Don Ihde and Lambros Malafouris (Philosophy and Technology 32:195-214, 2019) have argued that "we... more Don Ihde and Lambros Malafouris (Philosophy and Technology 32:195-214, 2019) have argued that "we are homo faber not just because we make things but also because we are made by them." The emphasis falls on the idea that the things that we create, use, rely on-that is, those things with which we engage-have a recursive effect on human existence. We make things, but we also make arrangements, many of which are long-standing, material, social, normative, economic, institutional , and/or political, and many of which are supported by various technologies, including AI, more and more. Critical theorists, such as Habermas, have argued that we need a "depth" or critical hermeneutics (one that combines hermeneutical understanding with scientific explanation) to provide a full account of this kind of recursivity. For Habermas, the explanatory aspect of critical hermeneutics has been modeled on neo-Marxist and neo-Freudian theories. We propose a new critical hermeneutical approach that uses the tools of embodied cognitive science, affordance theory, material engagement theory, and the concept of the socially extended mind.
Perceptions of entitativity are thought to be influenced by salient features such as the physical... more Perceptions of entitativity are thought to be influenced by salient features such as the physical proximity and physical similarity of group members (Campbell in Behav Sci 3:14–25, 1958). But social interactions among group members involve a number of low-level alignment (Pickering and Garrod in Behav Brain Sci 27:212–225, 2004) and synchronization (Marsh et al. in Top Cogn Sci 1:320–339, 2009) processes. Conversational partners, for instance, become aligned in syntax, semantics, emotion, and bodily posture. In this paper, we explore whether alignment correlates with observers’ judgments of entitativity, and, moreover, which specific forms of alignment have the strongest effects on these judgments. Results revealed that only emotional alignment had on effect on judgments of entitativity. We discuss how future work may further assess the role of various dimensions in shaping the perception of group status in linguistic interaction.
The artefactual environment is not just the passive, inert background against which the drama of ... more The artefactual environment is not just the passive, inert background against which the drama of human and non-human animal life plays out; but rather, the built environment plays an active role in the structure of agency. This is an insight that Lambros Malafouris (2013) has articulated in his framework of Material Engagement Theory (MET). I will discuss the enactive-embodied and dynamic approaches to cognition and action, emphasizing the ways that this approach leads to taking MET seriously by force of its own theoretical commitments. That is, material engagement is a natural development of these models of mind, specified to the particularities of the human historical situation. I will then discuss Theiner and Drain's (2017) critique of HMA, in which they argue that we should replace material agency with materially-scaffolded agency. Scaffolded agency, however, is too weak of a conception of how material culture shapes agency, and is a notion continues to privilege the sense of agency as a mark of what genuinely constitutes agency proper. Drawing on Steward (2016) I propose a definition of material agency that emphasizes the idea that agency is a process, and I suggest that material agency is better captured by the phenomenological experience of flow (Vuorre and Metcalf 2016). This phenomenological understanding of material agency both responds to Theiner & Drain's critique, and emphasizes the importance of investigating material culture phenomenologically.
In this chapter we argue that an account of joint or collective action should make explicit the d... more In this chapter we argue that an account of joint or collective action should make explicit the dynamical relations, not just among intersubjective forces, including normative and institutional practices, but also among the material conditions imposed by artifacts, tools, media, etc. Not only do joint actions emerge at these intersections, but also various aspects of the relevant cognitive processes (intentions, beliefs, commitments, common knowledge, etc.), rather than pre-existing in any complete form, emerge in the dynamical mix of agents, material things, and social structures. We employ Material Engagement Theory (MET) to explicate an account of these factors, and we show how this approach to joint action is consistent with an enactivist theory of cognition.
Creative Evolution: Mind, biosocial plasticity and material engagement
11 June 2016, Keble Colle... more Creative Evolution: Mind, biosocial plasticity and material engagement
11 June 2016, Keble College, Oxford University
I will be discussing the structure and phenomenology of coupled action, making connections to Dynamic Systems Theory, Material Engagement Theory and the enactivist action-oriented theories of perception. I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of how habits envelop objects that we engage with (e.g. the blind man’s cane), and how this produces a global—or, at least, non-discrete—reworking of our phenomenological field of significance. I will explain this coupling between bodies and artifacts in language of Dynamic Systems Theory, especially in terms of how emergent properties of a system can emerge out of the interactions among more basic parts, but is not reducible to these parts. I will then talk about how Merleau-Ponty’s description of the field of signification can be described in the language of affordances in order to make some connections to the concept of material agency in Material Engagement Theory. I by making some brief remarks about the phylogenetic preconditions that make this sort of material engagement a ubiquitous feature of our species-situation.
Habits: Pragmatist Approaches From Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory. Fausto Caruana & Italo Testa (eds.) Cambridge University Press, 2020
We explore different modes of experience in performance, including various experiences of flow, h... more We explore different modes of experience in performance, including various experiences of flow, heedful performance, and habit. In contrast to conceptions that take habit to be automatic or a more-or-less rote repetition of behavior, Dewey and Merleau-Ponty consider habit to be a general bodily responsiveness to the world. Dewey’s conception of intelligent habit involves a thoughtful attitude of care and attunement to the parameters of the task. Merleau-Ponty likewise describes habit as being both motor and perceptual. Habit is an open and adaptive way in which the body learns to cope with familiar situations in ways that involve some degree of heedful performance. The deployment of a motor habit, for example, adapts to the specific contour of the situation—different situations make different demands on how the habitual task, here and now, ought to be achieved. This conception of habit meshes well with ecological affordance-based accounts of action and perception.
Don Ihde and Lambros Malafouris (Philosophy and Technology 32:195-214, 2019) have argued that "we... more Don Ihde and Lambros Malafouris (Philosophy and Technology 32:195-214, 2019) have argued that "we are homo faber not just because we make things but also because we are made by them." The emphasis falls on the idea that the things that we create, use, rely on-that is, those things with which we engage-have a recursive effect on human existence. We make things, but we also make arrangements, many of which are long-standing, material, social, normative, economic, institutional , and/or political, and many of which are supported by various technologies, including AI, more and more. Critical theorists, such as Habermas, have argued that we need a "depth" or critical hermeneutics (one that combines hermeneutical understanding with scientific explanation) to provide a full account of this kind of recursivity. For Habermas, the explanatory aspect of critical hermeneutics has been modeled on neo-Marxist and neo-Freudian theories. We propose a new critical hermeneutical approach that uses the tools of embodied cognitive science, affordance theory, material engagement theory, and the concept of the socially extended mind.
Perceptions of entitativity are thought to be influenced by salient features such as the physical... more Perceptions of entitativity are thought to be influenced by salient features such as the physical proximity and physical similarity of group members (Campbell in Behav Sci 3:14–25, 1958). But social interactions among group members involve a number of low-level alignment (Pickering and Garrod in Behav Brain Sci 27:212–225, 2004) and synchronization (Marsh et al. in Top Cogn Sci 1:320–339, 2009) processes. Conversational partners, for instance, become aligned in syntax, semantics, emotion, and bodily posture. In this paper, we explore whether alignment correlates with observers’ judgments of entitativity, and, moreover, which specific forms of alignment have the strongest effects on these judgments. Results revealed that only emotional alignment had on effect on judgments of entitativity. We discuss how future work may further assess the role of various dimensions in shaping the perception of group status in linguistic interaction.
The artefactual environment is not just the passive, inert background against which the drama of ... more The artefactual environment is not just the passive, inert background against which the drama of human and non-human animal life plays out; but rather, the built environment plays an active role in the structure of agency. This is an insight that Lambros Malafouris (2013) has articulated in his framework of Material Engagement Theory (MET). I will discuss the enactive-embodied and dynamic approaches to cognition and action, emphasizing the ways that this approach leads to taking MET seriously by force of its own theoretical commitments. That is, material engagement is a natural development of these models of mind, specified to the particularities of the human historical situation. I will then discuss Theiner and Drain's (2017) critique of HMA, in which they argue that we should replace material agency with materially-scaffolded agency. Scaffolded agency, however, is too weak of a conception of how material culture shapes agency, and is a notion continues to privilege the sense of agency as a mark of what genuinely constitutes agency proper. Drawing on Steward (2016) I propose a definition of material agency that emphasizes the idea that agency is a process, and I suggest that material agency is better captured by the phenomenological experience of flow (Vuorre and Metcalf 2016). This phenomenological understanding of material agency both responds to Theiner & Drain's critique, and emphasizes the importance of investigating material culture phenomenologically.
In this chapter we argue that an account of joint or collective action should make explicit the d... more In this chapter we argue that an account of joint or collective action should make explicit the dynamical relations, not just among intersubjective forces, including normative and institutional practices, but also among the material conditions imposed by artifacts, tools, media, etc. Not only do joint actions emerge at these intersections, but also various aspects of the relevant cognitive processes (intentions, beliefs, commitments, common knowledge, etc.), rather than pre-existing in any complete form, emerge in the dynamical mix of agents, material things, and social structures. We employ Material Engagement Theory (MET) to explicate an account of these factors, and we show how this approach to joint action is consistent with an enactivist theory of cognition.
Creative Evolution: Mind, biosocial plasticity and material engagement
11 June 2016, Keble Colle... more Creative Evolution: Mind, biosocial plasticity and material engagement
11 June 2016, Keble College, Oxford University
I will be discussing the structure and phenomenology of coupled action, making connections to Dynamic Systems Theory, Material Engagement Theory and the enactivist action-oriented theories of perception. I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of how habits envelop objects that we engage with (e.g. the blind man’s cane), and how this produces a global—or, at least, non-discrete—reworking of our phenomenological field of significance. I will explain this coupling between bodies and artifacts in language of Dynamic Systems Theory, especially in terms of how emergent properties of a system can emerge out of the interactions among more basic parts, but is not reducible to these parts. I will then talk about how Merleau-Ponty’s description of the field of signification can be described in the language of affordances in order to make some connections to the concept of material agency in Material Engagement Theory. I by making some brief remarks about the phylogenetic preconditions that make this sort of material engagement a ubiquitous feature of our species-situation.
Habits: Pragmatist Approaches From Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory. Fausto Caruana & Italo Testa (eds.) Cambridge University Press, 2020
We explore different modes of experience in performance, including various experiences of flow, h... more We explore different modes of experience in performance, including various experiences of flow, heedful performance, and habit. In contrast to conceptions that take habit to be automatic or a more-or-less rote repetition of behavior, Dewey and Merleau-Ponty consider habit to be a general bodily responsiveness to the world. Dewey’s conception of intelligent habit involves a thoughtful attitude of care and attunement to the parameters of the task. Merleau-Ponty likewise describes habit as being both motor and perceptual. Habit is an open and adaptive way in which the body learns to cope with familiar situations in ways that involve some degree of heedful performance. The deployment of a motor habit, for example, adapts to the specific contour of the situation—different situations make different demands on how the habitual task, here and now, ought to be achieved. This conception of habit meshes well with ecological affordance-based accounts of action and perception.
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11 June 2016, Keble College, Oxford University
I will be discussing the structure and phenomenology of coupled action, making connections to Dynamic Systems Theory, Material Engagement Theory and the enactivist action-oriented theories of perception. I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of how habits envelop objects that we engage with (e.g. the blind man’s cane), and how this produces a global—or, at least, non-discrete—reworking of our phenomenological field of significance. I will explain this coupling between bodies and artifacts in language of Dynamic Systems Theory, especially in terms of how emergent properties of a system can emerge out of the interactions among more basic parts, but is not reducible to these parts. I will then talk about how Merleau-Ponty’s description of the field of signification can be described in the language of affordances in order to make some connections to the concept of material agency in Material Engagement Theory. I by making some brief remarks about the phylogenetic preconditions that make this sort of material engagement a ubiquitous feature of our species-situation.
11 June 2016, Keble College, Oxford University
I will be discussing the structure and phenomenology of coupled action, making connections to Dynamic Systems Theory, Material Engagement Theory and the enactivist action-oriented theories of perception. I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of how habits envelop objects that we engage with (e.g. the blind man’s cane), and how this produces a global—or, at least, non-discrete—reworking of our phenomenological field of significance. I will explain this coupling between bodies and artifacts in language of Dynamic Systems Theory, especially in terms of how emergent properties of a system can emerge out of the interactions among more basic parts, but is not reducible to these parts. I will then talk about how Merleau-Ponty’s description of the field of signification can be described in the language of affordances in order to make some connections to the concept of material agency in Material Engagement Theory. I by making some brief remarks about the phylogenetic preconditions that make this sort of material engagement a ubiquitous feature of our species-situation.