Guy Carmi
Dr. Guy E. Carmi received his S.J.D. and LL.M from the University of Virginia School of Law, and his LL.B. from the University of Haifa Faculty of Law. He teaches Comparative Perspectives on Freedom of Expression at the Heberw University of Jerusalem Faculty of Law. He previously taught Holocaust and the Law at the Radzyner School of Law of the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Introduction to American Law at the University of Haifa Faculty of Law, at the College of Management Law School, and at the University of Virginia School of Law.
Dr. Carmi's scholarship principally deals with comparative constitutional law, focusing on freedom of expression. Among his publications are articles in theAmerican Journal of Comparative Law, the McGill Law Journal, Boston University International Law Journal, the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, and the Connecticut Journal of International Law.
Dr. Carmi's doctoral dissertation titled "Dignity and Liberty: Differing Approaches to Free Speech in Germany, The United States and Israel" won The Gorney Prize for Young Researchers in the field of Public Law of The Israeli Association of Public Law. In his dissertation, Dr. Carmi examines the question whether freedom of expression is primarily based upon the value of human dignity or on the value of liberty, as well as the question how relying on either of these values affects the perception of freedom of expression and its protection. The dissertation examines these questions under three legal systems: Germany, the United States, and Israel. Freedom of expression in Israel is examined in light of the comparative research. His research indicates that only after the 1992 Constitutional Revolution, did the Supreme Court establish that human dignity, as interpreted in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, includes freedom of expression. Dr. Carmi reaches the conclusion that the link between freedom of expression and human dignity, despite the fact that such link was intended to strengthen freedom of expression, has actually weakened it. He offers ways to buttress freedom of expression in Israel, including the possibility of anchoring freedom of expression in the value of liberty of men.
Dr. Carmi is a partner in the litigation department of Lipa Meir & Co. in Tel-Aviv, where he works since 2008. He represents banking corporations, insurance companies, real-estate entrepreneurs and the like in a variety of complex civil and commercial litigation cases, in all judicial forums, including the Supreme Court. Dr. Carmi also handles, inter alia, antitrust, defamation, and administrative petitions (including tenders), as well as petitions to the High Court of Justice. In addition, Dr. Carmi writes legal briefs and opinions in the fields of comparative and constitutional law, communications law and defamation, and provides counseling to the firms' clients on these issues.
Dr. Carmi's scholarship principally deals with comparative constitutional law, focusing on freedom of expression. Among his publications are articles in theAmerican Journal of Comparative Law, the McGill Law Journal, Boston University International Law Journal, the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, and the Connecticut Journal of International Law.
Dr. Carmi's doctoral dissertation titled "Dignity and Liberty: Differing Approaches to Free Speech in Germany, The United States and Israel" won The Gorney Prize for Young Researchers in the field of Public Law of The Israeli Association of Public Law. In his dissertation, Dr. Carmi examines the question whether freedom of expression is primarily based upon the value of human dignity or on the value of liberty, as well as the question how relying on either of these values affects the perception of freedom of expression and its protection. The dissertation examines these questions under three legal systems: Germany, the United States, and Israel. Freedom of expression in Israel is examined in light of the comparative research. His research indicates that only after the 1992 Constitutional Revolution, did the Supreme Court establish that human dignity, as interpreted in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, includes freedom of expression. Dr. Carmi reaches the conclusion that the link between freedom of expression and human dignity, despite the fact that such link was intended to strengthen freedom of expression, has actually weakened it. He offers ways to buttress freedom of expression in Israel, including the possibility of anchoring freedom of expression in the value of liberty of men.
Dr. Carmi is a partner in the litigation department of Lipa Meir & Co. in Tel-Aviv, where he works since 2008. He represents banking corporations, insurance companies, real-estate entrepreneurs and the like in a variety of complex civil and commercial litigation cases, in all judicial forums, including the Supreme Court. Dr. Carmi also handles, inter alia, antitrust, defamation, and administrative petitions (including tenders), as well as petitions to the High Court of Justice. In addition, Dr. Carmi writes legal briefs and opinions in the fields of comparative and constitutional law, communications law and defamation, and provides counseling to the firms' clients on these issues.
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Papers by Guy Carmi
האחרונות לאיום של ממש על חופש הביטוי בישראל ועל היכולת של
יחידים, עיתונאים, עמותות ועובדים להשמיע ביקורת ציבורית ללא מורא.
ראוי כי המשפט הישראלי יאמץ מנגנון להתמודד איתן בחוק, בדומה
לנהוג בדין האמריקאי
free speech justification. The articulation of free speech in human
dignity terms carries unwarranted potential consequences that
may result in limiting free speech rather than protecting it. This possible
outcome makes human dignity inadequate as a free speech justification.
This Article also demonstrates why articulations of the rationales
behind the argument from dignity are either superfluous, since they
are aptly covered by the argument from autonomy, or simply too
broad and speech-restrictive to be considered free speech justifications.
As a matter of principle, the nexus between freedom of speech
and human dignity should be construed as inherently contentious.
This Article combines theoretical and comparative analyses to
demonstrate why European and other Western democracies are more
susceptible to the use of human dignity, both in their constitutional
doctrines and as a speech-restrictive term. Current American scholarship
regarding dignity as a free speech justification neglects to recognize
the harms of such discourse in a non-American setting, as well
as in the United States. Thus, unintentionally, advocates of free
speech may actually promote ajustification that eventually will lead to
speech restriction. For these reasons, the Article warns that inserting
human dignity into the realm of free speech justifications may be
analogous to inserting a "Trojan Horse," with human dignity as "the
enemy from within."
The statistical findings demonstrate that while human dignity rarely played a role in free speech rulings in the past, it plays a significant role today. Another indication of the “dignitization process” lies in the reference to foreign rulings. Moreover, a substantive examination of the Israeli Supreme Court’s free speech rulings from the last decade reveals the dignitization process both in rhetoric and outcomes.
This Article offers a means of strengthening the protection that free speech receives in Israel, by divorcing the constitutional protection of free speech from the concept of human dignity, and by focusing on the value of liberty. This can be achieved by the incorporation of the unenumerated right to free speech via the Liberty Clause within Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.
האחרונות לאיום של ממש על חופש הביטוי בישראל ועל היכולת של
יחידים, עיתונאים, עמותות ועובדים להשמיע ביקורת ציבורית ללא מורא.
ראוי כי המשפט הישראלי יאמץ מנגנון להתמודד איתן בחוק, בדומה
לנהוג בדין האמריקאי
free speech justification. The articulation of free speech in human
dignity terms carries unwarranted potential consequences that
may result in limiting free speech rather than protecting it. This possible
outcome makes human dignity inadequate as a free speech justification.
This Article also demonstrates why articulations of the rationales
behind the argument from dignity are either superfluous, since they
are aptly covered by the argument from autonomy, or simply too
broad and speech-restrictive to be considered free speech justifications.
As a matter of principle, the nexus between freedom of speech
and human dignity should be construed as inherently contentious.
This Article combines theoretical and comparative analyses to
demonstrate why European and other Western democracies are more
susceptible to the use of human dignity, both in their constitutional
doctrines and as a speech-restrictive term. Current American scholarship
regarding dignity as a free speech justification neglects to recognize
the harms of such discourse in a non-American setting, as well
as in the United States. Thus, unintentionally, advocates of free
speech may actually promote ajustification that eventually will lead to
speech restriction. For these reasons, the Article warns that inserting
human dignity into the realm of free speech justifications may be
analogous to inserting a "Trojan Horse," with human dignity as "the
enemy from within."
The statistical findings demonstrate that while human dignity rarely played a role in free speech rulings in the past, it plays a significant role today. Another indication of the “dignitization process” lies in the reference to foreign rulings. Moreover, a substantive examination of the Israeli Supreme Court’s free speech rulings from the last decade reveals the dignitization process both in rhetoric and outcomes.
This Article offers a means of strengthening the protection that free speech receives in Israel, by divorcing the constitutional protection of free speech from the concept of human dignity, and by focusing on the value of liberty. This can be achieved by the incorporation of the unenumerated right to free speech via the Liberty Clause within Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.