Books by Marwa Daoudy
Jadaliyya, 2020
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Cambridge University Press, 2020
Does climate change cause conflict? Did it cause the Syrian uprising? Some policymakers and acade... more Does climate change cause conflict? Did it cause the Syrian uprising? Some policymakers and academics have made this claim, but is it true? This study presents a new conceptual framework to evaluate this claim. Contributing to scholarship in the fields of critical security, environmental security, human security, and Arab politics, Marwa Daoudy prioritizes non-Western and marginalized perspectives to make sense of Syria's place in this international debate. Designing an innovative multidisciplinary framework and applying it to the Syrian case, Daoudy uses extensive field research and her own personal background as a Syrian scholar to present primary interviews with Syrian government officials and citizens, as well as the research of domestic Syrian experts, to provide a unique insight into Syria's environmental, economic and social vulnerabilities leading up to the 2011 uprising.
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Chap. I in Daoudy (2005) Le partage des eaux entre la Syrie, l'Irak et la Turquie: négociation, s... more Chap. I in Daoudy (2005) Le partage des eaux entre la Syrie, l'Irak et la Turquie: négociation, sécurité et asymétrie des pouvoirs, CNRS Editions, Paris (France).
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Chap. IV in Daoudy (2005) Le partage des eaux entre la Syrie, l'Irak et la Turquie: Négociation, ... more Chap. IV in Daoudy (2005) Le partage des eaux entre la Syrie, l'Irak et la Turquie: Négociation, Sécurité et asymétrie des pouvoirs, CNRS Editions, Paris (France).
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Articles by Marwa Daoudy
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2016
The relation between Syria and Turkey transformed from enmity in the 1990s to détente in the earl... more The relation between Syria and Turkey transformed from enmity in the 1990s to détente in the early 2000s, grew into amity after the rise to power of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) in 2002, and reverted to enmity in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. This research suggests that a combination of structural and identity-based factors, at regional and domestic levels, induced the collapse of the decade-long amity. This paper builds on the notion of a " structure-identity nexus " ; and determines the orientation of foreign policy outcomes from the 1990s until 2011. The discussion outlines the merits of a hybrid theoretical perspective by elaborating on Barkin's idea of 'realist constructivism', which draws on two rival traditions, realism and constructivism. The structure-identity framework explains the double transformation in the relationship, considering the return to inter-and intra-state conflict in 2011. The research draws on extensive primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews carried out with key figures. In addition to the relationship between Syria and Turkey, the structure-identity nexus provides potential broader explanations that fuel the shift from amity to enmity in the complex network of states found in the Middle East.
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International Negotiation, 2009
This article addresses the conflict over the Euphrates and Tigris waters from the perspective of ... more This article addresses the conflict over the Euphrates and Tigris waters from the perspective of negotiation theories, by examining the role of power in upstream/downstream negotiations. Conceptual and empirical links are established between water, negotiation (structure, process), power (asymmetries, coalition dynamics, strategies, development of alternatives) and security (direct/indirect interests such as national security, border security, territorial claims, economic development and environmental concerns). The study concludes that asymmetries in power have favored upstream/downstream interactions towards bilateral if not basin-wide arrangements. The framework shows that traditional elements of power, such
as upstream positions, military and economic resources, do not constitute the only sources of power. Bargaining power can also determine the dynamics between respective riparians. Time constitutes an important source of power, and interests vary over time when political settings and security concerns shift. Downstream or more vulnerable riparians can invert situations of power asymmetry by acting on the basin-dominant riparian’s interests and thus reduce its alternatives. Syria’s use of ‘issue linkage’ in its interactions with Turkey over water and wider security issues serves as the primary example.
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In the Middle East “no war is possible without Egypt, and no peace is possible without Syria,” as... more In the Middle East “no war is possible without Egypt, and no peace is possible without Syria,” as suggested by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the 1970s. From 1991 to 2000, Syria entered into extensive peace negotiations with Israel, another key actor in the Middle East. The objective of this article is to understand these negotiations, which involved periods of intense discord as well as
moments of rapprochement. Spectacular progress was made, for instance, between 1993 and 1995, when the “Rabin deposit,” Israel’s promise to withdraw from the Golan Heights to the 4 June 1967 border and thus allow Syria to recover access to Lake Tiberias, was proposed to the U.S. mediator. The two actors came close to an agreement but failed to put an end to the Israeli-Syrian conflict at the Shepherdstown negotiations in January 2000 and the Asad-Clinton summit on 26
March 2000 in Geneva. What lessons can be drawn from the process which took place between 1991 and 2000 in terms of the actors’ objectives, motivations and perceptions of each other? Why did the talks fail to produce an agreement? What was the weight of water in stimulating or blocking the process?
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Water Policy, 2008
This paper addresses hydro-hegemony from the perspective of International Water Law, by examining... more This paper addresses hydro-hegemony from the perspective of International Water Law, by examining the role of law in upstream/downstream negotiations. It is built on the understanding that International Water Law constitutes an element of power relations, asserting that it is a source of structural and bargaining power. The first section of the paper discusses main principles that have emerged, and their establishment as terms of reference for water cooperation. In the second part, competing claims are analyzed to see how co-riparians in the Euphrates and Tigris basins have provided deliberately conflicting interpretations over “International rivers”, “equitable and reasonable utilization”, “no harm”, “prior notification” and “consultation” to derive negotiating positions and influence from International Water Law. Conclusions point to the understanding of water law as a structural variable, impacting on the actors’ constraints and options and enhancing the structural power of the non hegemonic
riparians. International Water Law appears to operate as well as process-related variable which influences the process and outcome of water negotiations. As a source of bargaining power, legal principles increase the legitimacy of downstream riparians and enhances their bargaining position in the negotiation process.
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Inequitable access to water has caused much conflict, especially when water is embedded in larger... more Inequitable access to water has caused much conflict, especially when water is embedded in larger conflicts of a high-politics nature or where limited economic diversification restricts the range of policy options open to governments. Potential solutions tend to involve agreements on volumetric water allocations rather than focusing on the sharing of more broadly conceived potential mutual benefits. Located
in the volatile Middle East, the Euphrates and Tigris river basins are examples of this. Moreover, because this region has one of the highest population growth rates in the world, the potential for conflict is increased.
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Book chapters by Marwa Daoudy
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in Chetail ed. (2009), Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon, Oxford University Press.
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Water in the Middle East and in North Africa, 2004
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Book review by Marwa Daoudy
Natural Resources Forum, 2009
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Policy papers by Marwa Daoudy
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Books by Marwa Daoudy
Articles by Marwa Daoudy
as upstream positions, military and economic resources, do not constitute the only sources of power. Bargaining power can also determine the dynamics between respective riparians. Time constitutes an important source of power, and interests vary over time when political settings and security concerns shift. Downstream or more vulnerable riparians can invert situations of power asymmetry by acting on the basin-dominant riparian’s interests and thus reduce its alternatives. Syria’s use of ‘issue linkage’ in its interactions with Turkey over water and wider security issues serves as the primary example.
moments of rapprochement. Spectacular progress was made, for instance, between 1993 and 1995, when the “Rabin deposit,” Israel’s promise to withdraw from the Golan Heights to the 4 June 1967 border and thus allow Syria to recover access to Lake Tiberias, was proposed to the U.S. mediator. The two actors came close to an agreement but failed to put an end to the Israeli-Syrian conflict at the Shepherdstown negotiations in January 2000 and the Asad-Clinton summit on 26
March 2000 in Geneva. What lessons can be drawn from the process which took place between 1991 and 2000 in terms of the actors’ objectives, motivations and perceptions of each other? Why did the talks fail to produce an agreement? What was the weight of water in stimulating or blocking the process?
riparians. International Water Law appears to operate as well as process-related variable which influences the process and outcome of water negotiations. As a source of bargaining power, legal principles increase the legitimacy of downstream riparians and enhances their bargaining position in the negotiation process.
in the volatile Middle East, the Euphrates and Tigris river basins are examples of this. Moreover, because this region has one of the highest population growth rates in the world, the potential for conflict is increased.
Book chapters by Marwa Daoudy
Book review by Marwa Daoudy
Policy papers by Marwa Daoudy
as upstream positions, military and economic resources, do not constitute the only sources of power. Bargaining power can also determine the dynamics between respective riparians. Time constitutes an important source of power, and interests vary over time when political settings and security concerns shift. Downstream or more vulnerable riparians can invert situations of power asymmetry by acting on the basin-dominant riparian’s interests and thus reduce its alternatives. Syria’s use of ‘issue linkage’ in its interactions with Turkey over water and wider security issues serves as the primary example.
moments of rapprochement. Spectacular progress was made, for instance, between 1993 and 1995, when the “Rabin deposit,” Israel’s promise to withdraw from the Golan Heights to the 4 June 1967 border and thus allow Syria to recover access to Lake Tiberias, was proposed to the U.S. mediator. The two actors came close to an agreement but failed to put an end to the Israeli-Syrian conflict at the Shepherdstown negotiations in January 2000 and the Asad-Clinton summit on 26
March 2000 in Geneva. What lessons can be drawn from the process which took place between 1991 and 2000 in terms of the actors’ objectives, motivations and perceptions of each other? Why did the talks fail to produce an agreement? What was the weight of water in stimulating or blocking the process?
riparians. International Water Law appears to operate as well as process-related variable which influences the process and outcome of water negotiations. As a source of bargaining power, legal principles increase the legitimacy of downstream riparians and enhances their bargaining position in the negotiation process.
in the volatile Middle East, the Euphrates and Tigris river basins are examples of this. Moreover, because this region has one of the highest population growth rates in the world, the potential for conflict is increased.
perceptions propres d’un protagoniste syrien qui reste très méconnu ? Telle est la question à laquelle souhaite répondre cette étude, en disséquant les enjeux majeurs du processus : le territoire, la sécurité et les ressources en eau. L’analyse des obstacles rencontrés sur le chemin de la paix permettra en outre de
prendre la mesure des perspectives actuelles de reprise du dialogue, dans un contexte profondément bouleversé. Le décès du président Hafez Al-Assad en juin 2000 et l’arrivée au pouvoir de son fils Bachar, la
détérioration de la situation israélo-palestinienne depuis le déclenchement de la seconde Intifada et l’élection d’Ariel Sharon en Israël, la guerre américaine en Irak, l'assassinat de l'ancien Premier ministre libanais Rafic Hariri, le retrait des troupes syriennes du Liban en avril 2005, et la tenue du 10e Congrès du parti Baas en juin ont transformé l’échiquier intérieur et régional. Cette analyse entend apporter un nouvel éclairage sur les contraintes que subit la Syrie et les opportunités qui s’offrent à elles, en s’efforçant d’apprécier l’impact de
ces changements sur sa position de négociation.
the world, and the way we think about Syrian lives is no less prejudiced. We all know Syrians are victims of barrel
bombs, torture, sieges, and mass displacement. But their suffering is seen through four distorted lenses. Why have
Syrian lives mattered so little for five years?