Understanding the challenges of corporate governance is central to our comprehension of the econo... more Understanding the challenges of corporate governance is central to our comprehension of the economic dynamics driving corporations today. Among the most important institutions in capitalism today, corporations and joint-stock companies had their origins in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And as they became more prevalent, the issue of internal governance became more pressing. At stake—and very much contested—was the allocation of rights and obligations among shareholders, directors, and managers.
This comprehensive account of the development of corporate governance in Britain and Ireland during its earliest stages highlights the role of political factors in shaping the evolution of corporate governance as well as the important debates that arose about the division of authority and responsibility. Political and economic institutions confronted similar issues, including the need for transparency and accountability in decision making and the roles of electors and the elected, and this book emphasizes how political institutions—from election procedures to assemblies to annual reporting—therefore provided apt models upon which companies drew readily. Filling a gap in the literature on early corporate economy, this book provides insight into the origins of many ongoing modern debates.
Part II - 1850-1914 Volume 5: Birth John Duncan, Practical Directions for Forming and Managing Jo... more Part II - 1850-1914 Volume 5: Birth John Duncan, Practical Directions for Forming and Managing Joint-Stock Companies ... under the Provisions of the 'Joint-Stock Companies Act, 1856' (1856) Henry Lloyd Morgan, Auditors: Remarks on the Qualifications and Duties of Auditors of Accounts of Joint Stock and other Public Bodies (1857) Henry Lloyd Morgan, Personal Liabilities of Directors of Joint Stock Companies under the Fraudulent Trustees' Act, with Remarks on Limited Liability (1858) Alfred Emden, The Shareholders' Legal Guide, being a Concise Statement of the Law Relating to Shares, and of the Legal Rights and Responsibilities of Shareholders (1884) American Telephone Company, Prospectus of the American Telephone Company. Organized under the General Laws of the State of Virginia, for the Purpose of Carrying on the Telephone Business throughout the United States of Venezuela (1887) Gill McDowell Jarrah Company Limited, Prospectus (1898) Volume 6: Structure Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, Organization of the Service of the Baltimore & Ohio Rail Road, under the Proposed New System of Management (1847) William Thomas Thomson, On the Present Position of the Life Assurance Interests of Great Britain (1852) Robert Stewart, The Audit of Joint-Stock Bank Accounts by Shareholders: Is It Practicable or Desirable? (1853) William Rawson, Diary of a Director: Notes and Recollections Made during the Last Fourteen Years (1857) Pennsylvania Rail Road Company, Organization for Conducting the Business of the Road, adopted December 26, 1857 (1858) Pennsylvania Rail Road Company, By-Laws and Organization for Conducting the Business of the Pennsylvania Rail Road Company (1881) Michael Thomas Bass, A Circular from M. T. Bass, M.P., to Great Eastern Shareholders with a Financial Report (1876) James Graham Cannon, An Ideal Bank: an address delivered before the Institute of Accounts, New York, Jan 1891 (1891) American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Annual Report for 1911 (1911) American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Plan for Employees' Pensions, Disability Benefits and Insurance (1912) Volume 7: Strategy A Member of the Stock Exchange, Shareholders' Key to the London and North Western Railway Company (1853) Manhattan Fire Insurance Company, Instructions for the Agents of the...Company (1859) Henry Howell Putnam, Discriminating Taxation: a Review of the Arguments advanced in Support of a Discriminating Tax on the American Branches of Foreign Fire Insurance Companies (1898) New York Board of Fire Underwriters, Report Concerning Foreign Insurance Companies. Adopted September 21, 1870 (1870) US House of Representatives, Proceedings of the Committee on Manufactures...in Relation to Trusts, in US House of Representatives, 50th Congress 1st session, Report no. 3112 (1888) (extract) T H Farrer, 'Equalisation of Railway Rates', Fortnightly Review (1882) William E. Chandler, New Hampshire's Enslavement by the Free Passes, the Ale and Rum and the Corruption Money of the Railroads (1891) Edward Sherwood Meade, 'The Capitalization of the International Mercantile Marine Company', Political Science Quarterly (1904) Benjamin Howarth Thwaite, The American Invasion or England's Commercial Danger and the Triumphal Progress of the United States, with Remedies proposed to enable England to preserve her Industrial Position (1902) Conference of Counsel for Railroad Companies, Report of the Committee appointed by the Conference of Counsel for Railroad Companies held at Atlantic City, July 13, 14, 15, 1908 (1908) American Telegraph and Telephone Company, The Greatest Telephone System in the World as an Investment (1909) US Department of Commerce and Labour, Bureau of Corporations, 'History of the Foreign Interests of the Tobacco Combination', from Report of Commissioner of Corporations on the Tobacco Industry (1909) The Menace to Business of the Sherman Anti-trust Act (1910) New York Chamber of Commerce, Resolutions adopted February 19, 1914, in Regard to Proposed anti Trust Legislation: Statement of underlying Principles that should Control the Regulation of Business: Report by the Special Committee appointed ... March 3, 1914 (1914) Volume 8: Exit and Death Robert Russell Notman, Railway Amalgamation: Addressed to the Shareholders of the Aberdeen, Scottish Midland, Dundee and Arbroath, Scottish Central, and Caledonian Railway Companies (1852) Anon., Remarks on the Expediency of some of the Private Banks of London Being Formed into Joint-Stock Companies (1856) How to Mismanage a Bank: A Review of the Western Bank of Scotland (1859) Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation, Contract between the Boston & Lowell and Nashua & Lowell Railroad Corporations, February 1, 1857 (1877) Overend, Gurney and Co. (Limited), Report of the Committee of the Defence Association (1867) Robert Crawford, Letter to the Policy-Holders and Annuitants of the European Assurance Society, by a former Director (1871) B Haughton, Railway Amalgamation (1872) Robert Benson, The…
Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte, Apr 1, 2003
This article places the current crisis in pension provision in Great Britain in the context of it... more This article places the current crisis in pension provision in Great Britain in the context of its long-run development since the late nineteenth century. The origins of state and private pensions are briefly examined and the factors behind the great expansion of company and personal pensions since the 1920s are explored. History suggests that, relative to much of Europe, Britain has a highly-developed private pensions industry w ich, subject to certain reforms and a grea r level of compulsory savings, is well placed to help plug the current . auch in anderen entwickelten Wohlfahrtstaaten hat die gegenwartige Krise in der Altersversorgung in Grosbritannien drei Aspekte: erstens die Alterung der Bevolkerung, zweitens das Problem der Finanzierung und drittens das Problem der Wohlstandsunterschiede im Ruhestand. Diese drei Aspekte haben ihre tiefen Wurzeln in der Geschichte der Alterssicherung. Im Jahre 1881 gingen in Grosbritannien dreiviertel aller Manner uber 65 Jahre einer Beschaftigung nach, 1991 waren es weniger als zehn Prozent (vgl. Tabelle 1). 490. 000 Manner und Frauen empfingen 1909 die erste staatliche Pension; 2001 gab es elf Mio. Rentner in Grosbritannien.1 Heute glauben die meisten Wirtschaftswissenschaftler, das nicht die staatliche Wirtschaftspolitik, sondern die steigenden Realeinkommen und die Verhaltnisse am Arbeitsmarkt den Kurs des Ruhestandes im 20. Jahrhundert bestimmt haben. Trotzdem waren samtliche britische Regierungen im 20. sowie im 19. Jahrhundert davon uberzeugt, das ihre Politik die individuellen Entscheidungen der Burger uber den Eintritt in oder das Zuruckziehen aus dem Arbeitsprozes beeinflussen konnte. Die Victorianer haben bei ihrer Armenpolitik das Prinzip des Lohnabstands angewandt. Sie hielten es fur notwendig, fur die Armenfursorge geringere Anreize als fur die bezahlte Arbeit zu schaffen. Zwischen 1908 und 1946 hat die staatliche Altersversorgung das gleiche Prinzip angewandt. Die staatliche Pension erreichte, zusammen mit Zuschussen aus der Armenfursorge, hochstens zwei Drittel des Durchschnittslohns. In der ersten Halfte des 20. Jahrhunderts war die staatliche Altersversorgung real niemals hoher als die Armenfursorge fur alte Leute im vorigen Jahrhundert.2 Sogar nach der Einfuhrung der Sozialversicherung im Jahre 1946 hielt die staatliche Rente trotz nominaler Erhohungen kaum Schritt mit Lohnen und GehalIch bedanke mich bei Gabriele Vosseberg von der University of Hull Business School, sowie bei Prof. Dr. Peter Borscheid, Universitat Marburg, fur ihre Hilfe bei der Ubersetzung dieses Artikels. 1 Eric Midwinter, Pensioned Off: Retirement and Income Examined, Buckingham 1997, 48; Financial Times, 16. 11. 2001. 2 Midwinter, Pensioned Off (wie. Anm. 1), 20; Derek Fraser (Hrsg.), The New Poor Law in the Nineteenth Century, London 1976. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.57 on Fri, 09 Sep 2016 04:27:32 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Alterssicherung in Grosbritannien im 20. Jahrhundert 4C Tabelle 1 : Anteil der Manner in Grosbritannien uber 63 Jahre, die «wirtschaftlich aktiv» waren
... Author: Panayi, Panikos. Citation: Panayi, P. (2000) Ethnic minorities in nineteenth and twen... more ... Author: Panayi, Panikos. Citation: Panayi, P. (2000) Ethnic minorities in nineteenth and twentieth century Germany: Jews, Gypsies, Poles, Turks and others. London: Longman. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2086/4439. ISBN: 9780582267718. Date: 2000. Files in this item. ...
"The current debates surrounding the governance of large enterprises have their echoes in th... more "The current debates surrounding the governance of large enterprises have their echoes in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when both the incorporated and unincorporated joint-stock company became an increasingly widespread feature of the British economic landscape. One of the key elements of corporate governance is the extent of information available to shareholders: transparency of governance and access to information can become critical issues in the relations between company proprietors and directors. Historians have pointed to the importance of the development of permanent auditing arrangements, and to the increasing tendency in the second half of the nineteenth century for companies to withhold from their shareholders the right to inspect the company accounts. Most of the existing literature, however, relates to the period after the legislation of 1844-5 and 1855-6. This paper is concerned with the period prior to 1844, long before arrangements for permanent audit had become common in British joint-stock companies, and before they received legislative sanction and encouragement in the consolidating legislation of 1845. Our paper is based on the constitutions of a sample of 90 companies established in the period 1739-1844 - 30 canal and dock companies, 30 railways and 30 banks - which is part of a larger, ongoing project on the governance of joint-stock companies in Britain in the period. The canals, docks and railways in the sample were all incorporated, the banks all unincorporated. Their constitutions made various provisions for the auditing of accounts, and they granted shareholders differing degrees of access to company books. Through detailed typologies of audit provisions, procedures for presentation of balance sheets, and shareholders’ rights to inspect documents, we compare the three sectors, and consider differences between companies of different sizes, and changes over time. We show that, whereas in many incorporated companies the books of account were, in theory, open for inspection by shareholders ‘at all seasonable times’, in the banking sector a culture of secrecy operated to the extent that shareholders were often not even permitted to inspect the company deed of settlement. This calls into question Pratt and Storrar’s recent generalisation that ‘[u]ntil at least the middle of the 19th century, shareholders were considered to have an inherent right to inspect their companies’ books of account’. In the banking sector, it was standard procedure to provide for an ad hoc internal audit by a shareholders’ committee of inspection if required. By the 1840s railway companies were beginning to provide for permanent audit, and were moving away from the universal right of access that had characterised earlier incorporated companies. This reflects the tendency, identified by Timothy L. Alborn, for joint-stock companies to become less ‘democratic’ in this period."
ABSTRACT The questions underlying the theme of this book are interesting ones, not yet explored a... more ABSTRACT The questions underlying the theme of this book are interesting ones, not yet explored adequately by business historians. What happens when the founders of family firms, or the founding families of firms, arrive at the point where they need to seek capital from a large number of external investors? How do they manage the agency issues that arise? How do they negotiate the political space that inevitably opens up between the broader ownership base and the management of the firm? How is the personal control of company governance maintained? This book offers excellent examples of source-based business history, but unfortunately it fails to deliver answers to these key questions. The book consists of four case studies, with a lengthy chapter devoted to each: Raleigh, the Nottingham cycle manufacturer; Hadfields of Sheffield (steel castings, machinery, and armaments); Birmingham Small Arms (BSA), the armaments and motor vehicle manufacturer; and Alfred Herbert of Coventry, Britain's largest machine toolmaker. A final, shorter chapter examines the shareholding and capital structure of Hadfield's and the Leeds machine tool makers, Greenwood and Batley. None of these firms are new to business historians. The authors of this volume have co written articles on BSA, Raleigh and Herbert were the subject of recent monographs by Lewis and Lloyd-Jones, Maltby and Tweedale have separately written on Hadfields, and Floud has written on Greenwood and Batley. Nevertheless, this volume does more than just synthesize the existing literature. Company records are again deeply excavated to provide a narrative of the governance and capital structure for each firm. In terms of the central questions, the chapter on Alfred Herbert is the least revealing. While it describes a classic case of personal capitalism—Herbert and a small clique of relatives and managers ran the firm as a family concern from 1887 until his death in 1957; there were just nineteen shareholders in 1926—the story sheds no light on wider developments in corporate governance in British business. The remaining chapters have much more to say about shareholder-director relations. Raleigh was founded as a partnership by the venture capitalist Frank Bowden in 1887. Bowden and his son ran the company until the latter retired in 1955. External financing was first sought in 1889, when the firm converted to a public company. By 1896, the company had 234 shareholders, mostly small investors located in the Midland counties. Shareholder confidence was shaken, however, by falling cycle sales and by boardroom divisions over Bowden's plans to diversify into motor car production. After several years of agitation by an unelected shareholders' committee, Bowden bought back the company's shares in 1908 and proceeded to run his firm as a private limited company. When a public holding company was eventually floated in 1934, this did not result in greater accountability or disclosure to shareholders. Bowden and his managers resisted pressure to increase dividends, and well into the 1950s, they maintained reserve building and internal finance as their priorities. The argument, therefore, is that personal governance reigned supreme at Raleigh, despite changes in corporate form. What is not explained is exactly how this was able to happen. The reader is given almost no information about the rights of shareholders, before 1908 or after 1934, that would help her assess Bowden's tactics, for example, voting rights, the right to approve board appointments, to diversify production out of core areas, or to wind up the company, in other words, the kind of rights long associated with both incorporated and unincorporated joint-stock companies in the UK. A similar problem arises in the other principal chapters. Hadfields was dominated by Robert Abbott Hadfield, the son of the founder, who was chairman from 1888 till his death in 1940. Like Bowden at Raleigh, Hadfield viewed the ideal shareholder as a loyal but passive investor, who had no say in strategic decision making. Also like Bowden, Hadfield's consistent financial priority was to build up reserves as a fund to draw on for investment, rather than increase dividend payouts. The firm became a public limited company in 1888 with ordinary shareholders and, from 1898, also preference shareholders. Hadfield was by far the largest shareholder, owning some 13 percent of...
... Insuring the industrial revolution: fire insurance in Great Britain, 1700–1850. SHANEEWEN. Ar... more ... Insuring the industrial revolution: fire insurance in Great Britain, 1700–1850. SHANEEWEN. Article first published online: 22 NOV 2005. ... More content like this. Find more content: like this article. Find more content written by: SHANE EWEN. ...
Part II - 1850-1914 Volume 5: Birth John Duncan, Practical Directions for Forming and Managing Jo... more Part II - 1850-1914 Volume 5: Birth John Duncan, Practical Directions for Forming and Managing Joint-Stock Companies ... under the Provisions of the 'Joint-Stock Companies Act, 1856' (1856) Henry Lloyd Morgan, Auditors: Remarks on the Qualifications and Duties of Auditors of Accounts of Joint Stock and other Public Bodies (1857) Henry Lloyd Morgan, Personal Liabilities of Directors of Joint Stock Companies under the Fraudulent Trustees' Act, with Remarks on Limited Liability (1858) Alfred Emden, The Shareholders' Legal Guide, being a Concise Statement of the Law Relating to Shares, and of the Legal Rights and Responsibilities of Shareholders (1884) American Telephone Company, Prospectus of the American Telephone Company. Organized under the General Laws of the State of Virginia, for the Purpose of Carrying on the Telephone Business throughout the United States of Venezuela (1887) Gill McDowell Jarrah Company Limited, Prospectus (1898) Volume 6: Structure Baltimore & ...
... lawyers at Mussoorie. Another such detailed legislation for RTI was drafted by (CERC) Consume... more ... lawyers at Mussoorie. Another such detailed legislation for RTI was drafted by (CERC) Consumer ... But in most such efforts the role of the people who are victims of such corruption has ... The path breaking Right to Information Act (2005) which has come into effect ...
Understanding the challenges of corporate governance is central to our comprehension of the econo... more Understanding the challenges of corporate governance is central to our comprehension of the economic dynamics driving corporations today. Among the most important institutions in capitalism today, corporations and joint-stock companies had their origins in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And as they became more prevalent, the issue of internal governance became more pressing. At stake—and very much contested—was the allocation of rights and obligations among shareholders, directors, and managers.
This comprehensive account of the development of corporate governance in Britain and Ireland during its earliest stages highlights the role of political factors in shaping the evolution of corporate governance as well as the important debates that arose about the division of authority and responsibility. Political and economic institutions confronted similar issues, including the need for transparency and accountability in decision making and the roles of electors and the elected, and this book emphasizes how political institutions—from election procedures to assemblies to annual reporting—therefore provided apt models upon which companies drew readily. Filling a gap in the literature on early corporate economy, this book provides insight into the origins of many ongoing modern debates.
Part II - 1850-1914 Volume 5: Birth John Duncan, Practical Directions for Forming and Managing Jo... more Part II - 1850-1914 Volume 5: Birth John Duncan, Practical Directions for Forming and Managing Joint-Stock Companies ... under the Provisions of the 'Joint-Stock Companies Act, 1856' (1856) Henry Lloyd Morgan, Auditors: Remarks on the Qualifications and Duties of Auditors of Accounts of Joint Stock and other Public Bodies (1857) Henry Lloyd Morgan, Personal Liabilities of Directors of Joint Stock Companies under the Fraudulent Trustees' Act, with Remarks on Limited Liability (1858) Alfred Emden, The Shareholders' Legal Guide, being a Concise Statement of the Law Relating to Shares, and of the Legal Rights and Responsibilities of Shareholders (1884) American Telephone Company, Prospectus of the American Telephone Company. Organized under the General Laws of the State of Virginia, for the Purpose of Carrying on the Telephone Business throughout the United States of Venezuela (1887) Gill McDowell Jarrah Company Limited, Prospectus (1898) Volume 6: Structure Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, Organization of the Service of the Baltimore & Ohio Rail Road, under the Proposed New System of Management (1847) William Thomas Thomson, On the Present Position of the Life Assurance Interests of Great Britain (1852) Robert Stewart, The Audit of Joint-Stock Bank Accounts by Shareholders: Is It Practicable or Desirable? (1853) William Rawson, Diary of a Director: Notes and Recollections Made during the Last Fourteen Years (1857) Pennsylvania Rail Road Company, Organization for Conducting the Business of the Road, adopted December 26, 1857 (1858) Pennsylvania Rail Road Company, By-Laws and Organization for Conducting the Business of the Pennsylvania Rail Road Company (1881) Michael Thomas Bass, A Circular from M. T. Bass, M.P., to Great Eastern Shareholders with a Financial Report (1876) James Graham Cannon, An Ideal Bank: an address delivered before the Institute of Accounts, New York, Jan 1891 (1891) American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Annual Report for 1911 (1911) American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Plan for Employees' Pensions, Disability Benefits and Insurance (1912) Volume 7: Strategy A Member of the Stock Exchange, Shareholders' Key to the London and North Western Railway Company (1853) Manhattan Fire Insurance Company, Instructions for the Agents of the...Company (1859) Henry Howell Putnam, Discriminating Taxation: a Review of the Arguments advanced in Support of a Discriminating Tax on the American Branches of Foreign Fire Insurance Companies (1898) New York Board of Fire Underwriters, Report Concerning Foreign Insurance Companies. Adopted September 21, 1870 (1870) US House of Representatives, Proceedings of the Committee on Manufactures...in Relation to Trusts, in US House of Representatives, 50th Congress 1st session, Report no. 3112 (1888) (extract) T H Farrer, 'Equalisation of Railway Rates', Fortnightly Review (1882) William E. Chandler, New Hampshire's Enslavement by the Free Passes, the Ale and Rum and the Corruption Money of the Railroads (1891) Edward Sherwood Meade, 'The Capitalization of the International Mercantile Marine Company', Political Science Quarterly (1904) Benjamin Howarth Thwaite, The American Invasion or England's Commercial Danger and the Triumphal Progress of the United States, with Remedies proposed to enable England to preserve her Industrial Position (1902) Conference of Counsel for Railroad Companies, Report of the Committee appointed by the Conference of Counsel for Railroad Companies held at Atlantic City, July 13, 14, 15, 1908 (1908) American Telegraph and Telephone Company, The Greatest Telephone System in the World as an Investment (1909) US Department of Commerce and Labour, Bureau of Corporations, 'History of the Foreign Interests of the Tobacco Combination', from Report of Commissioner of Corporations on the Tobacco Industry (1909) The Menace to Business of the Sherman Anti-trust Act (1910) New York Chamber of Commerce, Resolutions adopted February 19, 1914, in Regard to Proposed anti Trust Legislation: Statement of underlying Principles that should Control the Regulation of Business: Report by the Special Committee appointed ... March 3, 1914 (1914) Volume 8: Exit and Death Robert Russell Notman, Railway Amalgamation: Addressed to the Shareholders of the Aberdeen, Scottish Midland, Dundee and Arbroath, Scottish Central, and Caledonian Railway Companies (1852) Anon., Remarks on the Expediency of some of the Private Banks of London Being Formed into Joint-Stock Companies (1856) How to Mismanage a Bank: A Review of the Western Bank of Scotland (1859) Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation, Contract between the Boston & Lowell and Nashua & Lowell Railroad Corporations, February 1, 1857 (1877) Overend, Gurney and Co. (Limited), Report of the Committee of the Defence Association (1867) Robert Crawford, Letter to the Policy-Holders and Annuitants of the European Assurance Society, by a former Director (1871) B Haughton, Railway Amalgamation (1872) Robert Benson, The…
Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte, Apr 1, 2003
This article places the current crisis in pension provision in Great Britain in the context of it... more This article places the current crisis in pension provision in Great Britain in the context of its long-run development since the late nineteenth century. The origins of state and private pensions are briefly examined and the factors behind the great expansion of company and personal pensions since the 1920s are explored. History suggests that, relative to much of Europe, Britain has a highly-developed private pensions industry w ich, subject to certain reforms and a grea r level of compulsory savings, is well placed to help plug the current . auch in anderen entwickelten Wohlfahrtstaaten hat die gegenwartige Krise in der Altersversorgung in Grosbritannien drei Aspekte: erstens die Alterung der Bevolkerung, zweitens das Problem der Finanzierung und drittens das Problem der Wohlstandsunterschiede im Ruhestand. Diese drei Aspekte haben ihre tiefen Wurzeln in der Geschichte der Alterssicherung. Im Jahre 1881 gingen in Grosbritannien dreiviertel aller Manner uber 65 Jahre einer Beschaftigung nach, 1991 waren es weniger als zehn Prozent (vgl. Tabelle 1). 490. 000 Manner und Frauen empfingen 1909 die erste staatliche Pension; 2001 gab es elf Mio. Rentner in Grosbritannien.1 Heute glauben die meisten Wirtschaftswissenschaftler, das nicht die staatliche Wirtschaftspolitik, sondern die steigenden Realeinkommen und die Verhaltnisse am Arbeitsmarkt den Kurs des Ruhestandes im 20. Jahrhundert bestimmt haben. Trotzdem waren samtliche britische Regierungen im 20. sowie im 19. Jahrhundert davon uberzeugt, das ihre Politik die individuellen Entscheidungen der Burger uber den Eintritt in oder das Zuruckziehen aus dem Arbeitsprozes beeinflussen konnte. Die Victorianer haben bei ihrer Armenpolitik das Prinzip des Lohnabstands angewandt. Sie hielten es fur notwendig, fur die Armenfursorge geringere Anreize als fur die bezahlte Arbeit zu schaffen. Zwischen 1908 und 1946 hat die staatliche Altersversorgung das gleiche Prinzip angewandt. Die staatliche Pension erreichte, zusammen mit Zuschussen aus der Armenfursorge, hochstens zwei Drittel des Durchschnittslohns. In der ersten Halfte des 20. Jahrhunderts war die staatliche Altersversorgung real niemals hoher als die Armenfursorge fur alte Leute im vorigen Jahrhundert.2 Sogar nach der Einfuhrung der Sozialversicherung im Jahre 1946 hielt die staatliche Rente trotz nominaler Erhohungen kaum Schritt mit Lohnen und GehalIch bedanke mich bei Gabriele Vosseberg von der University of Hull Business School, sowie bei Prof. Dr. Peter Borscheid, Universitat Marburg, fur ihre Hilfe bei der Ubersetzung dieses Artikels. 1 Eric Midwinter, Pensioned Off: Retirement and Income Examined, Buckingham 1997, 48; Financial Times, 16. 11. 2001. 2 Midwinter, Pensioned Off (wie. Anm. 1), 20; Derek Fraser (Hrsg.), The New Poor Law in the Nineteenth Century, London 1976. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.57 on Fri, 09 Sep 2016 04:27:32 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Alterssicherung in Grosbritannien im 20. Jahrhundert 4C Tabelle 1 : Anteil der Manner in Grosbritannien uber 63 Jahre, die «wirtschaftlich aktiv» waren
... Author: Panayi, Panikos. Citation: Panayi, P. (2000) Ethnic minorities in nineteenth and twen... more ... Author: Panayi, Panikos. Citation: Panayi, P. (2000) Ethnic minorities in nineteenth and twentieth century Germany: Jews, Gypsies, Poles, Turks and others. London: Longman. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2086/4439. ISBN: 9780582267718. Date: 2000. Files in this item. ...
"The current debates surrounding the governance of large enterprises have their echoes in th... more "The current debates surrounding the governance of large enterprises have their echoes in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when both the incorporated and unincorporated joint-stock company became an increasingly widespread feature of the British economic landscape. One of the key elements of corporate governance is the extent of information available to shareholders: transparency of governance and access to information can become critical issues in the relations between company proprietors and directors. Historians have pointed to the importance of the development of permanent auditing arrangements, and to the increasing tendency in the second half of the nineteenth century for companies to withhold from their shareholders the right to inspect the company accounts. Most of the existing literature, however, relates to the period after the legislation of 1844-5 and 1855-6. This paper is concerned with the period prior to 1844, long before arrangements for permanent audit had become common in British joint-stock companies, and before they received legislative sanction and encouragement in the consolidating legislation of 1845. Our paper is based on the constitutions of a sample of 90 companies established in the period 1739-1844 - 30 canal and dock companies, 30 railways and 30 banks - which is part of a larger, ongoing project on the governance of joint-stock companies in Britain in the period. The canals, docks and railways in the sample were all incorporated, the banks all unincorporated. Their constitutions made various provisions for the auditing of accounts, and they granted shareholders differing degrees of access to company books. Through detailed typologies of audit provisions, procedures for presentation of balance sheets, and shareholders’ rights to inspect documents, we compare the three sectors, and consider differences between companies of different sizes, and changes over time. We show that, whereas in many incorporated companies the books of account were, in theory, open for inspection by shareholders ‘at all seasonable times’, in the banking sector a culture of secrecy operated to the extent that shareholders were often not even permitted to inspect the company deed of settlement. This calls into question Pratt and Storrar’s recent generalisation that ‘[u]ntil at least the middle of the 19th century, shareholders were considered to have an inherent right to inspect their companies’ books of account’. In the banking sector, it was standard procedure to provide for an ad hoc internal audit by a shareholders’ committee of inspection if required. By the 1840s railway companies were beginning to provide for permanent audit, and were moving away from the universal right of access that had characterised earlier incorporated companies. This reflects the tendency, identified by Timothy L. Alborn, for joint-stock companies to become less ‘democratic’ in this period."
ABSTRACT The questions underlying the theme of this book are interesting ones, not yet explored a... more ABSTRACT The questions underlying the theme of this book are interesting ones, not yet explored adequately by business historians. What happens when the founders of family firms, or the founding families of firms, arrive at the point where they need to seek capital from a large number of external investors? How do they manage the agency issues that arise? How do they negotiate the political space that inevitably opens up between the broader ownership base and the management of the firm? How is the personal control of company governance maintained? This book offers excellent examples of source-based business history, but unfortunately it fails to deliver answers to these key questions. The book consists of four case studies, with a lengthy chapter devoted to each: Raleigh, the Nottingham cycle manufacturer; Hadfields of Sheffield (steel castings, machinery, and armaments); Birmingham Small Arms (BSA), the armaments and motor vehicle manufacturer; and Alfred Herbert of Coventry, Britain's largest machine toolmaker. A final, shorter chapter examines the shareholding and capital structure of Hadfield's and the Leeds machine tool makers, Greenwood and Batley. None of these firms are new to business historians. The authors of this volume have co written articles on BSA, Raleigh and Herbert were the subject of recent monographs by Lewis and Lloyd-Jones, Maltby and Tweedale have separately written on Hadfields, and Floud has written on Greenwood and Batley. Nevertheless, this volume does more than just synthesize the existing literature. Company records are again deeply excavated to provide a narrative of the governance and capital structure for each firm. In terms of the central questions, the chapter on Alfred Herbert is the least revealing. While it describes a classic case of personal capitalism—Herbert and a small clique of relatives and managers ran the firm as a family concern from 1887 until his death in 1957; there were just nineteen shareholders in 1926—the story sheds no light on wider developments in corporate governance in British business. The remaining chapters have much more to say about shareholder-director relations. Raleigh was founded as a partnership by the venture capitalist Frank Bowden in 1887. Bowden and his son ran the company until the latter retired in 1955. External financing was first sought in 1889, when the firm converted to a public company. By 1896, the company had 234 shareholders, mostly small investors located in the Midland counties. Shareholder confidence was shaken, however, by falling cycle sales and by boardroom divisions over Bowden's plans to diversify into motor car production. After several years of agitation by an unelected shareholders' committee, Bowden bought back the company's shares in 1908 and proceeded to run his firm as a private limited company. When a public holding company was eventually floated in 1934, this did not result in greater accountability or disclosure to shareholders. Bowden and his managers resisted pressure to increase dividends, and well into the 1950s, they maintained reserve building and internal finance as their priorities. The argument, therefore, is that personal governance reigned supreme at Raleigh, despite changes in corporate form. What is not explained is exactly how this was able to happen. The reader is given almost no information about the rights of shareholders, before 1908 or after 1934, that would help her assess Bowden's tactics, for example, voting rights, the right to approve board appointments, to diversify production out of core areas, or to wind up the company, in other words, the kind of rights long associated with both incorporated and unincorporated joint-stock companies in the UK. A similar problem arises in the other principal chapters. Hadfields was dominated by Robert Abbott Hadfield, the son of the founder, who was chairman from 1888 till his death in 1940. Like Bowden at Raleigh, Hadfield viewed the ideal shareholder as a loyal but passive investor, who had no say in strategic decision making. Also like Bowden, Hadfield's consistent financial priority was to build up reserves as a fund to draw on for investment, rather than increase dividend payouts. The firm became a public limited company in 1888 with ordinary shareholders and, from 1898, also preference shareholders. Hadfield was by far the largest shareholder, owning some 13 percent of...
... Insuring the industrial revolution: fire insurance in Great Britain, 1700–1850. SHANEEWEN. Ar... more ... Insuring the industrial revolution: fire insurance in Great Britain, 1700–1850. SHANEEWEN. Article first published online: 22 NOV 2005. ... More content like this. Find more content: like this article. Find more content written by: SHANE EWEN. ...
Part II - 1850-1914 Volume 5: Birth John Duncan, Practical Directions for Forming and Managing Jo... more Part II - 1850-1914 Volume 5: Birth John Duncan, Practical Directions for Forming and Managing Joint-Stock Companies ... under the Provisions of the 'Joint-Stock Companies Act, 1856' (1856) Henry Lloyd Morgan, Auditors: Remarks on the Qualifications and Duties of Auditors of Accounts of Joint Stock and other Public Bodies (1857) Henry Lloyd Morgan, Personal Liabilities of Directors of Joint Stock Companies under the Fraudulent Trustees' Act, with Remarks on Limited Liability (1858) Alfred Emden, The Shareholders' Legal Guide, being a Concise Statement of the Law Relating to Shares, and of the Legal Rights and Responsibilities of Shareholders (1884) American Telephone Company, Prospectus of the American Telephone Company. Organized under the General Laws of the State of Virginia, for the Purpose of Carrying on the Telephone Business throughout the United States of Venezuela (1887) Gill McDowell Jarrah Company Limited, Prospectus (1898) Volume 6: Structure Baltimore & ...
... lawyers at Mussoorie. Another such detailed legislation for RTI was drafted by (CERC) Consume... more ... lawyers at Mussoorie. Another such detailed legislation for RTI was drafted by (CERC) Consumer ... But in most such efforts the role of the people who are victims of such corruption has ... The path breaking Right to Information Act (2005) which has come into effect ...
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Books by Robin Pearson
This comprehensive account of the development of corporate governance in Britain and Ireland during its earliest stages highlights the role of political factors in shaping the evolution of corporate governance as well as the important debates that arose about the division of authority and responsibility. Political and economic institutions confronted similar issues, including the need for transparency and accountability in decision making and the roles of electors and the elected, and this book emphasizes how political institutions—from election procedures to assemblies to annual reporting—therefore provided apt models upon which companies drew readily. Filling a gap in the literature on early corporate economy, this book provides insight into the origins of many ongoing modern debates.
Papers by Robin Pearson
This comprehensive account of the development of corporate governance in Britain and Ireland during its earliest stages highlights the role of political factors in shaping the evolution of corporate governance as well as the important debates that arose about the division of authority and responsibility. Political and economic institutions confronted similar issues, including the need for transparency and accountability in decision making and the roles of electors and the elected, and this book emphasizes how political institutions—from election procedures to assemblies to annual reporting—therefore provided apt models upon which companies drew readily. Filling a gap in the literature on early corporate economy, this book provides insight into the origins of many ongoing modern debates.