we will see, the only significant way in which what is advocated today differs from the old practice... more
We come finally to contemporary efforts to bring back the classical practice of international punishment in its nearly complete form; as we will see, the only significant way in which what is advocated today differs from the old practice is in the lack of reliance on Natural Law metaphysics. Contemporary discussion of the criminalization of state behavior and the punishment of states for the commission of international crimes effectively brings us full circle to Grotius and Locke.
Research Interests:
OF THE THESIS RORTY, NEOPRAGMATISM AND NON-FOUNDATIONAL INTERNATIONAL
Research Interests:
Chapter 3 addressed categorical obligations, but showed that simple assertions of the universality of jus cogens rules did not fit within the current normative complex, which is still predominantly wed to the specificity of obligations.... more
Chapter 3 addressed categorical obligations, but showed that simple assertions of the universality of jus cogens rules did not fit within the current normative complex, which is still predominantly wed to the specificity of obligations. This chapter turns to the reemergence of obligations that are conceptualized not as bilateral, as has been dominant under Positivism, but as obligations that are owed generally; they are obligations erga omnes.3
Research Interests:
Page 1. Book Reviews 189 nationalism, the main threat to an American-led world order. As Malaysian President Mahatir stated at the G15 Summit, 'the end of the Cold War has deprived us of the only leverage we hadthe option to... more
Page 1. Book Reviews 189 nationalism, the main threat to an American-led world order. As Malaysian President Mahatir stated at the G15 Summit, 'the end of the Cold War has deprived us of the only leverage we hadthe option to defect. Now we can turn to no one' (p. 149). ...
Research Interests:
From Aristotle onward, we have been taught to think of prudence as an attribute either of the character or of the mind, but consistently as a virtue of the intellect (aretai dianoetikai). 1 Although in all understandings it is concerned... more
From Aristotle onward, we have been taught to think of prudence as an attribute either of the character or of the mind, but consistently as a virtue of the intellect (aretai dianoetikai). 1 Although in all understandings it is concerned with deliberate human action and practice, the tradition has always insisted that it is not just a skill. It had (at least until Hobbes) been understood to be something of a higher order than a (mere) skill (Hobbes 1996 [1651], I.V.VII-IX, I.VIII.IV-V, IV.XL.VI.II). I find the proposition that prudence is a virtue that can be possessed to be unsatisfactory; I propose rather that prudence is more fruitfully conceptualized as a practice, a much broader notion. To be prudent, or to act prudently is best captured not in Aristotelian or Stoic psychology, but as a practice informed by Wittgenstein's notion of "knowing how to go on". This points toward an understanding of prudence as a reflexive, rule-governed practice, as a "form of life" that involves thinking both about how we act and how we ought to act. As I will develop later, this is rather at odds with the predominant understanding of practice in the field, which by stripping deliberation from its understanding of practice, by making the relevant forms of knowledge wholly inarticulable and tacit, and by treating rules as enacted but never considered, strips all reflexivity from practice. To get at the traditional understandings of prudence from which I begin, it will be useful to start with the respective treatments of the composition of prudence of several of the authors/traditions that have provided our core vocabulary and semantics of prudence. Aristotle gave us a list of five component sub-virtues (to which he subsequently added two more), the Stoics six, Cicero three faculties, Aquinas eight, and Kant three (see Table 13.1) Surveying these sets of attributes points immediately to a conception of prudence as cognitive in character; in most of these treatments, the attributes identified are either mental operations or cognitive capacities. The very word "phronesis" derives from the verb "phroneo", to think. To use Kantian language, the components of prudence in these renderings are faculties
Research Interests:
Setting out to compare terms such as constructivism, as used in the field of International Relations (IR), and pragmatism presents a number of difficulties: the terms mean different things to different scholars, including those identifying... more
Setting out to compare terms such as constructivism, as used in the field of International Relations (IR), and pragmatism presents a number of difficulties: the terms mean different things to different scholars, including those identifying themselves by either label. For our ...
Research Interests:
After a long dormancy in the modern era, virtue-based ethical thought has once again become a subject of serious consideration and debate in the field of philosophy. The normative orientation of most International Political Theory,... more
After a long dormancy in the modern era, virtue-based ethical thought has once again become a subject of serious consideration and debate in the field of philosophy. The normative orientation of most International Political Theory, however, still comes primarily from principles-based (deontological) or outcome-based (consequentialist) ethical systems. Virtue ethics differs from focus deontological and consequentialist ethics by emphasizing character, context, and way of life, rather than rule-governed action. This chapter reviews the emergence of contemporary virtue ethics as a challenge to overly abstract, language-based analysis of moral concepts, and its development into a broad and nuanced ethical theory. It then connects virtue ethics to the capabilities approach to human development, which is similarly focused.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Consider a scenario almost too commonplace to think of as hypothetical: military planners must decide whether to attack a site which contributes significantly to their enemy's war efforts-a site which is located amidst... more
Consider a scenario almost too commonplace to think of as hypothetical: military planners must decide whether to attack a site which contributes significantly to their enemy's war efforts-a site which is located amidst noncombatants. The planners must decide whether to attack the site despite foreseeing that noncombatants will unavoidably be killed as a direct result of that attack. Destroying the enemy facility will contribute significantly ending the war, but it will do so only at the cost of these noncombatant's lives. Perhaps the oldest line of reasoning when confronting such situations relies simply upon simple military-instrumental calculation: if the destruction of the site will contribute to the achievement of victory, then other consequences need not be taken into consideration. In this tradition, success is the only relevant metric; this sort of reasoning is the moral sibling of the legal dictum "silent enim leges inter arma". 1 Just War theory has turned to Catholic moral theology for a test of such a proposed act's permissibility; the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) rests upon a presumed distinction between the intended effects of an act and the foreseen but unintended effects of that same act. 2 It is, strictly speaking, a deontological approach. 3
Research Interests:
... Constructivism and the Agent-Structure Debate It should by now be plain what the constructivist stance on issues of agency and structure is, but to clarify at the outset just how this stance relates to the debate over agency and... more
... Constructivism and the Agent-Structure Debate It should by now be plain what the constructivist stance on issues of agency and structure is, but to clarify at the outset just how this stance relates to the debate over agency and structure in IR, I make the following claims: Page 99. ...
Research Interests:
One of the insights of Constructivism is that our world is, in part, made by what we say about it. We make things what they are by saying what they are. One way is through the use of metaphor; by asserting that one thing is another thing.... more
One of the insights of Constructivism is that our world is, in part, made by what we say about it. We make things what they are by saying what they are. One way is through the use of metaphor; by asserting that one thing is another thing. Does our saying that a state is a person make it a person?A way to intervene in this discussion is by addressing it not in the abstract, but guided by a cognate question: Can states commit crimes, a uniquely human act? If states can commit and be liable for crimes, they must be able to form intents. If they are indeed persons in the relevant sense, this is no problem; if their personality is trope, however, attribution of criminal responsibility becomes tenuous.To analyse the issue, I trace the development of the trope of speaking of a group as if it were an individual from Roman Law, through to Hobbes, corporate law and IR Theory. Much hinges on Hobbes' elision of ‘body’ and ‘person’. I conclude that it is too much to expect of a metaphor that it act, that it have reasons, beliefs, and desires, and that these sum to intentions.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Contribution to a roundtable in International Studies Review edited by Andrew R. Hom
Research Interests:
(Statement of Responsibility) by Harry D. Gould(Thesis) Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 1993(Electronic Access) RESTRICTED TO NCF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE(Bibliography) Includes bibliographical... more
(Statement of Responsibility) by Harry D. Gould(Thesis) Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 1993(Electronic Access) RESTRICTED TO NCF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE(Bibliography) Includes bibliographical references.(Source of Description) This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.(Local) Faculty Sponsor: Bates, Margare
Research Interests:
From Aristotle onward, we have been taught to think of prudence as an attribute either of the character or of the mind, but consistently as a virtue of the intellect (aretai dianoetikai). 1 Although in all understandings it is concerned... more
From Aristotle onward, we have been taught to think of prudence as an attribute either of the character or of the mind, but consistently as a virtue of the intellect (aretai dianoetikai). 1 Although in all understandings it is concerned with deliberate human action and practice, the tradition has always insisted that it is not just a skill. It had (at least until Hobbes) been understood to be something of a higher order than a (mere) skill (Hobbes 1996 [1651], I.V.VII-IX, I.VIII.IV-V, IV.XL.VI.II). I find the proposition that prudence is a virtue that can be possessed to be unsatisfactory; I propose rather that prudence is more fruitfully conceptualized as a practice, a much broader notion. To be prudent, or to act prudently is best captured not in Aristotelian or Stoic psychology, but as a practice informed by Wittgenstein's notion of "knowing how to go on". This points toward an understanding of prudence as a reflexive, rule-governed practice, as a "form of life" that involves thinking both about how we act and how we ought to act. As I will develop later, this is rather at odds with the predominant understanding of practice in the field, which by stripping deliberation from its understanding of practice, by making the relevant forms of knowledge wholly inarticulable and tacit, and by treating rules as enacted but never considered, strips all reflexivity from practice. To get at the traditional understandings of prudence from which I begin, it will be useful to start with the respective treatments of the composition of prudence of several of the authors/traditions that have provided our core vocabulary and semantics of prudence. Aristotle gave us a list of five component sub-virtues (to which he subsequently added two more), the Stoics six, Cicero three faculties, Aquinas eight, and Kant three (see Table 13.1) Surveying these sets of attributes points immediately to a conception of prudence as cognitive in character; in most of these treatments, the attributes identified are either mental operations or cognitive capacities. The very word "phronesis" derives from the verb "phroneo", to think. To use Kantian language, the components of prudence in these renderings are faculties
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
<p>After a long dormancy in the modern era, virtue-based ethical thought has once again become a subject of serious consideration and debate in the field of philosophy. The normative orientation of most International Political... more
<p>After a long dormancy in the modern era, virtue-based ethical thought has once again become a subject of serious consideration and debate in the field of philosophy. The normative orientation of most International Political Theory, however, still comes primarily from principles-based (deontological) or outcome-based (consequentialist) ethical systems. Virtue ethics differs from focus deontological and consequentialist ethics by emphasizing character, context, and way of life, rather than rule-governed action. This chapter reviews the emergence of contemporary virtue ethics as a challenge to overly abstract, language-based analysis of moral concepts, and its development into a broad and nuanced ethical theory. It then connects virtue ethics to the capabilities approach to human development, which is similarly focused.</p>