Papers on the history of philosophy by Tobias Rosefeldt
This is a heavily updated version of "Transcendental Idealism and the Aposteriori Contents of Exp... more This is a heavily updated version of "Transcendental Idealism and the Aposteriori Contents of Experience" and contains my latest attempt to make sense of Kant's Transcendental Idealism.
ABSTRACT: This paper deals with the question of whether Kant's transcendental idealism allows for an explanation of the a posteriori aspects of mental content by the properties of empirical objects. I first show that a phenomenalist interpretation has severe problems with assuming that we perceive an object as being red or as being cubical partly because the perceived object is red and cubical, and then present an interpretation that allows us to save the realistic intuition behind these claims. According to this interpretation, Kantian phenomenal properties are understood as response-dependent properties of extra-mental objects that also have to have some response-independent (in-itself-) properties. I show that this interpretation is well supported by Kant's remarks about the transcendental object in the A-edition of the first Critique and that it also makes intelligible why Kant took explanations of mental content by means of empirical properties to imply an explanation by means of noumenal properties without thereby violating his own doctrine of noumenal ignorance. This not only allows us to establish a realistic reading of Kant idealism but also to discern the true kernel in Adickes’ infamous talk about Kant's theory of double affection.
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forthcoming in JHPhil
Kant's famous dictum that existence 'is not a real predicate that could be added to the concept o... more Kant's famous dictum that existence 'is not a real predicate that could be added to the concept of a thing' is standardly interpreted as an early variant of either Frege's thesis that existence is a second-order property, or of the claim that existence is a property of everything, which was once prominently made by Quine. This paper argues that both views are mistaken, because they can only make sense of some but not all claims that are distinctive of Kant's notion of existence. Most importantly, they cannot account for the fact that Kant followed the philosophical tradition of his time in assuming that there are existing as well as non-existing objects. I propose an alternative and novel interpretation of Kant's dictum, which takes his distinction between 'absolute and relative positing' to be the key to an adequate understanding of his account of the logical form, and ontological implications, of existential judgments. This interpretation shows that the least anachronistic way to interpret Kant's position from a contemporary point of view is to understand it as a forerunner of an account that has been proposed by certain followers of Meinong. This account allows us to take advantage of all the philosophical attractions of non-existent objects without having to accept an overly extravagant ontology.
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In recent years, more and more people have become attracted by the idea that the imagination shou... more In recent years, more and more people have become attracted by the idea that the imagination should play a central role in explaining our knowledge of what is possible and necessary and what would be the case if things were different from how they actually are. The biggest challenge for this account is to explain how the imagination can be restricted in such a way that it can play this epistemic role, for there are certainly also unrestricted uses of the imagination in which it fails to yield the requisite knowledge. In this paper, I inquire how Kant's account of the imagination could inspire the contemporary debate at this point. I first give an overview about Kant's account of the imagination and its different roles for our cognition of the real world. I then show that some recent attempts to seperate the epistemically valuable uses of the imagination from the epistemically worthless ones bear some striking similarities to Kant's ideas about how the imagination helps us to get insight into metaphysical possibility. By discussing what Kant says about the method of a prori imaginative construction in the case of concepts such as that of matter and that of disembodied minds, I also point to those aspects of his view which make it really distinct from all contemporary accounts, but which he himself thought bear the greatest potential of making the imagination a source of modal knowledge.
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This paper deals with the question of whether Kant's transcendental idealism allows for an explan... more This paper deals with the question of whether Kant's transcendental idealism allows for an explanation of the a posteriori aspects of mental content by the properties of empirical objects. I first show that a phenomenalist interpretation has severe problems with assuming that we perceive an object as being red or as being cubical partly because the perceived object is red and cubical, and then present an interpretation that allows us to save the realistic intuition behind these claims. According to this interpretation, Kantian phenomenal properties are understood as response-dependent properties of extra-mental objects that also have to have some response-independent (in-itself-) properties. I show that this interpretation is well supported by Kant's remarks about the transcendental object in the A-edition of the first Critique and that it also makes intelligible why Kant took explanations of mental content by means of empirical properties to imply an explanation by means of nouminal properties without thereby violating his own doctrine of noumenal ignorance. This allows us to discern the true kernel in Adickes' infamous talk about Kant's theory of double affection.
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This paper is about Kant's reasons for the view that an activity of the transcendental imaginatio... more This paper is about Kant's reasons for the view that an activity of the transcendental imagination is an essential ingredient of our intuition of time. I discuss his claim that we have to represent time by drawing a straight line and propose a solution to the problem of how this case is different from the one in which by drawing a straight line we represent one of the dimensions of space. My interpretation has the advantage of making it intelligible why Kant thought that there is an inextricable connection between the synthesis of the imagination and the awareness we have of our own representations and why Kant took time to be the form of inner sense.
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In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich zu rekonstruieren, weshalb Kant der Meinung war, dass Sollenssachv... more In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich zu rekonstruieren, weshalb Kant der Meinung war, dass Sollenssachverhalte letztlich nichts anderes sind als Wollenssachverhalte und dass moralisches Sollen darin besteht, etwas als noumenales Vernunftwesen von sich selbst als phänomenalem Naturwesen zu wollen. Dabei wird hoffentlich deutlich, dass das eigentlich eine ziemlich attraktive Idee ist.
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According to the standard interpretation of the first paralogism, its fallacy is based on a confu... more According to the standard interpretation of the first paralogism, its fallacy is based on a confusion between two meanings of the term 'subject', namely that of 'thinking subject' and that of 'subject of predication'. The paper argues that this interpretation is incorrect and that Kant in fact explains the illusion of cognizing ourselves as thinking substances by a misinterpretation of a certain logico-semantical feature of the representation 'I', namely that of non-predicability. This interpretation puts the first paralogism in accord with the other paralogisms, all of which are claimed by Kant to stem from a confusion between 'logical' and 'real' features of the self. It also allows us to relate the chapter on the paralogisms to Kant's views on the connection between the ideas of pure reason and the progress towards the unconditioned in chains of prosyllogisms.
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In this paper I present a new solution to the so-called ‚neglected alternative'-objection against... more In this paper I present a new solution to the so-called ‚neglected alternative'-objection against Kant's argument for transcendental idealism. According to this objection, Kant does not give sufficient justification for his claim that not only are space and time forms of our intuition but that they also fail to be things in themselves or properties thereof. I first discuss a proposal by Willaschek and Allais, who try to defend Kant against this charge by building on his account of a priori intuition, and argue that it is insufficient in order to meet the objection in its full force. I then present my own solution to the problem. It is based on a reconstruction of Kant's account of properties of appearances and tries to show that this account implies that spatio-temporal properties could in principle not pertain both to appearances and to things in themselves.
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In this paper, I propose two different reconstructions of Fichte's famous regress-objections for ... more In this paper, I propose two different reconstructions of Fichte's famous regress-objections for reflexive theories of self-consciousness. The first one of them is built on the concept of consciousness and bares a remarkable resemblance to Sartre's argument for a pre-reflexive 'cogito'. The second one is build on the concept of the 'I'. I argue that although traces of both objection can be found in Fichte's text they should not be confused. I also argue that the second reconstruction provides Fichte with a philosophically much more interesting insight than the first.
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Ausgehend von Eckart Försters provokanter Behauptung, dass es Philosophie eigentlich nur 25 Jahre... more Ausgehend von Eckart Försters provokanter Behauptung, dass es Philosophie eigentlich nur 25 Jahre lang, nämlich von 1781 bis 1806, gegeben habe, untersuche ich, welche Aspekte von Kants Transzendentalphilosophie bereits in seiner Inauguraldissertation von 1770 zu finden sind, und versuche zu zeigen, wie aufschlussreich diese Schrift für Kants kritisches Projekt ist.
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In this paper I show how Kant's assertions about things in themselves can be defended against the... more In this paper I show how Kant's assertions about things in themselves can be defended against the various objections made against it by Feder, Garve, Jacobi and Schulze.
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In this paper I defend Kant's idea that libertarian freedom and causal determinism can be made co... more In this paper I defend Kant's idea that libertarian freedom and causal determinism can be made compatible if we assume that the first pertains to the agent as a thing in itself and the second to the agent as an appearance. I show that the supposed absurd consequences for which Kant was blamed by authors such as Wood and Walker do not in fact follow from his account, and I explain how the counterfactual dependence of our empirical deeds from our intelligible character suffices to save moral responsibility in a deterministic world.
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The paper tries to shed new exegetical light on Frege's "Dialogue with Pünjer on Existence" by sh... more The paper tries to shed new exegetical light on Frege's "Dialogue with Pünjer on Existence" by showing that Pünjer's position in the dialogue is strongly inspired by Kantian claims about existence. It is argued that Pünjer's wavering between a broadly Meinongian and a broadly Fregean view on existence can be explained by the fact that there are Kantian remarks which seem to speak in favour of each of these views. A suggestion is then made how Kant's claims can be interpreted in such a way that the tension which they seem to entail disappears. Kant's notion of existence is shown to be Meinongian (in a broad sense).
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I reconstruct the ontological argument argument in Descartes' fifth meditation and show how Desca... more I reconstruct the ontological argument argument in Descartes' fifth meditation and show how Descartes can meet objections raised against it.
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The paper defends a reading of Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves ac... more The paper defends a reading of Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves according to which it amount to one between two kinds of properties of one and the same mind-independent objects: dispositional properties on the one hand, and non-dispositional properties on the other. Spatio-temporal appearance properties are understood as dispositions to have certain effects on minds with space and time as their forms of intuition.
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Ein Dilemma in Kants Theorie der Subjektivität besteht darin, daß er einerseits von einem identis... more Ein Dilemma in Kants Theorie der Subjektivität besteht darin, daß er einerseits von einem identischen Ich als dem Gegenstand eines reinen Selbstbewußtseins spricht, andererseits bestreiten muß, daß es sich bei diesem Ich um einen realen Gegenstand handelt. Horstmanns Interpretation des Kantischen Ichs als bloßer Aktivität wird als Ausweg aus diesem Dilemma verworfen. Dann wird gezeigt, daß Kant außer realen auch logische Gegenstände kennt und daß das Ich ein solcher bloß logischer Gegenstand ist.
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I provide an interpretation of Kant's claim that in pure self-consciousness we are only aware of ... more I provide an interpretation of Kant's claim that in pure self-consciousness we are only aware of the logical identity of the self not of the identity of the self as a real being. The interpretation builds on a general reconstruction of Kant's distinction between logical and real features of the self in the Paralogism chapter and shows how Kant accounts for the fact that awareness of one's own identity is possible without awareness of the identity of one's own body.
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I show that Heidegger's famous claim that there is a fundamental difference between 'Sein' (being... more I show that Heidegger's famous claim that there is a fundamental difference between 'Sein' (being, esse) and 'Seiendem' (beings, entia) bears a remarkable resemblance to Frege's distinction between (saturated) objects and (unsaturated) concepts. Both authors argue that in order for it to be possible to understand reality and say something about it, there cannot only be objects but there also has to be something that objects are and do (their being a certain way). And both authors point to a systematic problem that arises when we try to speak about that which is not an entity or an object, namely that we turn it into an object/ an entity when using name-like terms such as 'the concept of a horse' or 'das Sein'.
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Papers on contemporary philosophy by Tobias Rosefeldt
Naturalized metaphysics is guided by the idea that philosophy should be guided by the sciences. T... more Naturalized metaphysics is guided by the idea that philosophy should be guided by the sciences. The paradigmatic science that is relevant for metaphysics is physics because physics tells us what fundamental reality is ultimately like. There are other sciences, however, that de facto play a role in philosophical inquiries about what there is, one of them being the science of language, i.e. linguistics. In this paper I will be concerned with the question what role linguistics should and in fact does play for the meta-metaphysical question of how our views about fundamental reality can be reconciled with the everyday truisms about what there is. I will present several examples of two kinds of approaches to this question, linguistics-based accounts and purely philosophical accounts, and will discuss their respective methodological virtues and vices. In the end I will argues that even proponents of a purely philosophical answer to the meta-metaphysical question should take the results of linguistics seriously.
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The paper deals with cases of counting things that could exist but do not actually exist so that ... more The paper deals with cases of counting things that could exist but do not actually exist so that resist common strategies for actualist paraphrases and that play an important role in motivating Timothy Williamson's ontology of contingently concrete objects. It is argued that these cases should be understood as cases of quantification not over individual possible objects but rather over kinds of objects, some of which do not actually have instances. This claim is motivated by a comparison with other cases of natural-language quantification with a similar logical form that, in any case, have to be interpreted as involving quantification over kinds of things even if their surface structure seems to suggest otherwise.
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Papers on the history of philosophy by Tobias Rosefeldt
ABSTRACT: This paper deals with the question of whether Kant's transcendental idealism allows for an explanation of the a posteriori aspects of mental content by the properties of empirical objects. I first show that a phenomenalist interpretation has severe problems with assuming that we perceive an object as being red or as being cubical partly because the perceived object is red and cubical, and then present an interpretation that allows us to save the realistic intuition behind these claims. According to this interpretation, Kantian phenomenal properties are understood as response-dependent properties of extra-mental objects that also have to have some response-independent (in-itself-) properties. I show that this interpretation is well supported by Kant's remarks about the transcendental object in the A-edition of the first Critique and that it also makes intelligible why Kant took explanations of mental content by means of empirical properties to imply an explanation by means of noumenal properties without thereby violating his own doctrine of noumenal ignorance. This not only allows us to establish a realistic reading of Kant idealism but also to discern the true kernel in Adickes’ infamous talk about Kant's theory of double affection.
Papers on contemporary philosophy by Tobias Rosefeldt
ABSTRACT: This paper deals with the question of whether Kant's transcendental idealism allows for an explanation of the a posteriori aspects of mental content by the properties of empirical objects. I first show that a phenomenalist interpretation has severe problems with assuming that we perceive an object as being red or as being cubical partly because the perceived object is red and cubical, and then present an interpretation that allows us to save the realistic intuition behind these claims. According to this interpretation, Kantian phenomenal properties are understood as response-dependent properties of extra-mental objects that also have to have some response-independent (in-itself-) properties. I show that this interpretation is well supported by Kant's remarks about the transcendental object in the A-edition of the first Critique and that it also makes intelligible why Kant took explanations of mental content by means of empirical properties to imply an explanation by means of noumenal properties without thereby violating his own doctrine of noumenal ignorance. This not only allows us to establish a realistic reading of Kant idealism but also to discern the true kernel in Adickes’ infamous talk about Kant's theory of double affection.