Articles by Aaron Segal
Ergo: An Open Access Journal in Philosophy
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American Philosophical Quarterly, 2024
The fact that philosophy is systematic-that philosophical issues are thoroughly interconnected-wa... more The fact that philosophy is systematic-that philosophical issues are thoroughly interconnected-was a commonplace among nineteenth century idealists, then neglected by analytic philosophers throughout much of the twentieth century, and has now finally started to get some renewed attention. But other than calling attention to the fact, few philosophers have tried to say what it consists in, or what its implications are. I argue that the systematicity of philosophy has disastrous epistemological implications. In particular, it implies philosophical skepticism: philosophers are rationally prohibited from believing any philosophical thesis. The argument goes by way of a new principle that connects inquiry with what is rational to believe. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between my argument and other, more well-trodden arguments for philosophical skepticism.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2024
According to certain views about human ontology, the way we seem is very different from the way w... more According to certain views about human ontology, the way we seem is very different from the way we are. The appearances are a threat to such views. Here I take up and defuse the threat to one such view.
Pure immaterialism says that each of us is wholly immaterial. The appearances suggest otherwise. I argue that despite the fact that we might sometimes appear to be at least partly material, and that we can be perceptually justified in believing something solely on the basis of having a perceptual experience as of its being the case, none of us is ever perceptually justified in believing that we are even partly material (or that we’re not). Bottom line: we might be able to know whether we’re material, but we can’t know just by looking.
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Faith and Philosophy, forthcoming, 2023
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Synthese, 2021
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Mind, 2021
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Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, 2021
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Inquiry, 2021
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2020
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Nous, 2020
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Philosophers' Imprint, 2019
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Erkenntnis, 2017
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Philosophical Perspectives, 2016
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Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2015
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Philosophical Studies, 2014
Several philosophers have recently defended Causal Essentialism—the view that every property conf... more Several philosophers have recently defended Causal Essentialism—the view that every property confers causal powers, and whatever powers it confers, it confers essentially. I argue that on the face of it, Causal Essentialism implies a form of Monism, and in particular, the thesis I call ‘Mereological Monism’: that there is some concretum that is a part of every concretum. However, there are three escape routes, three views which are such that if one of them is true, Causal Essentialism does not imply any form of Monism at all. I survey the costs associated with taking these escape routes along with the costs associated with accepting Mereological Monism.
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Religious Studies, 2011
Sceptical theism has been employed by its adherents in an argument aimed at undermining the so ca... more Sceptical theism has been employed by its adherents in an argument aimed at undermining the so called ‘noseeum inference’. Erik Wielenberg (2010) has recently argued that there is an equally plausible argument for the conclusion that sceptical theism implies that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. Thus, sceptical theists need to give up their argument against the noseeum inference or accept the conclusion that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. I claim that sceptical theists need not face such a difficult choice because the argument that Wielenberg offers is not as plausible as their argument against the noseeum inference.(Online publication February 09 2011)
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Philo, 2010
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Book Chapters by Aaron Segal
Routledge Companion to Jewish Philosophy, 2024
This paper examines the question of what we are, maps the possible answers, and locates those ans... more This paper examines the question of what we are, maps the possible answers, and locates those answers in certain classical Jewish sources. It then develops a distinctively Jewish approach to that question-an idiosyncratic version of dualism-that hasn't been seriously explored in the general philosophical literature. After defending its Jewish bona fides, the paper motivates it based on more neutral philosophical considerations. It will emerge that there's a well-motivated, deeply Jewish, and heretofore neglected contender on the question of human ontology.
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Norton Introduction to Philosophy of Religion (eds. Lara Buchak and Dean Zimmerman), 2024
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Knowledge Through Narrative: Biblical Narratives and Human Flourishing,, 2024
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Articles by Aaron Segal
Pure immaterialism says that each of us is wholly immaterial. The appearances suggest otherwise. I argue that despite the fact that we might sometimes appear to be at least partly material, and that we can be perceptually justified in believing something solely on the basis of having a perceptual experience as of its being the case, none of us is ever perceptually justified in believing that we are even partly material (or that we’re not). Bottom line: we might be able to know whether we’re material, but we can’t know just by looking.
Book Chapters by Aaron Segal
Pure immaterialism says that each of us is wholly immaterial. The appearances suggest otherwise. I argue that despite the fact that we might sometimes appear to be at least partly material, and that we can be perceptually justified in believing something solely on the basis of having a perceptual experience as of its being the case, none of us is ever perceptually justified in believing that we are even partly material (or that we’re not). Bottom line: we might be able to know whether we’re material, but we can’t know just by looking.