In the conclusion to The Imaginary Jean-Paul Sartre draws attention to the centrality of imaginat... more In the conclusion to The Imaginary Jean-Paul Sartre draws attention to the centrality of imagination in human life, describing it as a constitutive structure of consciousness. Imagination, according to him, is not a contingent feature of consciousness, but one of its essential features. This essay re-examines Sartre’s notion of imagination, arguing that current interpretations do not exhaust its meaning. Beginning with a consideration of dichotomies that dominate his theory of imagination—such as those between present, material objects and absent images, or real entities and fictional creations, as well as interpretative responses to them—the essay moves on to explore the possibility of locating a different sense of imagination in his work, one which is irreducible to such oppositions. Focusing on Sartre’s example of the work of an impersonator, this essay advances the idea that the playful activity of impersonators and actors enables the spectators who are watching them to explore novel and often unfamiliar connections between objects in the world. Imagination, according to this interpretation, enriches and augments perception, rather than suspends or replaces it with mental images. This new interpretation of Sartre’s notion of imagination places him in proximity to Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘aspect-seeing’ in Philosophical Investigations. However, whereas Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘aspect-seeing’ can lead to the conclusion that it is impossible to draw a line between perceiving and imagining, the notion of imagination operative in Sartre’s example enables us to maintain and explain the differences between ordinary and ‘imaginative’ perception.
The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2012
"In his phenomenological study of imaginative acts in The Imaginary, Jean-Paul Sartre declares th... more "In his phenomenological study of imaginative acts in The Imaginary, Jean-Paul Sartre declares that memory and imagination are two different functions, and consequently severs the two from one another. Imagination, he argues, is the epitome of human freedom, since it allows consciousness to detach itself from experience or to negate reality; recollection, on the other hand, entirely depends on perception and is portrayed in The Imaginary as reproduction of perceptual experience. I show in this paper that although he explicitly treats memory and imagination as dichotomous, Sartre’s description of the two indicates strong affinities between them. First, Sartre uses recollections as examples of imaginative acts. Second, his phenomenological description of imagination is wholly applicable to recollection. The paper re-examines the relationship between memory and imagination in The Imaginary and uses Sartre’s theory of imagination as well as his autobiographical writing to conceptualize autobiographical memory as an active and productive aspect of the human mind "
Sartre’s early works on phenomenology reveal the complexity of his relationship to Husserl. Deepl... more Sartre’s early works on phenomenology reveal the complexity of his relationship to Husserl. Deeply indebted to phenomenology’s method as well as its substance, Sartre nonetheless confronted Husserl’s transcendental turn from Ideas onward. Although numerous studies have focused on Sartre’s points of contention with Husserl, drawing attention to his departure from Husserlian phenomenology, scholars have rarely examined the way in which Sartre engaged and responded to the early Husserl, particularly to his discussions of intentionality, consciousness, and self in Logical Investigations. This essay focuses on Sartre’s critical response to Logical Investigations, arguing that Husserl’s understanding of these three notions shapes and informs Sartre’s own approach to them in The Transcendence of the Ego (1936-37), “Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology” (1939), and Being and Nothingness (1943). By carefully reading Sartre side by side with Husserl, this essay articulates the ways in which Sartre allowed himself to think along with, and not against, Husserl.
Commenting on Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of imagination, Paul Ricoeur argues that Sartre fails to ... more Commenting on Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of imagination, Paul Ricoeur argues that Sartre fails to address the productive nature of imaginative acts. According to Ricoeur, Sartre’s examples show that he thinks of imagination in mimetic terms, neglecting its innovative and creative dimensions. Imagination, Ricoeur continues, manifests itself most clearly in fiction, wherein new meaning is created. By using fiction as the paradigm of imaginative activity, Ricoeur is able to argue against Sartre that the essence of imagination lies not in its ability to reproduce absent objects, but rather in the ability to transform reality through creative acts. Motivated by the intuition that Sartre the writer could not have forgotten to address such crucial dimensions of imagination,
I examine Sartre’s philosophical and literary work, showing that not only does he develop a notion of productive imagination, he also puts this notion to work by articulating the relationship between imagination, narrative, and identity formation,
well before Ricoeur advanced his narrative-identity theory. I argue that Sartre, like Ricoeur and MacIntyre, another representative of narrative-theory whose criticism of Sartre I address in this essay, views imagination and narrativity as necessary conditions for the formation of a coherent and meaningful sense of self
Antigone has buried her brother. When she is brought before Creon the sentry describes her by mea... more Antigone has buried her brother. When she is brought before Creon the sentry describes her by means of her voice: “She cried out bitterly, with a sound like the piercing note of a bird when she sees her empty next robbed of her young.” But in the philosophical tradition, from Hegel to Judith Butler and Jacques Lacan, Antigone’s voice has hardly been heard. Mourned for her premature, self-inflicted death, it was Antigone’s deeds that were understood as dramatizing the possibilities, both the risk and the promise, of human existence. Turning to Adrianna Cavarero's and Luce Irigaray's analyses of the play, I explore Antigone's voice and its relationship to air -- the element in which birds soar, the medium and precondition for acoustic waves, sounds and voices -- in order to develop an ecology of the feminine and articulate the possibilities, psychological and political, which an array of cultures and contexts of reception opens for us
This essay concerns Simone de Beauvoir's analysis of blame and punishment in "OEil pour oeil" and... more This essay concerns Simone de Beauvoir's analysis of blame and punishment in "OEil pour oeil" and the irreconcilable tensions that haunt it. I study these tensions-between the desire to blame and punish and the inability to provide moral justification for these practices-and locate their source in Beauvoir's conception of ethics in Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté. According to my reading, her ethics implies that violence violates freedom, the grounding principle of ethical life. Retaliatory and retributive judgments and the punishment they uphold, regardless of whether they are exerted by individuals or by official state powers, are forms of violence and are therefore unjustifiable. The aporias of blame and punishment in "OEil pour oeil" suggest that Beauvoir's ideal of ethics necessitates an abolitionist position regarding punishment. The essay ends with a reflection on the affinity between the position constructed from Beauvoir's work and feminist abolitionist theories that seek to undermine the legal, social, and political institutions that perpetuate, rather than resolve, economic, racial, gender, sex, and class inequality.
Among philosophers, Simone de Beauvoir is unique in treating childhood as a philosophical phenome... more Among philosophers, Simone de Beauvoir is unique in treating childhood as a philosophical phenomenon. In both The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, she examines the relationship between childhood and human freedom and considers its role in the development of subjectivity. Despite this, few sustained analyses of her treatment of the phenomenon exist. I argue that Beauvoir’s conception of childhood is not uniform, but changes from The Ethics of Ambiguity to The Second Sex. While the former presents children as lacking moral freedom, as not fully sovereign individuals, the latter suggests that children are just as free as adults. When children do not fully possess or exercise freedom, it is not because they are not in a position to do so, but rather because they are hindered by various social institutions. I find this position useful for developing a phenomenological account of childhood as a site for freedom. Hence, Beauvoir becomes a source for thinking of issues in philosophical anthropology concerning the temporality of human existence and the nature of human agency over a lifespan.
מאמר זה בוחן את האופן שבו דמויותיהן של איסמנה ואנטיגונה והדיאלוג ביניהן במחזהו של סופוקלס אנטיגונ... more מאמר זה בוחן את האופן שבו דמויותיהן של איסמנה ואנטיגונה והדיאלוג ביניהן במחזהו של סופוקלס אנטיגונה הפכו להיות מרכזיים עבור הפילוסופיה הפמיניסטית במאה ה-20. תוך התמקדות בדיאלוג שמנהלת הפילוסופיה הפמיניסטית עם המחזה ועם דמותן של האחיות, המאמר מבקש לחשוב עליהן כבנות שיח פילוסופיות ולבחון את האופן שבו דרך שיחה עימן הפילוסופיה ניסתה להביע את ההבטחה, או הכישלון, הגלומים ביחסים בין אחיות, ואף יותר מכך, לחשוב על הדרך שבה אחאות זו קשורה לצורת היות נשית, למשמעות נשית, לפעולה נשית קולקטיבית, ושורה של סוגיות אחרות. בפרט, המאמר מתמקד באופן שבו אנטיגונה ויחסן של אנטיגונה ואיסמנה, מופיעים כתֵמה בהגותה של הפילוסופית ילידת בלגיה לוס אירגארי. הבחירה באיריגארי נראית מפתיעה, משום שעל אף העובדה שיחסים בין נשים הם מרכזיים לעבודתה, היא לרוב מתמקדת ביחסים בין בנות לאימהות, ולא באלו השוררים בין אחיות. לאחר דיון ביחסי אימהות ובנות, ובחינה של האופן שבו איריגארי בוחרת לדון במבנה ובאופי של היחסים בין בנות לאימהות דרך אנטיגונה, המאמר עובר לדון בטקסט אוטוביוגרפי קצר של איריגארי שבו היא מלהקת את עצמה כאנטיגונה ומופיעה בו, באורח מפתיע ויוצא דופן, לא אםֵ, אלא אחות, בדמותה של הפילוסופית סימון דה בובואר. הפנייה שלה אל בובואר כאל אחות חושפת את האופן שבו איריגארי מבינה את המשמעות ואת האפשרויות הטמונות ב״היות אחות של־״, בייחוד עבור עתיד של שחרור. היא מאפשרת לנו לחשוב על ההבטחה ועל הכישלון האפשרי של דיאלוג בין אחיות, כמודל ליחסים בין נשים המבוססים על דומי שאינו שקול לזהות, ועל הבדל שאינו מחייב אחֵרוּת.
Following the thread that connects women to memory (and that
passes through forgetfulness, repreh... more Following the thread that connects women to memory (and that passes through forgetfulness, reprehension, and even effacement) in the work of Hegel, Irigaray, and Beauvoir, the essay focuses on women as they remember, including the questions of whom they remember, and who they are or who they can become by remembering. Following their accounts, which always pass through bodies—both the bodies of those who are remembered and of those who perform the remembering—, I focus on the different positions that Hegel, Irigaray, and Beauvoir assign to women on the basis of their having bodies, and bodies of particular kinds—women as mothers, sisters, daughters. Remembering women thus also turns out to be about the tasks and the fates that women face, as they remember others and are remembered in philosophy and literature, and how these tasks and fates bear on the positions allotted to them, both in the present and in memory.
G. W. F. Hegel sees Oedipus as an epitome of the philosophical quest for self-knowledge. In Hegel... more G. W. F. Hegel sees Oedipus as an epitome of the philosophical quest for self-knowledge. In Hegel's readings of Oedipus, the latter becomes a distant reflection of the modern and mature Hegelian self, who consciously takes on this quest. Yet unlike Oedipus, whose search for the truth about his past is characterized by both metaphorical and literal blindness, the modern self knows itself, precisely because it understands its past and can thus appropriate and situate itself in relation to the present. For Hegel, self-understanding entails grasping the proper relationship between past and present, which in turn necessitates acknowledging his own relationship to Oedipus. This essay examines Henrik Ibsen's turn to the Hegelian engagement with the past (Oedipus being one crucial moment in the Hegelian story of the history of self-consciousness), by focusing on one of the most enigmatic scenes in his 1866 drama, Peer Gynt, where the Norwegian protagonist is cast as Oedipus. The scene examines the drama's own past-through an engagement with a dramatic ancestor-and focuses on the influence of the past on fashioning modern European identity. Moreover, it offers a critique of how the past is utilized in the creation and consolidation of that identity. With this, Ibsen offers an implicit critique of Hegel's understanding of Oedipus, and his encounter with the Sphinx in particular. Revisiting Oedipus through its modern reception, Ibsen questions the act by which the past is revealed as such and is put to work in the service of a particular present.
Imagination is crucial to Joseph Margolis’ philosophy: he addresses its significance for the expe... more Imagination is crucial to Joseph Margolis’ philosophy: he addresses its significance for the experience of works of art and, more importantly, he portrays it as constitutive of human existence itself. I explicate these claims and define Margolis’ notion of imagination vis-à-vis Jean-Paul Sartre’s, whose own conception of imagination Margolis rejects. Studying Margolis and Sartre in relation to each other illuminates crucial differences between their positions and highlights the different commitment that underlie their philosophical anthropology as a whole. In the conclusion of this paper, I argue that there are in fact certain affinities between their positions and suggest that we think of the problem of imagination meta-philosophically, as a problem that guides philosophical thought in its various attempts to define the human
The article advances an interpretation of the self as an imaginary object. Focusing on the relati... more The article advances an interpretation of the self as an imaginary object. Focusing on the relationship between selfhood and memory in Sartre’s The Transcendence of the Ego, I argue that Sartre offers useful resources for thinking about the self in terms of narratives. Against interpretations that hold that the ego misrepresents consciousness or distorts it, I argue that the constitution of the ego marks a radical transformation of the conscious field. To prove this point, I turn to the role of reflection and memory in the creation of the self. Reflection and memory weave past, present and future into a consistent and meaningful life story. This story is no other than the self. I propose to understand the self as a fictional or imaginary entity, albeit one that has real presence in human life.
Narrative theorists, such as Paul Ricoeur and Alasdair MacIntyre, tend to undermine the role of n... more Narrative theorists, such as Paul Ricoeur and Alasdair MacIntyre, tend to undermine the role of narratives in Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy. It is thought that Sartrean Existentialism, which celebrates free and negating consciousness, leaves no room for developing a conception of narrative identity. Such identity hinges on continuity and integration of the moments that make up one’s life, whereas Sartrean identity consists of radical conversions and discontinuity. By offering a close and unorthodox reading of Sartre’s Nausea, this paper rebuts such claims. Sartre’s novel, as well as his philosophical works, show that narratives are crucial for a meaningful sense of self and that without such narratives the very fabric of life dissolves. Exposing Roquentin’s “failure of imagination”, I show that his disintegration stems from an inability to constitute a cohesive life-story. Consequently, I argue that Sartre does not portray narratives as an accidental prism imposed on life from the outside, as is usually thought. Instead, Sartre’s work reveals that narrative is the very structure that grounds life and endows it with meaning.
In her readings of the Greek tragedies, Luce Irigaray demonstrates that the power relations betwe... more In her readings of the Greek tragedies, Luce Irigaray demonstrates that the power relations between women and men permeate tragedy to its core. According to Irigaray, the source of the ancient tragedy —Antigone’s death is a clear example—lies in these systems of power that are bound to eradicate the heroine. In her reading, tragedy represents the fate of women, whose death and demise attest to the inability to represent themselves as women in the phallocentric culture, which, as Ibsen notes, does not allow women to be themselves. I develop in this paper a reading of Hedda Gabler which draws on Irigaray’s reading of the Greek tragedies, such as Aeschylus’ Oresteia, Sophocles’ Antigone, Oedipus the King, and Oedipus at Colonus, and Euripides’ Electra. These provide a broad comparative framework for interpreting the play, the only one of Ibsen’s works named, like the ancient tragedies, after its female protagonist. Building on her work, I set out to show how by probing the trope of the riddle and problematizing it, Hedda Gabler also positions women’s destiny at the intersection of gender and genre, engendering the tragedy of femininity. At the same time, the play offers the possibility of envisioning what Irigaray’s calls “…another dramatic play through which we can relate to each other as different.” (2010, 199). Thinking of the relationship between tragedy and gender from an Irigaraian perspective, we can see how Hedda Gabler, which genders tragedy through the story of a specific woman, engenders in the spectators the realization for the need for projecting new images and modes of feminine existence.
This paper examines the relation between passions and memory in Descartes’ theory of passions. Me... more This paper examines the relation between passions and memory in Descartes’ theory of passions. Memory plays two different roles in relation to passions in Descartes’ work: it is an integral part of our experience of passions and it is crucial for our ability to control them. Descartes acknowledges that memory is relevant both to physical chain of causes leading up to an experience of passions well as to the experience of passions itself. However, he does not
articulate a precise connection between his theory of memory and theory of passions, and therefore does not account for the specific ways in which memory can play a part in the origin of passions, experience and the possibility of modifying them.
"This paper offers an interpretation of Roland Barthes’ writing on photography. Barthes uses phot... more "This paper offers an interpretation of Roland Barthes’ writing on photography. Barthes uses photography to point to a third region of meaning, one which is neither public nor private and which both our theoretical and ordinary approaches to photography miss. Following Barthes’ attempts to articulate this region of meaning, the paper examines his different responses to photography and his gradual movement from punctual criticism and structural analysis toward a theory of photographic meaning. The relationship between photography and time is analyzed to show how photography can express the ephemeral nature of being as well as the arbitrariness and singularity of existence."
My contribution to The Sartrean Mind that examines the relationship between freedom, anxiety, and... more My contribution to The Sartrean Mind that examines the relationship between freedom, anxiety, and bad faith
This short essay turns to Donald Winnicott's notion of "Potential Space" to articulate a way of t... more This short essay turns to Donald Winnicott's notion of "Potential Space" to articulate a way of thinking about human imagination, in which imaginative activity is conceived beyond the opposition between the actual and the fictional, the real and the illusionary.
In the conclusion to The Imaginary Jean-Paul Sartre draws attention to the centrality of imaginat... more In the conclusion to The Imaginary Jean-Paul Sartre draws attention to the centrality of imagination in human life, describing it as a constitutive structure of consciousness. Imagination, according to him, is not a contingent feature of consciousness, but one of its essential features. This essay re-examines Sartre’s notion of imagination, arguing that current interpretations do not exhaust its meaning. Beginning with a consideration of dichotomies that dominate his theory of imagination—such as those between present, material objects and absent images, or real entities and fictional creations, as well as interpretative responses to them—the essay moves on to explore the possibility of locating a different sense of imagination in his work, one which is irreducible to such oppositions. Focusing on Sartre’s example of the work of an impersonator, this essay advances the idea that the playful activity of impersonators and actors enables the spectators who are watching them to explore novel and often unfamiliar connections between objects in the world. Imagination, according to this interpretation, enriches and augments perception, rather than suspends or replaces it with mental images. This new interpretation of Sartre’s notion of imagination places him in proximity to Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘aspect-seeing’ in Philosophical Investigations. However, whereas Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘aspect-seeing’ can lead to the conclusion that it is impossible to draw a line between perceiving and imagining, the notion of imagination operative in Sartre’s example enables us to maintain and explain the differences between ordinary and ‘imaginative’ perception.
The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2012
"In his phenomenological study of imaginative acts in The Imaginary, Jean-Paul Sartre declares th... more "In his phenomenological study of imaginative acts in The Imaginary, Jean-Paul Sartre declares that memory and imagination are two different functions, and consequently severs the two from one another. Imagination, he argues, is the epitome of human freedom, since it allows consciousness to detach itself from experience or to negate reality; recollection, on the other hand, entirely depends on perception and is portrayed in The Imaginary as reproduction of perceptual experience. I show in this paper that although he explicitly treats memory and imagination as dichotomous, Sartre’s description of the two indicates strong affinities between them. First, Sartre uses recollections as examples of imaginative acts. Second, his phenomenological description of imagination is wholly applicable to recollection. The paper re-examines the relationship between memory and imagination in The Imaginary and uses Sartre’s theory of imagination as well as his autobiographical writing to conceptualize autobiographical memory as an active and productive aspect of the human mind "
Sartre’s early works on phenomenology reveal the complexity of his relationship to Husserl. Deepl... more Sartre’s early works on phenomenology reveal the complexity of his relationship to Husserl. Deeply indebted to phenomenology’s method as well as its substance, Sartre nonetheless confronted Husserl’s transcendental turn from Ideas onward. Although numerous studies have focused on Sartre’s points of contention with Husserl, drawing attention to his departure from Husserlian phenomenology, scholars have rarely examined the way in which Sartre engaged and responded to the early Husserl, particularly to his discussions of intentionality, consciousness, and self in Logical Investigations. This essay focuses on Sartre’s critical response to Logical Investigations, arguing that Husserl’s understanding of these three notions shapes and informs Sartre’s own approach to them in The Transcendence of the Ego (1936-37), “Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology” (1939), and Being and Nothingness (1943). By carefully reading Sartre side by side with Husserl, this essay articulates the ways in which Sartre allowed himself to think along with, and not against, Husserl.
Commenting on Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of imagination, Paul Ricoeur argues that Sartre fails to ... more Commenting on Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of imagination, Paul Ricoeur argues that Sartre fails to address the productive nature of imaginative acts. According to Ricoeur, Sartre’s examples show that he thinks of imagination in mimetic terms, neglecting its innovative and creative dimensions. Imagination, Ricoeur continues, manifests itself most clearly in fiction, wherein new meaning is created. By using fiction as the paradigm of imaginative activity, Ricoeur is able to argue against Sartre that the essence of imagination lies not in its ability to reproduce absent objects, but rather in the ability to transform reality through creative acts. Motivated by the intuition that Sartre the writer could not have forgotten to address such crucial dimensions of imagination,
I examine Sartre’s philosophical and literary work, showing that not only does he develop a notion of productive imagination, he also puts this notion to work by articulating the relationship between imagination, narrative, and identity formation,
well before Ricoeur advanced his narrative-identity theory. I argue that Sartre, like Ricoeur and MacIntyre, another representative of narrative-theory whose criticism of Sartre I address in this essay, views imagination and narrativity as necessary conditions for the formation of a coherent and meaningful sense of self
Antigone has buried her brother. When she is brought before Creon the sentry describes her by mea... more Antigone has buried her brother. When she is brought before Creon the sentry describes her by means of her voice: “She cried out bitterly, with a sound like the piercing note of a bird when she sees her empty next robbed of her young.” But in the philosophical tradition, from Hegel to Judith Butler and Jacques Lacan, Antigone’s voice has hardly been heard. Mourned for her premature, self-inflicted death, it was Antigone’s deeds that were understood as dramatizing the possibilities, both the risk and the promise, of human existence. Turning to Adrianna Cavarero's and Luce Irigaray's analyses of the play, I explore Antigone's voice and its relationship to air -- the element in which birds soar, the medium and precondition for acoustic waves, sounds and voices -- in order to develop an ecology of the feminine and articulate the possibilities, psychological and political, which an array of cultures and contexts of reception opens for us
This essay concerns Simone de Beauvoir's analysis of blame and punishment in "OEil pour oeil" and... more This essay concerns Simone de Beauvoir's analysis of blame and punishment in "OEil pour oeil" and the irreconcilable tensions that haunt it. I study these tensions-between the desire to blame and punish and the inability to provide moral justification for these practices-and locate their source in Beauvoir's conception of ethics in Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté. According to my reading, her ethics implies that violence violates freedom, the grounding principle of ethical life. Retaliatory and retributive judgments and the punishment they uphold, regardless of whether they are exerted by individuals or by official state powers, are forms of violence and are therefore unjustifiable. The aporias of blame and punishment in "OEil pour oeil" suggest that Beauvoir's ideal of ethics necessitates an abolitionist position regarding punishment. The essay ends with a reflection on the affinity between the position constructed from Beauvoir's work and feminist abolitionist theories that seek to undermine the legal, social, and political institutions that perpetuate, rather than resolve, economic, racial, gender, sex, and class inequality.
Among philosophers, Simone de Beauvoir is unique in treating childhood as a philosophical phenome... more Among philosophers, Simone de Beauvoir is unique in treating childhood as a philosophical phenomenon. In both The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, she examines the relationship between childhood and human freedom and considers its role in the development of subjectivity. Despite this, few sustained analyses of her treatment of the phenomenon exist. I argue that Beauvoir’s conception of childhood is not uniform, but changes from The Ethics of Ambiguity to The Second Sex. While the former presents children as lacking moral freedom, as not fully sovereign individuals, the latter suggests that children are just as free as adults. When children do not fully possess or exercise freedom, it is not because they are not in a position to do so, but rather because they are hindered by various social institutions. I find this position useful for developing a phenomenological account of childhood as a site for freedom. Hence, Beauvoir becomes a source for thinking of issues in philosophical anthropology concerning the temporality of human existence and the nature of human agency over a lifespan.
מאמר זה בוחן את האופן שבו דמויותיהן של איסמנה ואנטיגונה והדיאלוג ביניהן במחזהו של סופוקלס אנטיגונ... more מאמר זה בוחן את האופן שבו דמויותיהן של איסמנה ואנטיגונה והדיאלוג ביניהן במחזהו של סופוקלס אנטיגונה הפכו להיות מרכזיים עבור הפילוסופיה הפמיניסטית במאה ה-20. תוך התמקדות בדיאלוג שמנהלת הפילוסופיה הפמיניסטית עם המחזה ועם דמותן של האחיות, המאמר מבקש לחשוב עליהן כבנות שיח פילוסופיות ולבחון את האופן שבו דרך שיחה עימן הפילוסופיה ניסתה להביע את ההבטחה, או הכישלון, הגלומים ביחסים בין אחיות, ואף יותר מכך, לחשוב על הדרך שבה אחאות זו קשורה לצורת היות נשית, למשמעות נשית, לפעולה נשית קולקטיבית, ושורה של סוגיות אחרות. בפרט, המאמר מתמקד באופן שבו אנטיגונה ויחסן של אנטיגונה ואיסמנה, מופיעים כתֵמה בהגותה של הפילוסופית ילידת בלגיה לוס אירגארי. הבחירה באיריגארי נראית מפתיעה, משום שעל אף העובדה שיחסים בין נשים הם מרכזיים לעבודתה, היא לרוב מתמקדת ביחסים בין בנות לאימהות, ולא באלו השוררים בין אחיות. לאחר דיון ביחסי אימהות ובנות, ובחינה של האופן שבו איריגארי בוחרת לדון במבנה ובאופי של היחסים בין בנות לאימהות דרך אנטיגונה, המאמר עובר לדון בטקסט אוטוביוגרפי קצר של איריגארי שבו היא מלהקת את עצמה כאנטיגונה ומופיעה בו, באורח מפתיע ויוצא דופן, לא אםֵ, אלא אחות, בדמותה של הפילוסופית סימון דה בובואר. הפנייה שלה אל בובואר כאל אחות חושפת את האופן שבו איריגארי מבינה את המשמעות ואת האפשרויות הטמונות ב״היות אחות של־״, בייחוד עבור עתיד של שחרור. היא מאפשרת לנו לחשוב על ההבטחה ועל הכישלון האפשרי של דיאלוג בין אחיות, כמודל ליחסים בין נשים המבוססים על דומי שאינו שקול לזהות, ועל הבדל שאינו מחייב אחֵרוּת.
Following the thread that connects women to memory (and that
passes through forgetfulness, repreh... more Following the thread that connects women to memory (and that passes through forgetfulness, reprehension, and even effacement) in the work of Hegel, Irigaray, and Beauvoir, the essay focuses on women as they remember, including the questions of whom they remember, and who they are or who they can become by remembering. Following their accounts, which always pass through bodies—both the bodies of those who are remembered and of those who perform the remembering—, I focus on the different positions that Hegel, Irigaray, and Beauvoir assign to women on the basis of their having bodies, and bodies of particular kinds—women as mothers, sisters, daughters. Remembering women thus also turns out to be about the tasks and the fates that women face, as they remember others and are remembered in philosophy and literature, and how these tasks and fates bear on the positions allotted to them, both in the present and in memory.
G. W. F. Hegel sees Oedipus as an epitome of the philosophical quest for self-knowledge. In Hegel... more G. W. F. Hegel sees Oedipus as an epitome of the philosophical quest for self-knowledge. In Hegel's readings of Oedipus, the latter becomes a distant reflection of the modern and mature Hegelian self, who consciously takes on this quest. Yet unlike Oedipus, whose search for the truth about his past is characterized by both metaphorical and literal blindness, the modern self knows itself, precisely because it understands its past and can thus appropriate and situate itself in relation to the present. For Hegel, self-understanding entails grasping the proper relationship between past and present, which in turn necessitates acknowledging his own relationship to Oedipus. This essay examines Henrik Ibsen's turn to the Hegelian engagement with the past (Oedipus being one crucial moment in the Hegelian story of the history of self-consciousness), by focusing on one of the most enigmatic scenes in his 1866 drama, Peer Gynt, where the Norwegian protagonist is cast as Oedipus. The scene examines the drama's own past-through an engagement with a dramatic ancestor-and focuses on the influence of the past on fashioning modern European identity. Moreover, it offers a critique of how the past is utilized in the creation and consolidation of that identity. With this, Ibsen offers an implicit critique of Hegel's understanding of Oedipus, and his encounter with the Sphinx in particular. Revisiting Oedipus through its modern reception, Ibsen questions the act by which the past is revealed as such and is put to work in the service of a particular present.
Imagination is crucial to Joseph Margolis’ philosophy: he addresses its significance for the expe... more Imagination is crucial to Joseph Margolis’ philosophy: he addresses its significance for the experience of works of art and, more importantly, he portrays it as constitutive of human existence itself. I explicate these claims and define Margolis’ notion of imagination vis-à-vis Jean-Paul Sartre’s, whose own conception of imagination Margolis rejects. Studying Margolis and Sartre in relation to each other illuminates crucial differences between their positions and highlights the different commitment that underlie their philosophical anthropology as a whole. In the conclusion of this paper, I argue that there are in fact certain affinities between their positions and suggest that we think of the problem of imagination meta-philosophically, as a problem that guides philosophical thought in its various attempts to define the human
The article advances an interpretation of the self as an imaginary object. Focusing on the relati... more The article advances an interpretation of the self as an imaginary object. Focusing on the relationship between selfhood and memory in Sartre’s The Transcendence of the Ego, I argue that Sartre offers useful resources for thinking about the self in terms of narratives. Against interpretations that hold that the ego misrepresents consciousness or distorts it, I argue that the constitution of the ego marks a radical transformation of the conscious field. To prove this point, I turn to the role of reflection and memory in the creation of the self. Reflection and memory weave past, present and future into a consistent and meaningful life story. This story is no other than the self. I propose to understand the self as a fictional or imaginary entity, albeit one that has real presence in human life.
Narrative theorists, such as Paul Ricoeur and Alasdair MacIntyre, tend to undermine the role of n... more Narrative theorists, such as Paul Ricoeur and Alasdair MacIntyre, tend to undermine the role of narratives in Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy. It is thought that Sartrean Existentialism, which celebrates free and negating consciousness, leaves no room for developing a conception of narrative identity. Such identity hinges on continuity and integration of the moments that make up one’s life, whereas Sartrean identity consists of radical conversions and discontinuity. By offering a close and unorthodox reading of Sartre’s Nausea, this paper rebuts such claims. Sartre’s novel, as well as his philosophical works, show that narratives are crucial for a meaningful sense of self and that without such narratives the very fabric of life dissolves. Exposing Roquentin’s “failure of imagination”, I show that his disintegration stems from an inability to constitute a cohesive life-story. Consequently, I argue that Sartre does not portray narratives as an accidental prism imposed on life from the outside, as is usually thought. Instead, Sartre’s work reveals that narrative is the very structure that grounds life and endows it with meaning.
In her readings of the Greek tragedies, Luce Irigaray demonstrates that the power relations betwe... more In her readings of the Greek tragedies, Luce Irigaray demonstrates that the power relations between women and men permeate tragedy to its core. According to Irigaray, the source of the ancient tragedy —Antigone’s death is a clear example—lies in these systems of power that are bound to eradicate the heroine. In her reading, tragedy represents the fate of women, whose death and demise attest to the inability to represent themselves as women in the phallocentric culture, which, as Ibsen notes, does not allow women to be themselves. I develop in this paper a reading of Hedda Gabler which draws on Irigaray’s reading of the Greek tragedies, such as Aeschylus’ Oresteia, Sophocles’ Antigone, Oedipus the King, and Oedipus at Colonus, and Euripides’ Electra. These provide a broad comparative framework for interpreting the play, the only one of Ibsen’s works named, like the ancient tragedies, after its female protagonist. Building on her work, I set out to show how by probing the trope of the riddle and problematizing it, Hedda Gabler also positions women’s destiny at the intersection of gender and genre, engendering the tragedy of femininity. At the same time, the play offers the possibility of envisioning what Irigaray’s calls “…another dramatic play through which we can relate to each other as different.” (2010, 199). Thinking of the relationship between tragedy and gender from an Irigaraian perspective, we can see how Hedda Gabler, which genders tragedy through the story of a specific woman, engenders in the spectators the realization for the need for projecting new images and modes of feminine existence.
This paper examines the relation between passions and memory in Descartes’ theory of passions. Me... more This paper examines the relation between passions and memory in Descartes’ theory of passions. Memory plays two different roles in relation to passions in Descartes’ work: it is an integral part of our experience of passions and it is crucial for our ability to control them. Descartes acknowledges that memory is relevant both to physical chain of causes leading up to an experience of passions well as to the experience of passions itself. However, he does not
articulate a precise connection between his theory of memory and theory of passions, and therefore does not account for the specific ways in which memory can play a part in the origin of passions, experience and the possibility of modifying them.
"This paper offers an interpretation of Roland Barthes’ writing on photography. Barthes uses phot... more "This paper offers an interpretation of Roland Barthes’ writing on photography. Barthes uses photography to point to a third region of meaning, one which is neither public nor private and which both our theoretical and ordinary approaches to photography miss. Following Barthes’ attempts to articulate this region of meaning, the paper examines his different responses to photography and his gradual movement from punctual criticism and structural analysis toward a theory of photographic meaning. The relationship between photography and time is analyzed to show how photography can express the ephemeral nature of being as well as the arbitrariness and singularity of existence."
My contribution to The Sartrean Mind that examines the relationship between freedom, anxiety, and... more My contribution to The Sartrean Mind that examines the relationship between freedom, anxiety, and bad faith
This short essay turns to Donald Winnicott's notion of "Potential Space" to articulate a way of t... more This short essay turns to Donald Winnicott's notion of "Potential Space" to articulate a way of thinking about human imagination, in which imaginative activity is conceived beyond the opposition between the actual and the fictional, the real and the illusionary.
The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Literature, 2019
Drama is a text written for performance. Yet, how do performances, which are particular and unsta... more Drama is a text written for performance. Yet, how do performances, which are particular and unstable shape drama as a text? How are we to understand the relationship between the text and the performances that it intends to generate? I use the testimonies of playwrights to articulate what writing for performance means; what considerations guide the composition of such texts, and how such considerations influence the character of drama. Next, I examine the authority that drama has over performance through two analogies used in contemporary philosophical debates, to show that the choice of analogy itself shapes our way of thinking about possible relationships between texts and their implementation in performances. Finally, I turn to drama as a practice of writing for audiences, rather than readers, analyzing the activity that drama performs as it addresses its audiences
The Philosophy of Theatre, Drama and Acting , Jul 2017
Jean-Paul Sartre’s contribution to theater was both concrete – he wrote about a dozen plays and w... more Jean-Paul Sartre’s contribution to theater was both concrete – he wrote about a dozen plays and was often involved in their production– and theoretical – he used examples from the theater to illuminate philosophical problems in his philosophical works, among them Being and Nothingness (1943) and The Imaginary (1940) and wrote and lectured on philosophical issues in theater throughout his life. Thus, his work provides a unique opportunity for exploring the connections between philosophy and theater. While numerous studies examine the relationship between his drama and philosophy, asking, for example, in what ways do his plays offer concrete examples of philosophical notions such as the look or bad faith, few works offer a sustained account of his philosophy of theater. As a result, the numerous texts, lectures and interviews wherein he discusses theater remain, for the most part, unexplored. Furthermore, his philosophical studies of imagination, embodiment, and action, though naturally lending themselves to analyses of acting and spectatorship, are rarely used for such purposes.
The chapter builds on these works to develop an account of Sartre’s notion of dramatic theater. His vision of dramatic theater entails a certain conception of the nature and function of plays, acting, and spectatorship. This chapter focuses on acting, through which the notion of action that is crucial to his conception of dramatic theater will be clarified. However, since actors enact texts before spectators, it is nearly impossible to analyze acting without taking texts, on the one hand, and spectators, on the other hand, into account. For this reason, I also discuss the ways in which actors and spectators utilize and understand dramatic texts, and touch upon spectators’ experience of the enactment of texts in the theater.
The research group “New Questions in Postcolonial Studies,” based in the University of Haifa, org... more The research group “New Questions in Postcolonial Studies,” based in the University of Haifa, organized a public symposium to discuss the question of Palestinian citizens and their absence from the nation-wide protests against the judicial reforms. The discussion was conducted in English, Arabic, and Hebrew and simultaneous translation was provided during the event.
In the past three years, masks -- and the faces that they cover, protect, or hide -- have become ... more In the past three years, masks -- and the faces that they cover, protect, or hide -- have become a matter of constant debate. A symbol of the oppressive force of state control, for some, and solidarity and social responsibility for others, the act of covering up the human face became the locus of ethical and political disputes. Taking the immediate present as our starting point, this two-day workshop turns to the visual, cultural, and philosophical histories in which masks and faces are imbricated, questioning the processes by which they gain meaning as standards for personhood and their power in shaping human interactions
In an interview given in 1959, on the occasion of the production of his play The Condemned of Alt... more In an interview given in 1959, on the occasion of the production of his play The Condemned of Altona, Jean-Paul Sartre commented on Brecht's drama, connecting it to the classical dramatists (e.g., Moliére) and also to the origins of philosophy. He says: "What Brecht wanted and what our classical dramatists tried for was to cause what Plato called "the source of all philosophy" – wonder, making the familiar unfamiliar." (Sartre on Theater, 74) When the interviewer asks if nothing but wonder is the "mainspring of a play" (ibid.), Sartre responded that he does not mean that it will be based on wonder alone, but rather that it would be able "[T]o 'show' and simultaneously to 'move'." (Sartre on Theater, 75) At this point, Sartre distinguishes Brecht's drama - that shows and moves simultaneously - from bourgeois theater. Whereas the latter presents things from "the eye of eternity" and is a drama of "human nature" (ibid.), the former is "a sign of the beginning of a movement or the continuation of a liquidation. That is to say, from the historical point of view, or better, the point of view of the future." (ibid.) Ibsen, Sartre continues, wrote from the perspective of the future, when in The Doll's House he "dealt with the emancipation of women at a time when it was barely thinkable…it was from the point of view of the future that he saw the collapse of the domineering and vacuous husband and Nora's liberation." (Ibid.)
Ibsen's A Doll House becomes a vanishing point where drama (non-bourgeois drama; radical drama), philosophy, wonder, and what Sartre calls the point of view of the future intersect. All these elements upon which Sartre fleetingly touches in this interview converge into Ibsen's A Doll House. I would like to use this Sartrean observation, this short comment, as a starting point for thinking about the meaning of these various terms and the way in which they come about in Sartre's and Ibsen's plays. Particularly, I want to focus on the inherent "futurity" of drama and the way in which the perspective of the future and the movement of continuation or liquidation brings about wonder, thus connecting the dramatic and the philosophical.
"Imagination plays a pivotal role in the philosophy of Joseph Margolis. In fact, his work suggest... more "Imagination plays a pivotal role in the philosophy of Joseph Margolis. In fact, his work suggests, in a way, that imagination is the very fabric of human life. This might sound odd given the fact that he repeatedly criticizes the centrality of imagination in various aesthetic theories – from Wollheim’s “seeing-in” to Walton’s “make-believe”. According to Margolis, the emphasis on the role of imagination in aesthetic experience leads to absurd conclusions in philosophy of art, but even worse, it poses a serious threat to philosophical theories of human existence. Margolis’ most explicit critique of the connection between the misguided use of imagination in aesthetics and philosophical anthropology is made in relation to Jean-Paul Sartre, who is widely known as the philosopher of imagination. Sartre explicitly says that imagination is not an accidental feature of consciousness, but is its “essential and transcendental condition.” Yet, according to Margolis, the centrality given to imagination is precisely the deepest flaw in Sartre’s system. Sartre’s arguments in favor of the unreality of artworks and the use of imagination in aesthetic experience damage not only his aesthetic theory, but also his philosophical anthropology as a whole. “…[I]f artworks…are ‘unreal,’ as Sartre signifies…then human selves, are also ‘unreal’…" says Margolis, who finds a crucial affinity between humans and works of art, both being cultural artifacts. Yet, despite its artificiality, there is nothing more evident than human reality. Hence, Margolis asks that we reconsider Sartre’s position regarding imagination, a position that leads us to see both the artwork and the human as imaginary or fictional.
In what sense, then, is imagination central to Margolis’ own thought? Or, better put, if imagination is indeed central to his thought, what kind of imagination is it and how does it differ from the Sartrean imagination that he blatantly rejects? In what follows, I want to offer answers to these questions, by examining Margolis’ phenomenology of imagination. To clarify the nature and role of imagination in his work, I will begin by situating it vis-à-vis Sartre’s theory of imagination. By contrasting Margolis with Sartre, I hope to shed light on the crucial differences between their positions and articulate, following Margolis, some limitations in Sartre’s notion of imagination. Moreover, the contrast between them reveals the manner in which Margolis’ notion of imagination overcomes these limitations. Finally, I want to use this comparative approach to develop the possibility of thinking beyond the differences between the two thinkers. By thinking beyond the differences, I do not mean reconciling the tensions or collapsing the differences into an agreement, but showing that the differences are inherent to their own thought, and perhaps to philosophical thought in general. The two models of imagination– Sartrean imagination as a gateway to the nonexistent and utterly new and Margolisian imagination as a condition for the richness and fullness of reality – reveal a tension inherent in philosophical thought. Thus, the notion of imagination allows me to explore the movement of thought between the two opposing poles of transcendence and embeddedness. I hope to show that the question of the essence of imagination is a prism for thinking about philosophy’s own concerns in its various attempts to understand human life and human reality.
"
The paper advances an interpretation of the self as an imaginary object. Against readings of Sart... more The paper advances an interpretation of the self as an imaginary object. Against readings of Sartre's work that hold that the ego misrepresents consciousness or distorts it, I demonstrate that the constitution of the ego marks a radical transformation of the conscious field. Focusing on Sartre’s The Transcendence of the Ego, I argue that he offers useful resources for thinking about the self in terms of narratives. Reflection and memory weave past, present and future into a consistent and meaningful sense of self. I propose to understand the self as a fictional or imaginary entity, albeit one that has real presence in human life.
Commenting on Sartre’s theory of imagination, Paul Ricoeur argues that he fails to address the pr... more Commenting on Sartre’s theory of imagination, Paul Ricoeur argues that he fails to address the productive nature of imagination. According to Ricoeur, Sartre’s choice of examples shows that he thinks of imagination in mimetic terms, neglecting its innovative and creative dimensions. But could Sartre the writer forget to address such crucial dimensions of imagination? I examine Sartre’s philosophical and literary work to show that not only does he develop a notion of productive imagination, he also puts this notion to work by articulating the relationship between imagination, narrative, and identity formation, well before Ricoeur advanced his narrative-identity theory
Review of Elaine Stavro's, Emancipatory Thinking: Simone de Beauvoir and Contemporary Political T... more Review of Elaine Stavro's, Emancipatory Thinking: Simone de Beauvoir and Contemporary Political Thought. Published online in Hypatia 2022
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Papers by Lior Levy
I examine Sartre’s philosophical and literary work, showing that not only does he develop a notion of productive imagination, he also puts this notion to work by articulating the relationship between imagination, narrative, and identity formation,
well before Ricoeur advanced his narrative-identity theory. I argue that Sartre, like Ricoeur and MacIntyre, another representative of narrative-theory whose criticism of Sartre I address in this essay, views imagination and narrativity as necessary conditions for the formation of a coherent and meaningful sense of self
passes through forgetfulness, reprehension, and even effacement) in
the work of Hegel, Irigaray, and Beauvoir, the essay focuses on women
as they remember, including the questions of whom they remember, and
who they are or who they can become by remembering. Following their
accounts, which always pass through bodies—both the bodies of those
who are remembered and of those who perform the remembering—, I focus on the different positions that Hegel, Irigaray, and Beauvoir assign
to women on the basis of their having bodies, and bodies of particular
kinds—women as mothers, sisters, daughters. Remembering women
thus also turns out to be about the tasks and the fates that women
face, as they remember others and are remembered in philosophy and
literature, and how these tasks and fates bear on the positions allotted
to them, both in the present and in memory.
I develop in this paper a reading of Hedda Gabler which draws on Irigaray’s reading of the Greek tragedies, such as Aeschylus’ Oresteia, Sophocles’ Antigone, Oedipus the King, and Oedipus at Colonus, and Euripides’ Electra. These provide a broad comparative framework for interpreting the play, the only one of Ibsen’s works named, like the ancient tragedies, after its female protagonist. Building on her work, I set out to show how by probing the trope of the riddle and problematizing it, Hedda Gabler also positions women’s destiny at the intersection of gender and genre, engendering the tragedy of femininity. At the same time, the play offers the possibility of envisioning what Irigaray’s calls “…another dramatic play through which we can relate to each other as different.” (2010, 199). Thinking of the relationship between tragedy and gender from an Irigaraian perspective, we can see how Hedda Gabler, which genders tragedy through the story of a specific woman, engenders in the spectators the realization for the need for projecting new images and modes of feminine existence.
articulate a precise connection between his theory of memory and theory of passions, and therefore does not account for the specific ways in which memory can play a part in the origin of passions, experience and the possibility of modifying them.
Book Chapters by Lior Levy
I examine Sartre’s philosophical and literary work, showing that not only does he develop a notion of productive imagination, he also puts this notion to work by articulating the relationship between imagination, narrative, and identity formation,
well before Ricoeur advanced his narrative-identity theory. I argue that Sartre, like Ricoeur and MacIntyre, another representative of narrative-theory whose criticism of Sartre I address in this essay, views imagination and narrativity as necessary conditions for the formation of a coherent and meaningful sense of self
passes through forgetfulness, reprehension, and even effacement) in
the work of Hegel, Irigaray, and Beauvoir, the essay focuses on women
as they remember, including the questions of whom they remember, and
who they are or who they can become by remembering. Following their
accounts, which always pass through bodies—both the bodies of those
who are remembered and of those who perform the remembering—, I focus on the different positions that Hegel, Irigaray, and Beauvoir assign
to women on the basis of their having bodies, and bodies of particular
kinds—women as mothers, sisters, daughters. Remembering women
thus also turns out to be about the tasks and the fates that women
face, as they remember others and are remembered in philosophy and
literature, and how these tasks and fates bear on the positions allotted
to them, both in the present and in memory.
I develop in this paper a reading of Hedda Gabler which draws on Irigaray’s reading of the Greek tragedies, such as Aeschylus’ Oresteia, Sophocles’ Antigone, Oedipus the King, and Oedipus at Colonus, and Euripides’ Electra. These provide a broad comparative framework for interpreting the play, the only one of Ibsen’s works named, like the ancient tragedies, after its female protagonist. Building on her work, I set out to show how by probing the trope of the riddle and problematizing it, Hedda Gabler also positions women’s destiny at the intersection of gender and genre, engendering the tragedy of femininity. At the same time, the play offers the possibility of envisioning what Irigaray’s calls “…another dramatic play through which we can relate to each other as different.” (2010, 199). Thinking of the relationship between tragedy and gender from an Irigaraian perspective, we can see how Hedda Gabler, which genders tragedy through the story of a specific woman, engenders in the spectators the realization for the need for projecting new images and modes of feminine existence.
articulate a precise connection between his theory of memory and theory of passions, and therefore does not account for the specific ways in which memory can play a part in the origin of passions, experience and the possibility of modifying them.
The chapter builds on these works to develop an account of Sartre’s notion of dramatic theater. His vision of dramatic theater entails a certain conception of the nature and function of plays, acting, and spectatorship. This chapter focuses on acting, through which the notion of action that is crucial to his conception of dramatic theater will be clarified. However, since actors enact texts before spectators, it is nearly impossible to analyze acting without taking texts, on the one hand, and spectators, on the other hand, into account. For this reason, I also discuss the ways in which actors and spectators utilize and understand dramatic texts, and touch upon spectators’ experience of the enactment of texts in the theater.
of ethical and political disputes. Taking the immediate present as our starting point, this two-day workshop turns to the visual, cultural, and philosophical histories in which masks and faces are imbricated, questioning the processes by which they gain meaning as standards for personhood
and their power in shaping human interactions
Ibsen's A Doll House becomes a vanishing point where drama (non-bourgeois drama; radical drama), philosophy, wonder, and what Sartre calls the point of view of the future intersect. All these elements upon which Sartre fleetingly touches in this interview converge into Ibsen's A Doll House. I would like to use this Sartrean observation, this short comment, as a starting point for thinking about the meaning of these various terms and the way in which they come about in Sartre's and Ibsen's plays. Particularly, I want to focus on the inherent "futurity" of drama and the way in which the perspective of the future and the movement of continuation or liquidation brings about wonder, thus connecting the dramatic and the philosophical.
In what sense, then, is imagination central to Margolis’ own thought? Or, better put, if imagination is indeed central to his thought, what kind of imagination is it and how does it differ from the Sartrean imagination that he blatantly rejects? In what follows, I want to offer answers to these questions, by examining Margolis’ phenomenology of imagination. To clarify the nature and role of imagination in his work, I will begin by situating it vis-à-vis Sartre’s theory of imagination. By contrasting Margolis with Sartre, I hope to shed light on the crucial differences between their positions and articulate, following Margolis, some limitations in Sartre’s notion of imagination. Moreover, the contrast between them reveals the manner in which Margolis’ notion of imagination overcomes these limitations. Finally, I want to use this comparative approach to develop the possibility of thinking beyond the differences between the two thinkers. By thinking beyond the differences, I do not mean reconciling the tensions or collapsing the differences into an agreement, but showing that the differences are inherent to their own thought, and perhaps to philosophical thought in general. The two models of imagination– Sartrean imagination as a gateway to the nonexistent and utterly new and Margolisian imagination as a condition for the richness and fullness of reality – reveal a tension inherent in philosophical thought. Thus, the notion of imagination allows me to explore the movement of thought between the two opposing poles of transcendence and embeddedness. I hope to show that the question of the essence of imagination is a prism for thinking about philosophy’s own concerns in its various attempts to understand human life and human reality.
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