ABSTRACT This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater manageme... more ABSTRACT This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater management problem, where quantity and quality of the water are taken into account. A group of farmers overexploits a groundwater stock and causes excessive pollution. A water agency wishes to regulate the farmers’ activity, in order to reach a minimum level of quantity and quality but is subject to a budget constraint and can only use regulatory policies that do not vary over time. The model takes into account the strategic interaction between farmers and the hierarchical relationship between the water agency and the farmers. Regulated and Laisser-Faire scenarios are compared. Results consist in a set of conditions under which constant policies can bring the groundwater resource back to the desired states. In an example, it is shown how this decision making tool could help define environmental tax policies.
ABSTRACT This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater manageme... more ABSTRACT This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater management problem, where quantity and quality of the water are taken into account. A group of farmers overexploits a groundwater stock and causes excessive pollution. A water agency wishes to regulate the farmers’ activity, in order to reach a minimum level of quantity and quality but is subject to a budget constraint and can only use regulatory policies that do not vary over time. The model takes into account the strategic interaction between farmers and the hierarchical relationship between the water agency and the farmers. Regulated and Laisser-Faire scenarios are compared. Results consist in a set of conditions under which constant policies can bring the groundwater resource back to the desired states. In an example, it is shown how this decision making tool could help define environmental tax policies.
Abstract Horizontal cooperation among franchisees is now a well-known reality in franchising, as ... more Abstract Horizontal cooperation among franchisees is now a well-known reality in franchising, as exemplified by the growing number,of franchisee associations and advertising coopera- tives. However, there is little understanding of the circumstances that favor cooperation
This note deals with time-consistency and agreeability, two dynamic individual rationality concep... more This note deals with time-consistency and agreeability, two dynamic individual rationality concepts, in special linear-quadratic differential games. Conditions ensuring their satisfaction are derived and a link between sustainability of cooperation and fair sharing of cooperation surplus is established.
Advances in Computational Management Science, 2002
We investigate the effects of retailer’s myopic behavior on channel members strategies and on sal... more We investigate the effects of retailer’s myopic behavior on channel members strategies and on sales in a single-manufacturer single-retailer distribution network (bilateral monopoly). The manufacturer controls her marketing effort and the retailer his price and marketing effort. Demand depends on, among other variables, goodwill whose evolution is function of both players’ marketing efforts. It is shown that a myopic retailer prices at a lower price than a nonmyopic one but invests less in marketing effort. The manufacturer confronted to a myopic retailer sets her marketing effort at a higher level. Manufacturer’s performance is hurt by a myopic retailer.
ABSTRACT This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater manageme... more ABSTRACT This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater management problem, where quantity and quality of the water are taken into account. A group of farmers overexploits a groundwater stock and causes excessive pollution. A water agency wishes to regulate the farmers’ activity, in order to reach a minimum level of quantity and quality but is subject to a budget constraint and can only use regulatory policies that do not vary over time. The model takes into account the strategic interaction between farmers and the hierarchical relationship between the water agency and the farmers. Regulated and Laisser-Faire scenarios are compared. Results consist in a set of conditions under which constant policies can bring the groundwater resource back to the desired states. In an example, it is shown how this decision making tool could help define environmental tax policies.
ABSTRACT This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater manageme... more ABSTRACT This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater management problem, where quantity and quality of the water are taken into account. A group of farmers overexploits a groundwater stock and causes excessive pollution. A water agency wishes to regulate the farmers’ activity, in order to reach a minimum level of quantity and quality but is subject to a budget constraint and can only use regulatory policies that do not vary over time. The model takes into account the strategic interaction between farmers and the hierarchical relationship between the water agency and the farmers. Regulated and Laisser-Faire scenarios are compared. Results consist in a set of conditions under which constant policies can bring the groundwater resource back to the desired states. In an example, it is shown how this decision making tool could help define environmental tax policies.
Abstract Horizontal cooperation among franchisees is now a well-known reality in franchising, as ... more Abstract Horizontal cooperation among franchisees is now a well-known reality in franchising, as exemplified by the growing number,of franchisee associations and advertising coopera- tives. However, there is little understanding of the circumstances that favor cooperation
This note deals with time-consistency and agreeability, two dynamic individual rationality concep... more This note deals with time-consistency and agreeability, two dynamic individual rationality concepts, in special linear-quadratic differential games. Conditions ensuring their satisfaction are derived and a link between sustainability of cooperation and fair sharing of cooperation surplus is established.
Advances in Computational Management Science, 2002
We investigate the effects of retailer’s myopic behavior on channel members strategies and on sal... more We investigate the effects of retailer’s myopic behavior on channel members strategies and on sales in a single-manufacturer single-retailer distribution network (bilateral monopoly). The manufacturer controls her marketing effort and the retailer his price and marketing effort. Demand depends on, among other variables, goodwill whose evolution is function of both players’ marketing efforts. It is shown that a myopic retailer prices at a lower price than a nonmyopic one but invests less in marketing effort. The manufacturer confronted to a myopic retailer sets her marketing effort at a higher level. Manufacturer’s performance is hurt by a myopic retailer.
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Papers by Georges Zaccour