I am an Assistant Professor in International Relations and Political Science at Franklin University Switzerland (Lugano).
I received my PhD from City University of Hong Kong in 2017 and my MA from Sciences Po Paris in 2014. My areas of research include: politics of nation branding, Korean political economy and society, international political economy (especially in the Asia-Pacific), global development studies, everyday cultural practices and political economy. I am particularly committed to interdisciplinary work.
Prior to joining Franklin University Switzerland in August 2019, I was Assistant Professor of International Political Economy at Tokyo International University (2017-2019). Address: Kawagoe, Saitama, Japan
Why has the practice of nation branding and its competitive imaginary become common sense in Kore... more Why has the practice of nation branding and its competitive imaginary become common sense in Korea? This article retraces the domestication, in Korea, of nation branding into an unquestioned policy imperative and of a competitive common sense. It shows how, in Korea, nation branding emerged as a policy solution to four national urgencies in the post-democratisation political economic context. It was adopted in conjunction by the state and the chaebol to resolve obstacles to capital accumulation. Korean policy-makers hired promotional consultants to participate in agenda -making processes. However, these consultants were not hired by the Korean government to design Korea's branding policies. Their power was essentially cultural. Their discourses provided policy justification and functioned as a governing device to exhort citizens to accept global competition as an unquestionable social reality and the pro-capital reforms that are (supposedly) needed to cope with competition.
This article discusses the use of film as pedagogical material to teach Everyday International Po... more This article discusses the use of film as pedagogical material to teach Everyday International Political Economy (EIPE). Film is an effective tool to bridge IPE research and teaching, and to fully integrate the everyday an as object of IPE scholarship and pedagogy. Film allows students to develop an understanding of IPE that considers often forgotten actors of the global economy, and to see how the global economy shapes and is shaped by what takes places in schools, workplaces, and households. The article discusses one practical experience of using film to teach EIPE: a ‘Political Economy of East Asia’ course developed by the author. It offers a concrete demonstration of how three movies can be integrated into the curriculum to discuss themes such as regional outsourcing, financial crises, East Asian developmentalism, the global division of labour, cultural globalization, and China’s economic rise; how active learning through film is encouraged; and how students’ work on these movies is assessed. The article concludes by addressing methodological difficulties, students’ evaluations of the course, and future research.
Depuis sa transition démocratique au début des années 1990, la Corée du Sud (ci-après, Corée) ten... more Depuis sa transition démocratique au début des années 1990, la Corée du Sud (ci-après, Corée) tente de soigner son image à l’international. Les deux administrations conservatrices qui se sont succédé de 2008 à 2016 ont notamment mené des politiques particulièrement volontaristes en termes de nation branding. Ce concept, voisin étendu de celui de diplomatie publique, signifie que l’État doit s’assurer de l’image de marque de la nation à l’étranger. Le nation branding serait nécessaire pour assurer la compétitivité internationale des entreprises nationales et attirer des capitaux (humains et financiers) étrangers mais aussi pour améliorer le soft power national. Le nation branding fut notamment utilisé par les pays de l’ex-bloc soviétique...
Environmental security has traditionally been placed as a low politics issue in a period of incre... more Environmental security has traditionally been placed as a low politics issue in a period of increasing interdependence of transborder issues. This is occurring in the context of regional convergences between hegemonic and hydrological cycles. The Mekong subregional space is being constructed and represented by major donor and recipient stakeholders as a potential and proven site of geo‐economic opportunity and risk assessment. With more stakeholders involved there is more market competition for access to subregional resources. This paper argues that the engendering of donor competition is creating the need for new strategies of state‐competition and solidarity with recipient states, which have been key to Korean Official Development Assistance (ODA) in selling the development experience. This is increasingly legitimated by particular forms of strategic nation‐branding techniques to generate both specific South–South solidarity and the sharing of the development experience through the managing of the opportunity costs of climate change.
The Korean government has strategically promoted the country’s development
assistance policies as... more The Korean government has strategically promoted the country’s development assistance policies as an alternative to traditional donors’ failed development promises and disguised neo-imperialist policies. This article questions the adequacy of fit between this narrative of exceptionalism and the reality of Korea’s developmental policy prescriptions. Based on field interviews and an analysis of policy recommendation reports produced by the Economic Development Cooperation Fund’s Knowledge Sharing Program, this article shows that Korea is actually ‘kicking away the ladder’ by offering neoliberal prescriptions that are much more in line with global developmental liberalism than its own promotional narrative suggests. Korea is merely aligning itself with the global development status quo. But these prescriptions ease chaebols’ entry in developing markets and contribute to exporting an oppressive chaebol-led transnational labour regime, notably in the Philippines.
The recent impeachment and subsequent removal from office of South Korean President Park Geun-hye... more The recent impeachment and subsequent removal from office of South Korean President Park Geun-hye have revealed the extent of state-business collusion in the country. But this is far from being a solely Korean story, as it puts ties between public and private actors under the spotlight.
This article analyses the relationships between private and public sectors in shaping the South K... more This article analyses the relationships between private and public sectors in shaping the South Korean development assistance agenda. Since 2008, subsequent Korean administrations have made development assistance a keystone of their foreign policy. Fast growing middle-income countries seem to be favourite development partners for these administrations and the parallel increase in the overseas expansion of Korean chaebol in these developing partner markets suggests that interactions between private economic interests and development assistance exigencies have been numerous. Based upon fieldwork on Korean development assistance, this article shows that Korean conglomerates are both informally and structurally included in decision-making processes as a result of the specific governance architecture inherited from the developmental state era. But recently, since its accession to the Development Assistance Committee in 2010, Korea has also been institutionalising private actors’ inclusion in official development assistance delivery mechanisms. This should be understood as part of a global agenda that has increasingly privatised development formulation and delivery. The inclusion of chaebol in official development assistance through institutional mechanisms might actually be more aligned with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development norms than the existing literature suggests.
By looking at the phenomenon of nation branding, and focusing on the South Korean presidential na... more By looking at the phenomenon of nation branding, and focusing on the South Korean presidential nation branding strategy over recent years, this article tries to uncover how the imperative of competitiveness has moved from the corporate sector to the representation of national identity. By asking why more and more governments feel compelled to implement nation branding campaigns, and what identity South Korea in particular has tried to sell to a global audience, I contribute to an understanding of how a certain discourse of globalization structures the form of modern states in their identity and the image they associate with it. Rather than treating the issue of nation branding from a policy-oriented perspective, as has been done numerous times by marketing consultancies and scholars alike, I approach it as a form of proactive identity projection, the phenomenon through which national identity is embedded in the contemporary discourse on global competitiveness. Influenced by Foucault’s understanding of power, the central argument of this article is that a powerful discourse of globalization deploys an intangible normative framework with tangible effects on contemporary understandings of national identity, imposed by a specific form of non-coercive power. National governmentshire private consultants to perform identities and political programs according to this framework. In other words, states are non-coercively constrained to share normalized self-representations. The South Korean case is a salient feature of this trend, and is an exemplary case study of the interactions between global structures and local factors in the nation branding phenomenon. KEYWORDS: nation branding, governmentality, neoliberalism, competitiveness, South Korea
Why has the practice of nation branding and its competitive imaginary become common sense in Kore... more Why has the practice of nation branding and its competitive imaginary become common sense in Korea? This article retraces the domestication, in Korea, of nation branding into an unquestioned policy imperative and of a competitive common sense. It shows how, in Korea, nation branding emerged as a policy solution to four national urgencies in the post-democratisation political economic context. It was adopted in conjunction by the state and the chaebol to resolve obstacles to capital accumulation. Korean policy-makers hired promotional consultants to participate in agenda -making processes. However, these consultants were not hired by the Korean government to design Korea's branding policies. Their power was essentially cultural. Their discourses provided policy justification and functioned as a governing device to exhort citizens to accept global competition as an unquestionable social reality and the pro-capital reforms that are (supposedly) needed to cope with competition.
This article discusses the use of film as pedagogical material to teach Everyday International Po... more This article discusses the use of film as pedagogical material to teach Everyday International Political Economy (EIPE). Film is an effective tool to bridge IPE research and teaching, and to fully integrate the everyday an as object of IPE scholarship and pedagogy. Film allows students to develop an understanding of IPE that considers often forgotten actors of the global economy, and to see how the global economy shapes and is shaped by what takes places in schools, workplaces, and households. The article discusses one practical experience of using film to teach EIPE: a ‘Political Economy of East Asia’ course developed by the author. It offers a concrete demonstration of how three movies can be integrated into the curriculum to discuss themes such as regional outsourcing, financial crises, East Asian developmentalism, the global division of labour, cultural globalization, and China’s economic rise; how active learning through film is encouraged; and how students’ work on these movies is assessed. The article concludes by addressing methodological difficulties, students’ evaluations of the course, and future research.
Depuis sa transition démocratique au début des années 1990, la Corée du Sud (ci-après, Corée) ten... more Depuis sa transition démocratique au début des années 1990, la Corée du Sud (ci-après, Corée) tente de soigner son image à l’international. Les deux administrations conservatrices qui se sont succédé de 2008 à 2016 ont notamment mené des politiques particulièrement volontaristes en termes de nation branding. Ce concept, voisin étendu de celui de diplomatie publique, signifie que l’État doit s’assurer de l’image de marque de la nation à l’étranger. Le nation branding serait nécessaire pour assurer la compétitivité internationale des entreprises nationales et attirer des capitaux (humains et financiers) étrangers mais aussi pour améliorer le soft power national. Le nation branding fut notamment utilisé par les pays de l’ex-bloc soviétique...
Environmental security has traditionally been placed as a low politics issue in a period of incre... more Environmental security has traditionally been placed as a low politics issue in a period of increasing interdependence of transborder issues. This is occurring in the context of regional convergences between hegemonic and hydrological cycles. The Mekong subregional space is being constructed and represented by major donor and recipient stakeholders as a potential and proven site of geo‐economic opportunity and risk assessment. With more stakeholders involved there is more market competition for access to subregional resources. This paper argues that the engendering of donor competition is creating the need for new strategies of state‐competition and solidarity with recipient states, which have been key to Korean Official Development Assistance (ODA) in selling the development experience. This is increasingly legitimated by particular forms of strategic nation‐branding techniques to generate both specific South–South solidarity and the sharing of the development experience through the managing of the opportunity costs of climate change.
The Korean government has strategically promoted the country’s development
assistance policies as... more The Korean government has strategically promoted the country’s development assistance policies as an alternative to traditional donors’ failed development promises and disguised neo-imperialist policies. This article questions the adequacy of fit between this narrative of exceptionalism and the reality of Korea’s developmental policy prescriptions. Based on field interviews and an analysis of policy recommendation reports produced by the Economic Development Cooperation Fund’s Knowledge Sharing Program, this article shows that Korea is actually ‘kicking away the ladder’ by offering neoliberal prescriptions that are much more in line with global developmental liberalism than its own promotional narrative suggests. Korea is merely aligning itself with the global development status quo. But these prescriptions ease chaebols’ entry in developing markets and contribute to exporting an oppressive chaebol-led transnational labour regime, notably in the Philippines.
The recent impeachment and subsequent removal from office of South Korean President Park Geun-hye... more The recent impeachment and subsequent removal from office of South Korean President Park Geun-hye have revealed the extent of state-business collusion in the country. But this is far from being a solely Korean story, as it puts ties between public and private actors under the spotlight.
This article analyses the relationships between private and public sectors in shaping the South K... more This article analyses the relationships between private and public sectors in shaping the South Korean development assistance agenda. Since 2008, subsequent Korean administrations have made development assistance a keystone of their foreign policy. Fast growing middle-income countries seem to be favourite development partners for these administrations and the parallel increase in the overseas expansion of Korean chaebol in these developing partner markets suggests that interactions between private economic interests and development assistance exigencies have been numerous. Based upon fieldwork on Korean development assistance, this article shows that Korean conglomerates are both informally and structurally included in decision-making processes as a result of the specific governance architecture inherited from the developmental state era. But recently, since its accession to the Development Assistance Committee in 2010, Korea has also been institutionalising private actors’ inclusion in official development assistance delivery mechanisms. This should be understood as part of a global agenda that has increasingly privatised development formulation and delivery. The inclusion of chaebol in official development assistance through institutional mechanisms might actually be more aligned with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development norms than the existing literature suggests.
By looking at the phenomenon of nation branding, and focusing on the South Korean presidential na... more By looking at the phenomenon of nation branding, and focusing on the South Korean presidential nation branding strategy over recent years, this article tries to uncover how the imperative of competitiveness has moved from the corporate sector to the representation of national identity. By asking why more and more governments feel compelled to implement nation branding campaigns, and what identity South Korea in particular has tried to sell to a global audience, I contribute to an understanding of how a certain discourse of globalization structures the form of modern states in their identity and the image they associate with it. Rather than treating the issue of nation branding from a policy-oriented perspective, as has been done numerous times by marketing consultancies and scholars alike, I approach it as a form of proactive identity projection, the phenomenon through which national identity is embedded in the contemporary discourse on global competitiveness. Influenced by Foucault’s understanding of power, the central argument of this article is that a powerful discourse of globalization deploys an intangible normative framework with tangible effects on contemporary understandings of national identity, imposed by a specific form of non-coercive power. National governmentshire private consultants to perform identities and political programs according to this framework. In other words, states are non-coercively constrained to share normalized self-representations. The South Korean case is a salient feature of this trend, and is an exemplary case study of the interactions between global structures and local factors in the nation branding phenomenon. KEYWORDS: nation branding, governmentality, neoliberalism, competitiveness, South Korea
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assistance policies as an alternative to traditional donors’ failed
development promises and disguised neo-imperialist policies. This
article questions the adequacy of fit between this narrative of exceptionalism
and the reality of Korea’s developmental policy prescriptions.
Based on field interviews and an analysis of policy recommendation
reports produced by the Economic Development Cooperation Fund’s
Knowledge Sharing Program, this article shows that Korea is actually
‘kicking away the ladder’ by offering neoliberal prescriptions that are
much more in line with global developmental liberalism than its own
promotional narrative suggests. Korea is merely aligning itself with the
global development status quo. But these prescriptions ease chaebols’
entry in developing markets and contribute to exporting an oppressive
chaebol-led transnational labour regime, notably in the Philippines.
strategy over recent years, this article tries to uncover how the imperative of competitiveness has moved from the
corporate sector to the representation of national identity. By asking why more and more governments feel compelled
to implement nation branding campaigns, and what identity South Korea in particular has tried to sell to a global
audience, I contribute to an understanding of how a certain discourse of globalization structures the form of modern
states in their identity and the image they associate with it. Rather than treating the issue of nation branding from a
policy-oriented perspective, as has been done numerous times by marketing consultancies and scholars alike, I
approach it as a form of proactive identity projection, the phenomenon through which national identity is embedded in
the contemporary discourse on global competitiveness. Influenced by Foucault’s understanding of power, the central
argument of this article is that a powerful discourse of globalization deploys an intangible normative framework with
tangible effects on contemporary understandings of national identity, imposed by a specific form of non-coercive
power. National governmentshire private consultants to perform identities and political programs according to this
framework. In other words, states are non-coercively constrained to share normalized self-representations. The South
Korean case is a salient feature of this trend, and is an exemplary case study of the interactions between global
structures and local factors in the nation branding phenomenon.
KEYWORDS: nation branding, governmentality, neoliberalism, competitiveness, South Korea
assistance policies as an alternative to traditional donors’ failed
development promises and disguised neo-imperialist policies. This
article questions the adequacy of fit between this narrative of exceptionalism
and the reality of Korea’s developmental policy prescriptions.
Based on field interviews and an analysis of policy recommendation
reports produced by the Economic Development Cooperation Fund’s
Knowledge Sharing Program, this article shows that Korea is actually
‘kicking away the ladder’ by offering neoliberal prescriptions that are
much more in line with global developmental liberalism than its own
promotional narrative suggests. Korea is merely aligning itself with the
global development status quo. But these prescriptions ease chaebols’
entry in developing markets and contribute to exporting an oppressive
chaebol-led transnational labour regime, notably in the Philippines.
strategy over recent years, this article tries to uncover how the imperative of competitiveness has moved from the
corporate sector to the representation of national identity. By asking why more and more governments feel compelled
to implement nation branding campaigns, and what identity South Korea in particular has tried to sell to a global
audience, I contribute to an understanding of how a certain discourse of globalization structures the form of modern
states in their identity and the image they associate with it. Rather than treating the issue of nation branding from a
policy-oriented perspective, as has been done numerous times by marketing consultancies and scholars alike, I
approach it as a form of proactive identity projection, the phenomenon through which national identity is embedded in
the contemporary discourse on global competitiveness. Influenced by Foucault’s understanding of power, the central
argument of this article is that a powerful discourse of globalization deploys an intangible normative framework with
tangible effects on contemporary understandings of national identity, imposed by a specific form of non-coercive
power. National governmentshire private consultants to perform identities and political programs according to this
framework. In other words, states are non-coercively constrained to share normalized self-representations. The South
Korean case is a salient feature of this trend, and is an exemplary case study of the interactions between global
structures and local factors in the nation branding phenomenon.
KEYWORDS: nation branding, governmentality, neoliberalism, competitiveness, South Korea