Well‐functioning agents ordinarily have an excellent epistemic relationship to their intentional ... more Well‐functioning agents ordinarily have an excellent epistemic relationship to their intentional actions. This phenomenon is often characterized as knowledge of what one is doing and labeled “practical knowledge”. But when we examine it carefully, it seems to require a particular kind of understanding – understanding of the normative structure of one’s action. Three lines of argument are offered to support this Necessity of Understanding thesis. The first appeals to the nature of intentional action and the second to our everyday reasons explanation of action. The final line of argument draws on a practical amnesia case in which an agent forgets her overall goal while acting. Implications of the Necessity of Understanding thesis for the widely endorsed non-observational view of practical knowledge is briefly discussed. It is argued that support for the non-observational view is weaker than has been appreciated.
Anscombe claims that the applicability of ‘why’ questions – ‘Why are you leaving?’, ‘Why did you ... more Anscombe claims that the applicability of ‘why’ questions – ‘Why are you leaving?’, ‘Why did you do that?’ – is a distinguishing feature of intentional action. I critically discuss a near-identical claim – the Distinguishing Feature Claim (DF Claim) – as a widely accepted necessary condition claim that is inspired by Anscombe: (DF Claim) If A is an intentional action, then an RE-question is given application to A. My main aim in this paper is to present reasons for thinking that DF Claim is false. First, there are intentional actions for which RE-questions are unsound, and so these questions are not, I argue, ‘given application’. Second, when these questions are ‘given application’ this is plausibly explained, not in terms of some necessary link obtaining between intentional action and such questions, but in terms of the fact that agents have exercised certain rational capacities in acting.
Surrounding Self-Control, edited by Alfred Mele, 2020
In this chapter the author defends a novel view of the relationships among intention for the futu... more In this chapter the author defends a novel view of the relationships among intention for the future, self-control, and cooperation. The author argues that when an agent forms an intention for the future she comes to regard herself as criticizable if she does not act in accordance with her intention. In contexts where the agent has inclinations that run contrary to her unrescinded intention, her disposition for reflexive criticism helps her to resist these inclinations. Such intentions have, the author argues, a built-in mechanism for exercising self-control. The author goes on to argue that this mechanism can also function as a mechanism for cooperative behavior. Agents are not just equipped to abide by plans for the future, they are also thereby equipped for exercising self-control and for cooperating.
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 7, edited by David Shoemaker, 2021
It is widely accepted that we are answerable in a special way for our intentional actions. And it... more It is widely accepted that we are answerable in a special way for our intentional actions. And it is also widely accepted that we are thus answerable because we perform intentional actions for reasons. The aim of this chapter is to argue against this ‘reasons’ view of such answerability. First, reasons are distinguished from practical standards. Then, it is argued that the best interpretation of the practices in which we treat agents as answerable is that they fundamentally concern practical standards rather than reasons. This view shows that we are answerable, not just because we are deliberators, but because we are executive agents whose complex executive capacities open us to criticism.
While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative... more While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative or rational status, comparatively little has been said about the subjective authority of intention. What is it about intending that explains the " hold " that an intention has on an agent – a hold that is palpable from her first-person perspective? I argue that several prima facie appealing explanations are not promising. Instead, I maintain that the subjective authority of intention can be explained in terms of the inner structure of intention. In adopting an intention the agent comes to see herself as criticizable depending on whether she executes the intention. This allows us to explain in first-personal terms why the agent becomes disposed to act and deliberate in ways that are characteristic of intention. As intention-formation involves profound changes to reflexive evaluative attitudes, this is the " Self-Evaluation " view of the subjective authority of intention.
In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states... more In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. We should conclude that rationalizing action explanation is not a species of causal explanation.
What is special about successful action explanation is that it reveals what the agent saw in her ... more What is special about successful action explanation is that it reveals what the agent saw in her action. Most contemporary philosophers assume that this amounts to explanation in terms of the reason for which the agent acted. They also assume that such explanations conform to a realist picture of explanation. What is disputed is whether the reason is a psychological state (Psychologism) or a normative state of affairs (Anti-Psychologism). I argue that neither psychological states nor their contents suffice to make actions intelligible in the right way (such theories fail to meet what I call the Reasonableness Constraint), while Anti-Psychologism can’t explain acting on bad reasons (it fails the Bad Reasons Constraint). The alternative that I propose, Proceduralism, has it that explaining an action requires simulating the agent’s practical deliberation. On this view, explanation is not grounded in reasons, and thereby avoids the problems with “bad” reasons that Anti-Psychologism faces. Instead, in simulating to the same conclusion as the agent, the “explainer” comes to see what the agent saw in her action, thereby satisfying the Reasonableness Constraint. Proceduralism requires giving up on the assumption that the reason for which the agent acts explains the action and on the realist picture of action explanation. In addition, it accounts for the incomprehension that explainers experience when they encounter “alien” psychologies – psychologies that are deeply different from their own.
There have been numerous attempts to explain the so-called Knobe Effect – a striking difference i... more There have been numerous attempts to explain the so-called Knobe Effect – a striking difference in people’s willingness to make intentionality judgments about actions of harm and help. It is a remarkable feature of the discussion so far that it assumes without scrutiny that the substitution of one act-type for another (harm for help in Knobe’s CEO scenarios) could not, taken alone, explain the difference in the responses. This paper presents evidence, both experimental and conceptual, that it is precisely this difference that promises to explain the asymmetry. Harming unlike helping can be freely attributed to the well-intentioned and ill-intentioned, the knowing and the naive.
Michael Bratman’s celebrated video game case has convinced many that the so-called Simple View is... more Michael Bratman’s celebrated video game case has convinced many that the so-called Simple View is false. I argue, first, that the Simple View is not undermined by the case, and second, that the real import of the case is that it raises the question of how we can rationally intend mutually exclusive ends. I offer a solution to this puzzle that draws on what I call the Self-Evaluation aspect of intention.
The causalist faces a dilemma: either she adopts a simple account of the causal route between int... more The causalist faces a dilemma: either she adopts a simple account of the causal route between intention and outcome, at the cost of failing to rule out deviance cases, or she adopts a more sophisticated account, at the cost of ruling out cases of intentional action in which the causal route is merely unusual. Underlying this dilemma, I argue, is that the agent’s perspective plays an ineliminable role in determining which causal pathways are deviant and which are not.
NCSD, which is defended in Part 1 of this two-part book, is an ontological dualism of personssub... more NCSD, which is defended in Part 1 of this two-part book, is an ontological dualism of personssubjects of experienceand their organized bodies. However, just as a statue has physical characteristics although it is distinct from the clay of which it is made, persons ...
Well‐functioning agents ordinarily have an excellent epistemic relationship to their intentional ... more Well‐functioning agents ordinarily have an excellent epistemic relationship to their intentional actions. This phenomenon is often characterized as knowledge of what one is doing and labeled “practical knowledge”. But when we examine it carefully, it seems to require a particular kind of understanding – understanding of the normative structure of one’s action. Three lines of argument are offered to support this Necessity of Understanding thesis. The first appeals to the nature of intentional action and the second to our everyday reasons explanation of action. The final line of argument draws on a practical amnesia case in which an agent forgets her overall goal while acting. Implications of the Necessity of Understanding thesis for the widely endorsed non-observational view of practical knowledge is briefly discussed. It is argued that support for the non-observational view is weaker than has been appreciated.
Anscombe claims that the applicability of ‘why’ questions – ‘Why are you leaving?’, ‘Why did you ... more Anscombe claims that the applicability of ‘why’ questions – ‘Why are you leaving?’, ‘Why did you do that?’ – is a distinguishing feature of intentional action. I critically discuss a near-identical claim – the Distinguishing Feature Claim (DF Claim) – as a widely accepted necessary condition claim that is inspired by Anscombe: (DF Claim) If A is an intentional action, then an RE-question is given application to A. My main aim in this paper is to present reasons for thinking that DF Claim is false. First, there are intentional actions for which RE-questions are unsound, and so these questions are not, I argue, ‘given application’. Second, when these questions are ‘given application’ this is plausibly explained, not in terms of some necessary link obtaining between intentional action and such questions, but in terms of the fact that agents have exercised certain rational capacities in acting.
Surrounding Self-Control, edited by Alfred Mele, 2020
In this chapter the author defends a novel view of the relationships among intention for the futu... more In this chapter the author defends a novel view of the relationships among intention for the future, self-control, and cooperation. The author argues that when an agent forms an intention for the future she comes to regard herself as criticizable if she does not act in accordance with her intention. In contexts where the agent has inclinations that run contrary to her unrescinded intention, her disposition for reflexive criticism helps her to resist these inclinations. Such intentions have, the author argues, a built-in mechanism for exercising self-control. The author goes on to argue that this mechanism can also function as a mechanism for cooperative behavior. Agents are not just equipped to abide by plans for the future, they are also thereby equipped for exercising self-control and for cooperating.
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 7, edited by David Shoemaker, 2021
It is widely accepted that we are answerable in a special way for our intentional actions. And it... more It is widely accepted that we are answerable in a special way for our intentional actions. And it is also widely accepted that we are thus answerable because we perform intentional actions for reasons. The aim of this chapter is to argue against this ‘reasons’ view of such answerability. First, reasons are distinguished from practical standards. Then, it is argued that the best interpretation of the practices in which we treat agents as answerable is that they fundamentally concern practical standards rather than reasons. This view shows that we are answerable, not just because we are deliberators, but because we are executive agents whose complex executive capacities open us to criticism.
While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative... more While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative or rational status, comparatively little has been said about the subjective authority of intention. What is it about intending that explains the " hold " that an intention has on an agent – a hold that is palpable from her first-person perspective? I argue that several prima facie appealing explanations are not promising. Instead, I maintain that the subjective authority of intention can be explained in terms of the inner structure of intention. In adopting an intention the agent comes to see herself as criticizable depending on whether she executes the intention. This allows us to explain in first-personal terms why the agent becomes disposed to act and deliberate in ways that are characteristic of intention. As intention-formation involves profound changes to reflexive evaluative attitudes, this is the " Self-Evaluation " view of the subjective authority of intention.
In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states... more In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. We should conclude that rationalizing action explanation is not a species of causal explanation.
What is special about successful action explanation is that it reveals what the agent saw in her ... more What is special about successful action explanation is that it reveals what the agent saw in her action. Most contemporary philosophers assume that this amounts to explanation in terms of the reason for which the agent acted. They also assume that such explanations conform to a realist picture of explanation. What is disputed is whether the reason is a psychological state (Psychologism) or a normative state of affairs (Anti-Psychologism). I argue that neither psychological states nor their contents suffice to make actions intelligible in the right way (such theories fail to meet what I call the Reasonableness Constraint), while Anti-Psychologism can’t explain acting on bad reasons (it fails the Bad Reasons Constraint). The alternative that I propose, Proceduralism, has it that explaining an action requires simulating the agent’s practical deliberation. On this view, explanation is not grounded in reasons, and thereby avoids the problems with “bad” reasons that Anti-Psychologism faces. Instead, in simulating to the same conclusion as the agent, the “explainer” comes to see what the agent saw in her action, thereby satisfying the Reasonableness Constraint. Proceduralism requires giving up on the assumption that the reason for which the agent acts explains the action and on the realist picture of action explanation. In addition, it accounts for the incomprehension that explainers experience when they encounter “alien” psychologies – psychologies that are deeply different from their own.
There have been numerous attempts to explain the so-called Knobe Effect – a striking difference i... more There have been numerous attempts to explain the so-called Knobe Effect – a striking difference in people’s willingness to make intentionality judgments about actions of harm and help. It is a remarkable feature of the discussion so far that it assumes without scrutiny that the substitution of one act-type for another (harm for help in Knobe’s CEO scenarios) could not, taken alone, explain the difference in the responses. This paper presents evidence, both experimental and conceptual, that it is precisely this difference that promises to explain the asymmetry. Harming unlike helping can be freely attributed to the well-intentioned and ill-intentioned, the knowing and the naive.
Michael Bratman’s celebrated video game case has convinced many that the so-called Simple View is... more Michael Bratman’s celebrated video game case has convinced many that the so-called Simple View is false. I argue, first, that the Simple View is not undermined by the case, and second, that the real import of the case is that it raises the question of how we can rationally intend mutually exclusive ends. I offer a solution to this puzzle that draws on what I call the Self-Evaluation aspect of intention.
The causalist faces a dilemma: either she adopts a simple account of the causal route between int... more The causalist faces a dilemma: either she adopts a simple account of the causal route between intention and outcome, at the cost of failing to rule out deviance cases, or she adopts a more sophisticated account, at the cost of ruling out cases of intentional action in which the causal route is merely unusual. Underlying this dilemma, I argue, is that the agent’s perspective plays an ineliminable role in determining which causal pathways are deviant and which are not.
NCSD, which is defended in Part 1 of this two-part book, is an ontological dualism of personssub... more NCSD, which is defended in Part 1 of this two-part book, is an ontological dualism of personssubjects of experienceand their organized bodies. However, just as a statue has physical characteristics although it is distinct from the clay of which it is made, persons ...
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(DF Claim) If A is an intentional action, then an RE-question is given application to A.
My main aim in this paper is to present reasons for thinking that DF Claim is false. First, there are intentional actions for which RE-questions are unsound, and so these questions are not, I argue, ‘given application’. Second, when these questions are ‘given application’ this is plausibly explained, not in terms of some necessary link obtaining between intentional action and such questions, but in terms of the fact that agents have exercised certain rational capacities in acting.
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(DF Claim) If A is an intentional action, then an RE-question is given application to A.
My main aim in this paper is to present reasons for thinking that DF Claim is false. First, there are intentional actions for which RE-questions are unsound, and so these questions are not, I argue, ‘given application’. Second, when these questions are ‘given application’ this is plausibly explained, not in terms of some necessary link obtaining between intentional action and such questions, but in terms of the fact that agents have exercised certain rational capacities in acting.